Cases
2012Du15821 Revocation of corrective order in a collective agreement
Plaintiff, Appellee et al.
person
National Metal Trade Union
[Judgment of the court below]
The President of the Central Local Labor Agency
The judgment below
Seoul High Court Decision 2011Nu34162 Decided June 20, 2012
Imposition of Judgment
January 28, 2016
Text
All appeals are dismissed.
Costs of appeal shall be borne by each party.
Reasons
The grounds of appeal are examined (to the extent of supplement in case of supplemental appellate briefs not timely filed).
1. Plaintiff’s ground of appeal
A. As to the assertion regarding the misapprehension of legal principles regarding the provision on the day-to-day labor union at the time of the original adjudication, Articles 5 and 29(1) of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act (amended by Act No. 9930, Jan. 1, 2010; hereinafter “Labor Relations Adjustment Act”) guarantee workers’ freedom to organize and join a trade union and the right to collective bargaining. However, “where a trade union is organized in one business or workplace” under Article 7(1) of the Addenda, the establishment of a new trade union, which shares the same subject matter with the trade union, was prohibited until June 30, 201. As such, “where a trade union is organized in one business or workplace” in which the establishment of multiple trade unions is prohibited, the term “where a trade union is established in the same business or workplace” refers to cases where a company unit trade union exists in the relevant business or workplace or has the ability to independently conduct collective bargaining and collective agreements, and thus, a branch or chapter of a trade union by industry, type of occupation or region is established (see, etc.).
The court below rejected the plaintiff's assertion that the defendant's corrective order should be revoked on the ground that the provision of this case's negotiation clause (Article 1 of the collective agreement) which is the sole labor organization that only the plaintiff, who has directly concluded a collective agreement with the employer as a unit trade union for each industry, is an exclusive labor organization that can conduct collective bargaining, and no other labor organization is recognized, is obviously unlawful because it infringes workers' freedom to form and join a trade union, and the right to collective bargaining, and the purport of the above provision is merely a mere mere representation of the plaintiff's union members.
In light of the aforementioned legal principles and records, the above determination by the court below is just and acceptable, and contrary to what is alleged in the grounds of appeal, there were no errors by exceeding the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence against logical and empirical rules, or by misapprehending the legal principles on the interpretation of the collective agreement provisions. (B) The court below, on the grounds of its stated reasoning, determined that the Defendant’s corrective order was lawful on the ground that the provision of facilities of this case (Article 15(7) of the Trade Union Act, which the employer provided gasoline and the financial self-reliance fund to the trade union and bears the expenses for the management and maintenance of the trade union office (Article 15(7), etc.) provides gasoline and the financial self-reliance fund to the trade union.
In light of the relevant legal principles and records, the above determination by the court below is just, and contrary to the allegations in the grounds of appeal, the court below did not err by misapprehending the legal principles on the subsidization of operating expenses prohibited
Supreme Court Decision 90Nu6392 Decided May 28, 1991 cited in the ground of appeal is not appropriate to invoke the case different from this case.
2. As to the Defendant’s ground of appeal
A. Article 2 Subparag. 4(d) proviso of the Trade Union Act, which provides that, in cases where a person who was dismissed in the original adjudication made an application for remedy to the Labor Relations Commission for unfair labor practices, such as misapprehension of the legal doctrine regarding the qualification provision for the dismissed, the proviso of Article 2 Subparag. 4(d) shall not be construed as a person other than an employee until the Central Labor Relations Commission makes a decision on review (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2012Du28247, Jan. 29, 2015).
In light of such legal principles and evidence duly admitted, the reasoning of the judgment of the court below is somewhat inappropriate. However, the court below held that the defendant's corrective order was unlawful on the ground that it did not violate the Trade Union Act on the ground that it did not violate the Labor Relations Commission Act on the ground that it did not constitute a violation of Article 5 (2) of the collective agreement on the ground that the plaintiff, an industrial unit trade union, and the employer, who asserted the validity of "in the collective agreement entered into between the plaintiff and the employer, cannot be interpreted as non-member until the final judgment
In conclusion, the decision is justifiable, and contrary to the allegations in the grounds of appeal, there is no error by failing to exhaust all necessary deliberations or by misapprehending the legal principles on the concept of workers or the qualification of union members under the Trade Union Act, or by
Supreme Court Decision 2007Du4483 Decided March 24, 2011, etc. cited as the grounds of appeal, is inappropriate to be invoked in the instant case due to different cases.
B. In a case where a collective agreement exists on July 1, 2010, the applicable date of the pertinent part of Article 24(2) of the Trade Union Act which prohibits a full-time officer from paying wages to the full-time officer, and Article 81 subparag. 4 of the Trade Union Act which regulates the employer’s acts of providing wages to the full-time officer, the term of validity shall be deemed as effective until the effective date pursuant to the proviso to Article 3 of the Addenda of the Trade Union Act (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2012Da72063, Nov. 15, 2012).
In the same purport, the lower court is justifiable to have rejected the Defendant’s assertion that the instant provision of full-time officer treatment (Article 15(1), etc. of the Organization Convention) included in the collective agreement concluded with the Plaintiff on June 29, 2010 is valid even on the premise that the payment of wages to the full-time officer of a trade union is valid. In so doing, it did not err by misapprehending the legal doctrine on the interpretation of Articles 3 and 8 of the Addenda of the Trade Union Act,
3. Conclusion
Therefore, all appeals are dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against each party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.
Judges
The presiding judge shall keep the record of the Justice
Justices Kim Yong-deok
Chief Justice Park Jong-young
Justices Kim Jae-han