Whether it conflicts with Article 27 of the Act on the Disposal of Property Belonging to the State in case of double lease of the property devolving upon succession by acquiring the leased property by succession;

If the property devolvingd was leased twice, the acquisition by succession to the leased property remaining on the ground is in conflict with the provisions of the suspension of double lease.

Articles 10 through 12, and 27 of the Act on the Disposal of Property Belonging to Jurisdiction

Note Man-hee

The Director General of Seoul Government

Kim Jong-hee

Seoul High Court Decision 62Gu344 delivered on April 25, 1963

The appeal is dismissed.

The portion arising from the final appeal among the final appeals shall be borne by the defendant, and the portion arising from the participation shall be borne by the supplementary intervenor.

We examine the grounds of appeal by the defendant Lee Hy-sung.

(1) As to the ground of appeal No. 1, according to the Supreme Court precedents, the acquisition of the right to any property devolving upon the State, prohibited under the Act on the Disposal of Property Belongings also recognizes the legality of the acquisition of the right to the property devolving upon the State. Therefore, the provisions inconsistent with this purport of the Act on the Disposal of Property Belongings have been a private culture. As the defendant's intervenor leases the property devolving upon the non-party's transfer of this property to the non-party 1 and legally purchased the property devolving upon the transfer of the property devolving upon the transfer from the former lessee to the non-party 93-2 of Jongno-dong

According to the facts duly established by the court below, the defendant's intervenor leased the site belonging to Jongno-gu Seoul, Jongno-gu, Seoul from the defendant around October 1947, and also leased the site belonging to this case from the defendant on November 18, 1953. As a result, the court below's decision that the defendant's assistant intervenor cannot purchase the site belonging to this case pursuant to the provisions of Articles 10 through 12 of the Act on the Disposal of Property Belonging to the defendant as stipulated in Article 27 of the same Act, which applies mutatis mutandis under this Act, is interpreted to the purport that the defendant's assistant intervenor could not purchase the site belonging to this case. Thus, it is not a case where the plaintiff succeeded to the lease of the site belonging to this case as a kind of oil which leased the property belonging to this case twice, or it is not a case that the plaintiff acquired the right of the former tenant legally, and it does not conflict with the provisions of the prohibition of double lease.

(2) As to the ground of appeal No. 2, the court below acknowledged the fact that the defendant first leased the building site to the defendant joining the defendant and thereafter sold the same object to the plaintiff. However, since the defendant joining the defendant is disqualified for purchasing the property devolving upon the plaintiff, the sale disposition against the plaintiff was not discussed even if it was unlawful, but again sold to the plaintiff. However, since the sale disposition against the plaintiff was already sold to the defendant joining the defendant, the sale disposition against the plaintiff is a disposition with a significant defect in the disposal act. Thus, the cancellation of the disposition against the plaintiff is made in order to correct the invalid disposition as a matter of course, and even if the defendant joining the defendant is disqualified for purchasing the property devolving upon the plaintiff, the defect of the sale disposition against the plaintiff, which is void as a matter of course, is not cured as a matter of course.

However, the argument that in the case where the sale of the property for the same ownership was made to Gap first and later, the sale of the property for the same ownership is null and void as a matter of course in the case of the sale of the property for the last time belongs to the appellant's independent opinion. Therefore, it is not possible to employ this argument to develop the logic on the premise that the sale of the land for the same ownership is null and void as a matter of course.

Accordingly, this appeal is dismissed without merit. The costs of appeal are assessed against the defendant, while the costs of appeal are assessed against the supplementary intervenor. The costs of appeal are assessed against the supplementary intervenor.

It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating judges.

Justices of the Supreme Court (Presiding Judge) Dog-Jak (Presiding Judge) Dog-Jak, Red Mag-Jak, Live-Jak, Live-P