The Korea Persons Association of the Korea Persons Association of the Korea Persons Association (Law Firm Sejongyang, Attorneys Park Byung-kick et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Dong-gu Seoul Agricultural Cooperatives (Law Firm Democratic, Attorneys Jung-nam et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Seoul High Court Decision 201Na11446 delivered on May 2, 201

August 29, 2012

Seoul Southern District Court Decision 2010Gahap6001, 97289 (Counterclaim) Decided September 29, 2011

1. In the first instance trial, the judgment of the first instance, including a claim that the Plaintiff (Counterclaim Defendant) changed on an exchange basis with respect to a part of the claim against the Defendant’s future mutual savings bank, and the primary claim that the Defendant (Counterclaim Plaintiff) Seoul Agricultural Cooperative added to the Plaintiff (Counterclaim Defendant) is changed as follows.

A. All of the lawsuits filed by the Plaintiff (Counterclaim Defendant) against the future mutual savings bank of the Plaintiff (Counterclaim Defendant) are dismissed.

B. The Defendant (Counterclaim Plaintiff) Dong Agricultural Cooperative Co., Ltd. performed the procedure for registration of cancellation of the registration of the establishment of the establishment of each neighboring real estate that was completed on June 29, 2007 by the Seoul Southern District Court, Yeongdeungpo-gu Office of Registry of Registry of Registry No. 3112 with respect to each real estate listed in the separate sheet No. 1

C. The Plaintiff (Counterclaim Defendant) paid 2,474,989,453 won to the Defendant-Counterclaim Seoul Agricultural Cooperative (Counterclaim Plaintiff) and 17% per annum from April 1, 201 to October 31, 2012, and 20% per annum from the following day to the date of full payment.

D. The defendant (Counterclaim plaintiff)'s remaining counterclaim claims against the plaintiff (Counterclaim defendant) of the Seoul Agricultural Cooperative Corporation are dismissed.

2. Of the total litigation costs, the part arising between the Plaintiff (Counterclaim Defendant) and the Defendant (Counterclaim Plaintiff) Dong Seoul Agricultural Cooperative (including the part arising from the principal lawsuit and the counterclaim) bears 50% of the total litigation costs, and the remainder is borne by the Plaintiff (Counterclaim Defendant) and the Seoul Agricultural Cooperative (Counterclaim Plaintiff) Dong-gu, Seoul. The part arising between the Plaintiff (Counterclaim Defendant) and the Defendant (Counterclaim Defendant) are borne by the Plaintiff (Counterclaim Defendant).

3. The preceding paragraph (c) may be provisionally executed.

1. Purport of claim

(a) Main claim;

1) Defendant (Counterclaim Plaintiff) Claim against the Seoul Agricultural Cooperative

The main text of this paragraph is as follows.

2) Claim against Defendant Future Mutual Savings Banks

Defendant Future Mutual Savings Bank, Inc., performed the procedure for registration of cancellation of each registration of the establishment of a neighboring mortgage completed on July 20, 2007 by receipt of No. 33798 of the Seoul Southern District Court (Seoul Southern District Court), transferred the right to claim dividend payment of KRW 59,764,720 distributed in the voluntary auction case No. 201, Seoul Southern District Court (Seoul Southern District Court) to the Plaintiff, and notified the Nonparty to the Republic of Korea of the purport of the transfer (the Plaintiff requested the said Defendant to implement the procedure for registration of cancellation of each neighboring mortgage registration of each neighboring real estate listed in the separate sheet No. 2, which was completed in the above Defendant’s name, on the ground that each real estate listed in the separate sheet No. 2, was sold in the discretionary auction procedure).

(b) Counterclaim;

The Plaintiff (Counterclaim Defendant; hereinafter “Plaintiff”) paid to the Defendant (Counterclaim Plaintiff; hereinafter “Defendant”) the amount of KRW 2,474,989,453 from April 1, 201 to the service date of the application for modification of the claim for the instant counterclaim from April 1, 201 to the service date of the application for modification of the claim, 17% per annum, and the amount of KRW 20% per annum from the next day to the day of full payment (the above Defendant filed a claim for damages arising from the initial tort, and added the claim for return of the loan to the primary claim).

2. Purport of appeal

A. The plaintiff

Of the judgment of the first instance, the part against the plaintiff as to the counterclaim shall be revoked, and the defendant, Dong Seoul Agricultural Cooperative's counterclaim claim falling under the above revoked part shall be dismissed.

(b) Defendant Dong Seoul Agricultural Cooperative;

1) Mainity: The part of the judgment of the court of first instance against the defendant Dong-Seoul Agricultural Cooperative on the main action is revoked, and the plaintiff's main claim corresponding to the revoked part is dismissed.

