A. In a case where the defendant acknowledged the authenticity and voluntariness of the protocol of interrogation of the defendant as to the defendant prepared by the prosecutor, and denied it, the admissibility of such protocol

B. Whether the suspect's interrogation protocol prepared by the prosecutor without the defendant's signature, seal and seal (negative)

(c) A case that there is no seriousness of the punishment before and after the amendment of Article 3 (1) of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Economic Crimes, and thus the law should be applied before the

D. In the case of the foregoing “C”, whether the court may apply the Act before the amendment without the amendment process even if the prosecutor sought the application of the new Act after the amendment (affirmative)

A. In a case where the defendant acknowledged the authenticity and voluntariness of the protocol of interrogation of the defendant as to the defendant prepared by the public prosecutor, and thereafter denied the protocol or submitted the document, it cannot be said that the protocol is inadmissible, and the court's first statement recognizing the authenticity of formation in light of the contents, form, etc. of the protocol and the statement related to the crime in the court of the defendant, etc. is credibility, when the protocol of interrogation of the suspect is acknowledged as admissible.

B. The defendant's interrogation protocol on the defendant prepared without the defendant's signature, seal and seal shall not be admissible.

C. The case holding that Article 3 (1) of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Economic Crimes should be applied before and after the revision of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Economic Crimes since the amount of profit that the defendant acquired through the crime of fraud was 520,000 million won in total, since the amount of the punishment was revised on December 31, 1990.

D. In a case where the facts constituting an offense acknowledged by the court are identical without difference in the facts charged, even if the prosecutor sought the application of the new law after the revision of the corporation at the time of trial, there is no concern that there would be substantial disadvantages to the defendant's exercise of his/her right to defense unless there is a difference in the seriousness of the punishment for the offense, the former law

A. (B) Articles 244 and 312(1)(c) of the Criminal Procedure Act; Article 3(1)3 of the former Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Economic Crimes (amended by Act No. 4292, Dec. 31, 1990); Article 3(1)2 of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Economic Crimes; Article 1(1)4 of the Criminal Act; Articles 254 and 298 of the Criminal Act

B. Supreme Court Decision 81Do1370 delivered on October 27, 1981 (Gong1981, 14516). Supreme Court Decision 91Do191 delivered on October 8, 1991 (Gong1991, 2757) D. Supreme Court Decision 75Do363 delivered on November 23, 1976 (Gong197, 9637).

Defendant

Defendant

Attorney Jeon Jong-gu

Seoul High Court Decision 92No231 delivered on March 27, 1992

The appeal is dismissed.

The number of detention days after an appeal shall be included in the calculation of the original sentence.

(1) We examine the Defendant’s grounds of appeal on the grounds of appeal No. 1, excluding the Defendant’s violation of law due to the amendment of statutes, violation of law in litigation procedures due to inconsistency between the name of the crime and the applicable law, and violation of law

When the defendant acknowledged the authenticity and voluntariness of the protocol formation of the suspect interrogation protocol of the defendant prepared by the public prosecutor, and then submitted the statement denying it or the document, the admissibility of the protocol cannot be always denied, and when the court acknowledged its authenticity in light of the contents, form, etc. of the protocol and the statement related to the crime in the court of the defendant, etc., and acknowledged its authenticity, the protocol of suspect interrogation shall be admitted as evidence. According to the records, the first and second protocol of suspect interrogation of the defendant prepared by the public prosecutor, after reading the contents of the protocol, signed and sealed by the defendant and sent it to the defendant, and the second protocol of suspect interrogation of the defendant prepared by the public prosecutor, after recognizing the formation and voluntariness of the protocol, the defendant was notified of the major points of the prior hearing and stated that there is no objection, but the contents of the above protocol of suspect interrogation cannot be seen as having been considerably different from those of the statement in the court of first instance, and the first protocol of suspect interrogation of the defendant cannot be admitted as evidence.

Although the court below's first instance court's interrogation protocol prepared as evidence for fact-finding, it contains some statements suitable for the facts in the above interrogation protocol without specifying it, or there is no signature or seal affixed by the defendant's refusal to sign or seal, the remaining interrogation protocol of suspect interrogation except for the first and second interrogation protocol is most likely to refuse to make statements in the examination and it is not useful to recognize the facts in the judgment, and each protocol of suspect interrogation without the defendant's signature or seal is also used as evidence. However, if the court below's first instance court's signature or seal without the defendant's signature or seal is also admitted as evidence and the above interrogation protocol of suspect interrogation prepared as evidence without the defendant's signature or seal is not admissible as evidence, it is not unlawful in the court below's decision excluding the above interrogation protocol of suspect interrogation prepared as evidence, or it is not proper to recognize the facts in the first instance court's decision as unlawful or unlawful since it is not proper to recognize the defendant's right to use the evidence as evidence in the first instance court's decision as evidence.

(2) We examine the Defendant’s grounds of appeal on the violation of the law, violation of the law due to the amendment of the law, violation of the law in the litigation procedure due to the inconsistency between the criminal and the applicable law, and the grounds of appeal

Article 3 (1) 3 of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Crimes shall apply to the amount of profit acquired by the defendant as a result of the crime of fraud in Article 1 of the judgment of the court below. Even if the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Economic Crimes was amended on December 31, 1990, the pertinent provision of the Act prior to the amendment of the Act shall not apply to the amount of profit (see Supreme Court Decision 91Do1911 delivered on October 8, 1991). Thus, the court below's decision is just in holding that Article 3 (1) 3 of the Act prior to the amendment should be applied in the same opinion. If a crime recognized by the court is identical to the facts charged without the difference between the case and the new law after the amendment of the corporation, even if the prosecutor seeks to have applied the new law, it is not proper to apply the former Act without having any substantial disadvantage to the defendant's exercise of his right to defense (see Supreme Court Decision 91Do1736 delivered on June 13, 1976).

(3) We examine the defendant's grounds of appeal on unreasonable sentencing.

In this case, the reason why the amount of punishment is inappropriate is not a legitimate ground for appeal, and even after examining the record, it cannot be found that there was an error of law, such as theory of prosecution, in the determination of punishment against the defendant of the first instance court maintained by the court below. Therefore, we cannot accept the conclusion

(4) The appeal is dismissed on the grounds that the appeal is dismissed, and part of the number of days pending trial after the appeal is included in the principal sentence. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Lee Chang-chul (Presiding Justice)