(a) Status of a person who has filed an application for a negotiated contract on stocks devolvingd and paid security money;

(b) Assignment of expectation rights to purchase vested shares;

The Government's approval to apply for a free contract on vested stocks and to transfer to another person the stocks to be purchased pursuant to paragraph (2) of this Article, Article 34 subparagraph 2 of this Article, and Article 35 subparagraph 2 of this Article, to a person expected to purchase the stocks to be purchased prior to the date of payment of deposit, shall also be prohibited from acquiring the stocks to be purchased prior to the acquisition of ownership, and if violated, it shall be justifiable to cancel the sale of stocks to vest, and if so, to transfer the right of purchase to another person at the scheduled stage

Article 22 of the Reversion Property Disposal Act, Article 34 of the Reversion Property Disposal Act, Article 35 of the Reversion Property Disposal Act

Supreme Court Decision 65Nu86 Decided December 28, 1965

Plaintiff

Minister of Finance and Economy

Seoul High Court Decision 66Gu31 delivered on August 11, 1966

The appeal is dismissed.

The costs of appeal are assessed against the plaintiff.

(1) First, we examine the Plaintiff’s agent’s ground of appeal.

(A) On the first issue, the shortest distance of argument is as follows. In this case, the Plaintiff filed an application for a negotiated contract on the shares devolving upon the Plaintiff, and paid the bond to the authorities, but it is difficult to view the Plaintiff’s status as the owner of the right at this stage. In other words, the Plaintiff’s status cannot be the subject of the right before receiving the notification that the contract would be concluded by the Defendant. Furthermore, the Plaintiff’s status cannot be the subject of the right before the payment of the deposit is made by the Defendant. The Plaintiff is not the purchaser at the only stage of the payment of the deposit. After the payment of the deposit, the Plaintiff becomes the purchaser after investigating whether the Defendant is qualified as the purchaser and determining that the Plaintiff is not disqualified. Accordingly, the Plaintiff could not be subject to the disposition of the right that the Plaintiff transferred the status to the Non-Party Sung Fungchin Foundation at the stage of the Plaintiff’s failure to reach the status of the right holder. However, this is only the Plaintiff’s de facto waiver of the purchase of the

The purchaser referred to in Articles 22(2) and 22(3) of the Act refers to a person who purchases property devolving upon the contract for sale and purchase of property devolving upon the State, and only the person who makes an application for the purchase and sale contract with the above Plaintiff shall not be included in this speed. Accordingly, the Plaintiff cannot be obliged to manage the property devolving upon the State under Chapter 4 of the Act on the Disposal of Property Belonging to the State. It is the purport that the Plaintiff’s transfer of the above status to the Sung Pul Foundation is merely a waiver of the purchase that occurred prior to the conclusion of the contract for the number of shares devolving upon the State even before the formation of the contract for the purchase and sale of property. However, even if the contract for the purchase of the property devolving upon the State was concluded, the Minister of Finance and Economy allowed the purchase and sale of the property devolving upon the State’s permission to pay the deposit to the purchaser, and even if the purchase and sale of the property to whom the property devolving upon the State would be attributed, it is prohibited that the sale and purchase of the property devolving upon the State’s decision will be cancelled.

(B) On the second ground of the above, the purport cannot be deemed to have been the condition that the consent of the government authorities should be granted at the time of transferring the status of the applicant for the purchase contract (payment of security deposit) of this case between the plaintiff and the above foundation when filing an application for a negotiated contract on the shares to which this case belongs. The above written consent (Evidence No. 33) cannot be deemed to be a conditional waiver. The court below acknowledged that the court below agreed to transfer the status of the applicant for the purchase of the shares to which it belongs between the plaintiff and the above foundation as a conditional waiver. It does not mean that the above consent is not only the materials when it recognizes that the court below agreed to transfer the status of the applicant for the purchase as the contractor for the shares to which it belongs between the plaintiff and the above foundation. The court below erred in the misapprehension of the law.

(2) Next, we examine the Plaintiff’s agent’s ground of appeal.

(A) The decision on the argument of the appeal as to the first and third grounds for appeal is the same as that of the above (1) Item (a). Thus, the court below cannot be said to have erred by misapprehending the legal principles as to the status of the plaintiff, or by misapprehending the legal principles as to the status of the plaintiff, or by failing to exhaust all necessary deliberations as to the status of the applicant for the conclusion of the contract, after paying the security deposit to purchase the vested shares.

(B) As to the second issue, the court below is justified in rejecting the judgment of the court below regarding the second issue that the testimony of the witness 1, 2, and 3 on the condition that the authority's approval should be obtained in the transfer of the testimony between the plaintiff and the Sungchip Foundation. It is difficult to say that the written preparation of the defendant's supplementary intervenor was made by the person who is the person who is the subject of the argument.

(C) On the fourth ground of appeal, the second judgment of the court below did not err in holding that, in accordance with the judgment of the court below, the Defendant’s sales contract of the instant case sold to the Plaintiff was cancelled, if the Plaintiff received the premium prior to the acquisition of ownership, and transferred the shares to another person, thereby impeding the order in disposal of property devolvingd upon the Plaintiff, even though the authority knew such fact and concluded the sale of shares devolvingd upon a sexually explicit basis, it cannot be deemed that it was the purport to waive its right to cancel the sales contract of the shares devolvingd upon the knowledge of such fact.

(D) The purport of the above-mentioned determination as to the 5th issue is that, although the Plaintiff is not a purchaser of the shares vested in it, if the Minister of Finance and Economy permitted the Plaintiff’s application for a negotiated contract for the purchase of the shares vested in it, and the Plaintiff transferred the right to expectation for the purchase of shares vested in it in this stage to a third party, the Plaintiff should be treated as the purchaser of the property vested in it under Article 22(2) of the Enforcement Decree of the Act on the Disposal of Property vested in it. Therefore, there is no room for applying Article 7(3) of the Enforcement Decree of the Act on the Disposal of Property

In this sense, the judgment of the court below cannot be viewed as a misunderstanding of the legal principles of administrative regulations.

Therefore, this appeal is dismissed as it is without merit, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party.

This decision is consistent with the opinions of the involved judges.

The judge of the Supreme Court (Presiding Judge) shall transfer to the police officer of the Red Circuit;