2) Preliminary: To modify Paragraph 3 of the Disposition of the first instance judgment as stated in the purport of the counterclaim.

(c) Defendant future mutual savings banks;

The judgment of the first instance is revoked, and the plaintiff's claim is dismissed.

1. Basic facts

This part of the reasoning of the judgment of the first instance is the same as the corresponding part of the reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance. Thus, this part of the reasoning is cited in accordance with the main sentence of Article 420

2. Determination as to the defendants' main defense against the main defense

A. The defendants' assertion

As to the principal lawsuit of this case, the registration of the establishment of the establishment of the first, second, and third roots of the plaintiff church was completed without going through the procedures prescribed by the rules of the plaintiff church, and thus null and void, and the registration is cancelled, the Defendants asserted that the party council convened to bring the principal lawsuit of this case is illegal, since the party council convened to bring the principal lawsuit of this case is not convened by the non-party 1, who was the representative of the plaintiff church at the time of the plaintiff church, and that the non-party 2 and the non-party 3 who is the representative of the plaintiff church at the first instance court, the non-party 3 who is the representative of the plaintiff church at the plaintiff church at the plaintiff church at the plaintiff church, is not a legitimate representative of the plaintiff church, and filing a lawsuit to the social court without permission of the plaintiff church 10th and the non-party 6th of the church .

B. Determination

1) Facts of recognition

In full view of the evidence Nos. 5-1, 2, 6-1 through 9, 1, 2, 3, 9-1, 13, 16, 17, 30, 32, 34, and 35 of the evidence Nos. 5-1, 2, 6-1 through 7-1, 2, 3, 9-1, 13, 16, 17, 30, 32, 34, and 35 of the witness of the first instance trial, the following facts may be acknowledged

A) As Nonparty 1 was unable to cancel the registration of the establishment of each of the instant units under his/her own responsibility, on February 27, 2010, Nonparty 1 notified Nonparty 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12, who is the party member of the Plaintiff church at the time of Nonparty 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12, who is the party member of the Plaintiff church, of the fact that “1.1.1. the election of the Speaker pro tempore,” and on February 28, 2010, Nonparty 2 notified Nonparty 1 of the purport that “the temporary meeting will be held (the maximum amount of claims KRW 5.6 billion)” and the remaining party members except Nonparty 11 received the above notification.

B) On February 28, 2010, Nonparty 1 and Nonparty 5, Nonparty 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12 of the party members attended the above party meeting held at 3:15 minutes p.m. on February 28, 2010, Nonparty 1 and the party members filed a lawsuit to nullify the cause of creation of a collateral security (the maximum amount of claims KRW 5.46 billion) against a financial institution on February 1, 2000. The resolution was adopted as “the appointment of Nonparty 7 as the representative of the school to enforce the resolution under paragraph 1 of this Article.”

C) On March 14, 2010, Nonparty 1 convened a temporary meeting of 10 p.m. on an oral basis. Of Nonparty 1 and 8 members, Nonparty 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 12 attended the above party meeting, and the majority of Nonparty 1 and Nonparty 1 attended the above party meeting, and the majority of all members decided that “the representative of Nonparty 7 to file a lawsuit to nullify the cause of the creation of a collateral security is replaced from Nonparty 2 to Nonparty 2,” and Nonparty 1 appointed Nonparty 2 as the representative of the party meeting on the same day pursuant to Article 3 of Chapter 9 of the Constitution of this case.

D) According to the Rules of the Labor Association organized pursuant to the Constitution of the instant church, the instant association may set up an exclusive committee consisting of four pastors and three chiefs as the special committee, and the exclusive committee may exercise its discretionary power over administrative and disciplinary actions with respect to the case delegated by the labor association. On September 15, 2010, the instant association passed a resolution on September 18, 2010 to organize and process the exclusive committee. On September 18, 2010, the association passed a resolution on September 13, 2010 to organize and process the affairs pertaining to the Plaintiff church. Nonparty 13, 3, 14, 15, Nonparty 16, 17, and 18 as the head of the Labor Association opened the exclusive committee and passed a resolution on the appointment of Nonparty 2 as the temporary chairman of the Plaintiff church.

E) In addition, on April 11, 2012, Nonparty 3 was appointed as the temporary president of the Labor Relations Commission by attending six of the seven members of the Labor Relations Commission, and Nonparty 2 resigned from the temporary president of the Plaintiff church.

F) On the other hand, Chapter IV of the Constitution of the instant church. Article 6 subparagraph 8 of Chapter X of the Political Part provides that “If there is a pleading on land or house cases as well as on which branch church belongs, the Union has the authority to take measures.”

