A. Whether it is against the rule of experience and logic to require the mother to bear part of the child support together with the divorced father

(b) The case affirming the judgment of the court below that the child support to be additionally borne by designating the mother for three minor children is 329,810 won per month, which is 2/3 of the amount expected to be the child support;

(c) The point at which a person who has no right of custody after a specific point of time is entitled to file a claim for child support with the other party where he/she seeks to change the method of child support while continuing to rear in violation of the reconciliation clause;

(d)the method of remedy in cases where there is an imminent cause making it extremely difficult to protect the person under custody if there is a need to change the method of rearing due to a change in circumstances after the decision on the method of fostering was made, and the method of fostering is raised until a new agreement or trial is made.

A. It is not against the rule of experience and logic even if the father who was divorced from the parent who actually was in charge of bringing up the child had to bear part of the child support, as long as the child support could not be shared due to the lack of any import to the mother who was actually in charge of bringing up the child.

B. The case affirming the judgment of the court below that the child support to be borne by a child shall be 329,810 won per month, which is 2/30 of the expected amount of child support in consideration of all the circumstances such as the average consumption amount of urban households and the property level and revenue of the parties, etc.

C. If there has been a settlement in a lawsuit under which the respondent is obligated to take care of the principal of this case and deliver him/her to the custody of the principal of this case to the specified time with regard to the custody of the child between the claimant and the respondent, unless the method of fostering the principal of this reconciliation clause is modified by any other agreement or trial thereafter, the applicant has no right to take care of the principal of this case after the specified time, and notwithstanding that, if he/she voluntarily takes care of the principal of this case without delivering it to the respondent, it is illegal custody in relation to the relation to the defendant. Thus, it cannot be said that the respondent has a duty to pay the child support to the claimant for illegal custody until the new method of fostering is determined in lieu

D. On the other hand, if there is a need to change the method of fostering due to a change in the situation after an agreement or a trial has been decided, and if there is an urgent reason to make it extremely difficult to protect the recipient’s smooth custody if there is a new agreement or trial, it can be relieved by the method of a temporary change of the previous agreement by the method stipulated in Article 37 of the former Family Trial Act (amended by Act No. 4300, Dec. 31, 1990) prior to the enforcement of the Family Litigation Act (amended by Act No. 4300, Jan. 1, 1991) and then a temporary change of the previous agreement is made by the method stipulated in Article 62 of the Family Litigation Act (amended by Act No. 62 of the Family Litigation Act).

A.B.D. Article 837 of the Civil Code, D. Article 62 of the Family Litigation Act

C. Supreme Court Decision 75Meu17,18 (Gong1976, 9278) decided June 11, 1985 (Gong1985, 997) 86Meu17 decided March 25, 1986 (Gong1986, 704)

A

B

Daegu High Court Decision 91Reu16 delivered on August 21, 1991

The appeal is dismissed.

The costs of appeal shall be borne by the appellant.

We examine the grounds of appeal.

With respect to No. 1:

According to the reasoning of the judgment of the court below, the appellant and the appellee were married on May 10, 197 but married on February 18, 1985, and they delivered three South Koreas, which are the principals of this case during marital life, and the appellant filed a request for adjudication, such as designation of rearing person against the appellee after divorce, until July 31, 1989, until July 31, 1989, and the appellee designated the appellant as child rearing expenses from August 1, 198 to July 31, 1989, and the appellee paid 300,000 won monthly child rearing expenses to the principal of this case during that period, and the appellant could have visited and interview the principal of this case, and the appellant shall have no reasonable interest in the appellant's first sale of the money to the principal of this case, and the appellant shall not have paid the remaining amount of money to the appellant's child rearing expenses to the extent that the appellant's first sale of the money to the principal of this case without any reasonable understanding of the appellant's money.

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, with regard to the claim of the claimant that the child support should be paid from the time when the claimant continued to rear the principal of the case even after the period of fostering the claimant under the above protocol of conciliation, since all parents have the duty to support the child, it is merely a performance of their duty to support unless there exist specific grounds for claim, such as the agreement on fostering, and thus, it cannot be claimed from another joint obligor. However, if it is necessary to establish the amount of the child support and the name of the debt in advance when the request for designation of the child is made and it is necessary to designate the child as the child, the claim for designation of the child support may be made simultaneously with the claim for payment of the child support. In this case, deeming that the child support cannot be claimed before the conclusion of the oral argument of the fact-finding court is unreasonable since the amount of the child support is changed depending on the prompt and orderly progress of the trial proceedings which cannot be held responsible for the party, and thus, the obligation of the joint obligor to support or the joint obligor to bear the child support between the child support obligor and the other joint obligor can be paid at the same time.

The above determination by the court below is acceptable as a substitute if one of the parties to a divorce raises a child under no agreement or trial with regard to the method of fostering the child, and is in exclusive charge of the child support. However, according to the court below's acknowledged in this case, there was a settlement in a lawsuit between the claimant and the respondent in which the respondent would already bear part of the child support until July 31, 1989 and the respondent would have decided to rear the principal of the case and the respondent would have to deliver the principal of the case to the defendant. Since the settlement clause provides that, unless the method of fostering the principal of the case is not modified by any other agreement or trial, the applicant does not have the right to rear the principal of the case and, notwithstanding the fact that he voluntarily raises the principal of the case to the defendant without delivering it to the defendant, it is illegal in relation to the defendant's child support, and it cannot be said that the defendant would have an obligation to pay the child support to the claimant for an unlawful act after the delivery of the child support, and it cannot be said that the court below ordered the defendant to pay it.

In such a case, if, after the need to change the method of fostering the child arises and actually claims the payment of the child support, if the defendant does not have the obligation to pay the child support, it would actually lead to neglecting the rearing of the minor to be brought up. However, if the situation is changed after the decision of the method of fostering was made by an agreement or a trial, it is necessary to change the method of fostering the child. Nevertheless, if the method of fostering is raised until a new agreement or a trial is held, if there is an imminent reason that it is extremely difficult to protect the child under the previous method, the court below cannot make the child support payment for the reason that it is illegal for the protection of the rights and interests of the child.

However, the lower court’s error is favorable to the claimant, and it does not constitute a ground for reversal in the instant case in which only the claimant appealed, and instead, it is obvious that the Defendant is obliged to pay the child support from the expiration of the period of custody of the claimant under the above protocol of compromise to the delivery date of the duplicate of the instant written appeal cannot be accepted. Ultimately, the argument is without merit.

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Kim Yong-sung (Presiding Justice)