Plaintiff 1 and one other (Law Firm Sejongwon, Attorneys Yoon-young et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

E. A. E. A.I. International Roster (Attorney Kim Sang-hwan, Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Defendant 1 (Alternative: Defendant 1, et al., Counsel for the defendant-appellant)

April 11, 2017

Seoul Central District Court Decision 2015Gahap534383 Decided January 8, 2016

1. Revocation of the first instance judgment, and all of the plaintiffs' claims are dismissed.

2. The plaintiffs shall bear the total cost of the lawsuit, including the part resulting from the supplementary participation.

1. Purport of claim

The plaintiff 1 confirms that he is in the position of the pension insurance in attached Form 1, and the plaintiff 2 is in the position of each contractor of the pension insurance in attached Form 2.

2. Purport of appeal

The same shall apply to the order.

1. Basic facts

Pursuant to the main sentence of Article 420 of the Civil Procedure Act, the part of Paragraph (1) of the reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance (from 2.8 to 6 pages of the judgment of the court of first instance) shall be cited on the ground of this judgment.

2. The plaintiffs' assertion and the judgment of this court

A. The plaintiffs' assertion

In full view of the language and text of the testamentary gift of this case, the true intention of the deceased to realize each of the instant pension insurance contracts and the instant testamentary gift, and the complicated legal relationship arises when the rights to receive pension insurance money and the right to terminate the contract are separated and reverted to different persons respectively, the subject of the testamentary gift of this case is not simply the right to receive pension insurance money, but the status of the policyholder under each of the instant pension insurance contracts. Furthermore, in light of the fact that testamentary gift is a sole act without the other party, and that the Civil Act provisions on testamentary gift give priority to the free decision of the testator, it is necessary to guarantee maximum freedom to dispose of the property of the testamentary donee, unlike the transfer of the position of the contractor by general contract acceptance, the consent or consent of the other party to the contract is unnecessary. Accordingly, since the plaintiffs are dissatisfied with each of the instant pension insurance contracts even though they were in the position of the contractor, they seek confirmation.

B. Relevant legal principles

(1) The acquisition of a contract aimed at succession to the status of a contracting party includes the transfer of comprehensive rights and obligations arising out of the contract relationship, such as the right to cancel, in addition to the transfer of claims and obligations arising out of the contract relationship. If the acquisition of a contract is legally made, the transferor would withdraw from the contract relationship, and there is no contract relationship between the remaining parties and the transferor, barring special circumstances such as the transferor's reservation of exemption after the contract is made, and the obligation and obligation becomes extinct accordingly. Such acceptance of a contract would normally take place upon the agreement between the transferor, the transferee, and the remaining parties. If two of the parties have agreed prior to the agreement between the two of the parties concerned, the other parties shall consent or consent thereto (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 85Da734, Sept. 8, 1987; 2009Da8303, May 24, 2012; 2012Da97840, Nov. 14, 2013).

(2) In a case where the issue of whether to accept a contract is disputed, the determination should be made carefully in light of the nature of the contract, the motive and background of the transaction, the form and content of the transaction, the purpose to be achieved by the transaction, the transaction practice, etc., taking into account the fact that it is a juristic act that has a significant impact on the legal status between the parties, such as causing a change in the contractual subject, etc. (see Supreme Court Decision 2010Da54535, Jun. 28,

(3) Meanwhile, as long as the formation of a disposal document is recognized as authentic, the court shall recognize the existence and content of the expression of intent as stated in the relevant disposal document, unless there is any clear and acceptable reflective evidence that denies the contents of the statement. In a case where there is any difference between the parties regarding the interpretation of a contract and the interpretation of the intent of the parties expressed in the disposal document is at issue, the court shall reasonably interpret the document in accordance with logical and empirical rules by comprehensively taking into account the contents of the statement, the motive and circumstances leading up to the agreement, the purpose to be achieved by the agreement, the parties’ genuine intent, etc. (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 2002Da6753, Jun. 11, 2002; 2010Da60172, Aug. 17, 2012; 2012Da39172, Nov. 15, 2012).

C. Determination on applying the relevant legal doctrine to the factual basis of the instant case

(1) The Plaintiffs’ claim is based on the premise that ① the subject of testamentary gift based on the deceased’s testamentary gift on September 27, 2013 is not a insurance claim based on each of the instant pension insurance contracts, but the status of the policyholder itself, and ② the consent or consent of the contracting party is not necessary before the status of the contracting party by testamentary gift, unlike the general contract acceptance.

(2) First, we examine whether the deceased’s property (subject matter of testamentary gift) bequeathed to the plaintiffs through the testamentary certificate of this case is the policyholder status of each of the pension insurance contracts of this case.

(A) On November 21, 2012, the deceased concluded each of the instant pension insurance contracts with the Defendant and paid the total amount of the premium in lump sum. Each of the instant pension insurance contracts stated that Plaintiff 1, each of the respective insured, was 50 years of age, and Plaintiff 2 was at the age of 49 years, the insured, who is a policyholder and a beneficiary, and that the legal heir would receive a certain amount of the deceased’s pension if the insured died, and that the legal heir would receive a death insurance. In addition, according to the purport of the written and arguments in the instant testamentary document, Nonparty 2 stated that the instant testamentary document included the “list of testamentary assets and real estate”; Nonparty 1’s immediate annuity insurance policy (number 1 omitted); Nonparty 1’s annuity insurance policy (number 1 omitted); Nonparty 2’s annuity insurance policy (number 2 omitted); and Plaintiff 2, respectively, indicated that each of the instant pension insurance policies is accompanied by a copy of each of the instant pension insurance policies.

(B) However, in full view of the following circumstances acknowledged based on the aforementioned facts and the purport of the entire arguments, the recognition of the above Paragraph (a) is insufficient to recognize the property bequeathed by the deceased to the plaintiffs as not a claim for pension insurance based on each of the instant pension insurance contracts, but a policyholder status under the pension insurance contract. There is no evidence to acknowledge otherwise.

① Since the product name of each of the instant pension insurance contracts is an undividended AI-type inheritance pension (type of life). Therefore, it can be understood that the deceased’s meaning of the “pension immediately after a non-dividend dividend AI-type” stated in the instant testamentary deed is bequeathed of all money generated from each of the instant pension insurance to the Plaintiffs. However, even so, barring any other reasonable circumstance, construing the annuity insurance money as the policyholder status of the annuity insurance contract can be contradictory to the language and text, unless there is any other reasonable circumstance.

② In light of the content and nature of each of the instant pension insurance contracts, the deceased’s intention was not to directly receive each of the instant pension insurance contracts, but to inherit a certain amount of money to the Plaintiffs from the beginning through each of the instant pension insurance contracts, and on its extension, there is no room to view that the deceased’s intention was to agree with the status of the insured, policyholders, and beneficiaries by bequeathed the status of the policyholders and beneficiaries to the Plaintiffs. However, it is natural that a testamentary donee cannot testamentary gift any more than he/she owns, but if the testamentary gift does not take effect, the testamentary gift belongs to the heir (see Article 1090 of the Civil Act) unless the testator expresses his/her different intention by his/her will, unless the testamentary gift takes effect, even before the status of the policyholder by testamentary gift takes account of the need for the consent or consent of the Defendant, who is the other party to the testamentary gift, even before the status of the policyholder by testamentary gift takes effect, rather than by his/her unilateral declaration without the consent or consent of the Defendant.

③ The substance of the instant dispute appears to be a conflict of interest between the Plaintiffs and other co-inheritors, including the Intervenor and the Intervenor. As seen below, the terms and conditions of each of the instant pension insurance contracts explicitly require the Defendant’s consent to change of the policyholder, and if the Defendant contests that the Plaintiffs did not succeed to the status of the policyholder, it should be more careful to write down the term “pension insurance money” in the instant testamentary deed in itself as a policyholder’s position.

(3) Next, we examine whether the defendant's consent or consent is necessary to change the status of the contractor of each of the instant pension insurance contracts.

(A) According to the purport of Eul 1’s statement and arguments, Article 6 of each of the instant pension insurance terms and conditions may be acknowledged as having changed the beneficiary without the defendant’s consent (Paragraph 2), unlike the change of the beneficiary (Article 6), and the policyholder may obtain the defendant’s consent. In such a case, the fact that the consent is notified in writing or is written on the back of the insurance policy (insurance policy) is clearly stated (Paragraph 1).

(B) As such, it is difficult to interpret that the consent or consent of the insurer, who is the other party to the insurance contract, is unnecessary to transfer the insurance premium under each of the instant pension insurance contracts to the other party without the consent or consent, because the consent of the other party is clearly stated as a condition to change the policyholder, and the purport of requiring the consent or consent of the other party is to consider the other party’s personal trust, such as the other party’s credit rating and the ability to perform the obligation, as an important element constituting the foundation of the contract. Furthermore, it is difficult to accept the Plaintiffs’ assertion that the above provision is null and void because, unlike general contract acceptance to guarantee the freedom of legacy or the freedom of disposal of property, the insured, who is the policyholder, has already paid the insurance premium under each of the instant pension insurance contracts in lump sum, has no particular difficulty in realizing the contents of benefits, on the grounds that there is no particular obstacle to the realization of the benefit.

(C) If a policyholder and a person entitled to receive the insurance proceeds are separated, the termination refund would result in the division of the deceased’s co-inheritors in the event that each of the instant pension insurance contracts is terminated, which is not consistent with the intent of the deceased who intended to inherit a certain amount of money through the payment of the pension insurance proceeds to the Plaintiffs. However, it is difficult to view that the policyholder may testamentary gift by disregarding the Defendant’s interest, the contracting party, and without his/her consent or consent, solely on the ground that the legal relationship becomes complicated by separating the right to receive the insurance proceeds and the status

(D) In addition, Article 547(1) of the Civil Act provides that “if one or both of the parties concerned or both are involved, the termination or termination of a contract shall be made against all or all of them.” Thus, barring special circumstances, such as where one of the parties concerned died, and where there exist several successors thereto, in order for them to rescind the said contract, their successors shall express their intent of cancellation (see Supreme Court Decision 2013Da22812, Nov. 28, 2013). Therefore, the right to each of the instant pension insurance proceeds was bequeathed to the Plaintiffs, and even if the status of the policyholders itself is recognized as joint inheritance to the deceased’s successors, it is difficult to deem that the other inheritors may arbitrarily exclude the intent of the Plaintiffs and cancel or terminate each of the instant pension insurance contracts.

(4) Ultimately, it is difficult to accept the Plaintiffs’ assertion that Plaintiff 1 has the status under the Pension Insurance Contract of this case, and that Plaintiff 2 has the status under the Pension Insurance Contract of this case.

3. Conclusion

The plaintiffs' claims against the defendant must be dismissed in entirety due to the lack of reasonable grounds. Since the judgment of the court of first instance is unfair with different conclusions, it is so decided as per Disposition by accepting the defendant's appeal.

[Attachment]

Judges Harmful (Presiding Judge) Credit of Yellow Sea;