2) Determination on the assertion of the Defendant Union

According to Article 35 of the Rules of the plaintiff church, disposal and acquisition of real estate shall be under the jurisdiction of the church, and the agenda related thereto shall be resolved with the consent of 2/3 or more of the members of the church, and the church shall be convened when it is deemed necessary by Articles 20 and 7 and 2 of the Rules of the plaintiff church. However, the non-party 1, who is the chairman of the church and the chairman of the church, convened a temporary church, and the temporary church which was convened was decided to file a lawsuit against the defendant church on February 28, 2010 under the authority of 2/3 or more of the members of the plaintiff church, so the lawsuit of this case shall not be brought by the non-party 1 to the non-party 2, who is not a legitimate resolution of the plaintiff church to appoint the non-party 7 as the chairman of the plaintiff church of this case on the day of the plaintiff church to be a legitimate resolution of the plaintiff church of this case on the basis of Article 90 of the Constitution of the plaintiff church of this case.

Thus, the lawsuit of this case is unlawful, and there are no grounds to believe that the defendant union's defense of safety is unlawful.

3) Determination on the assertion of Defendant Bank

The provisions of Article 265 of the Civil Act concerning the preservation of property jointly owned cannot be applied to the preservation of property jointly owned. Since the resolution of a general meeting of members pursuant to Article 276(1) of the Civil Act or the articles of incorporation shall be followed pursuant to the articles of incorporation. Thus, even in cases where a church which is not a juristic person files a lawsuit as an act of preserving property jointly owned by an association which is not a juristic person, the resolution of the general meeting of members or the procedure pursuant to the articles of incorporation shall be adopted (see Supreme Court Decision 2007Da17062, Dec. 27, 2007)

However, according to the rules of the plaintiff church, the management and disposition of collective ownership property shall be governed by the resolution of the party meeting. The resolution of the plaintiff church on February 28, 2010 of the plaintiff church is merely a resolution to file a lawsuit for cancellation of the registration of creation of a mortgage consisting of 5,460,000 won of the maximum debt amount, which is 5,000,000 won of the registration of creation of a mortgage on each real property listed in the list of the No. 1 of this case, i.e., the registration of creation of a mortgage on the No. 1 of this case, the maximum debt amount shall not be deemed a resolution to file a lawsuit for cancellation of the registration of creation of a mortgage on the No. 2 of this case or the third real property listed in the attached list No. 2 of this case, and there is no

Therefore, the lawsuit seeking the cancellation of the registration of the establishment of the establishment of the second place of the instant case on the premise that the registration of the establishment of the establishment of the second place of the instant case was null and void on the ground that the registration of the establishment of the establishment of the third place of the instant case was cancelled by voluntary auction. Thus, the lawsuit seeking the return of unjust enrichment is unlawful without going through a resolution of the party meeting in accordance

3. Plaintiff’s principal claim against the Defendant Union

(a) Grounds for claims;

In the case of a church that is an organization of Germany, the church's annual report, contribution money, and other property that is the revenue of the church belongs to the collective ownership of the members of the church, unless there are special circumstances. Therefore, in the event that the church's articles of incorporation or other rules do not exist, the disposition of the property is conducted by a resolution comprised of the members of the church, so even if the properties of the church are disposed by the representative of the church, the act done without following such procedures is null and void (see Supreme Court Decisions 2001Da57679, Feb. 8, 2002; 2006Da23312, Feb. 12, 2009, etc.).

As acknowledged earlier, Article 35 (3) of the Rules that fall under the articles of incorporation of the Plaintiff church provides that "acquisition and disposal of real estate shall belong to the party council," and Article 35 (5) of the Rules provides that "The members of the party council shall be the members of the party council who shall attend at least 2/3 of the party members, and the acquisition and disposal of real estate shall be approved by all the members present." However, the non-party 1 entered into the first mortgage contract with the Defendant association without the above resolution of the party council and completed the registration under the said contract without permission, so the establishment registration of the first mortgage contract of this case is null and void as a registration completed by an invalid disposal.

Therefore, the Defendant Mutual Aid Association is obligated to implement the procedure for registration of cancellation of the registration of the establishment of the first place of the instant mortgage.

B. Defenses of the defendant union

1) Claim for consent of party members

Defendant Union asserts that the first mortgage contract of this case is valid since more than half of the members agreed explicitly or implicitly to the first mortgage contract of this case. However, as seen earlier, as long as the first mortgage contract of this case was concluded without a legitimate meeting of the Plaintiff church, it is null and void, and it cannot affect the validity of the consent of the individual party members expressed regardless of the resolution of the church. Thus, this part of the allegation by Defendant Union is without merit.

2) Apparent assertion

A) The Defendant Union asserts that the registration of the establishment of the first place of the instant mortgage is valid since the Plaintiff is liable for the expression agency pursuant to Article 126 of the Civil Act regarding the first place of the instant mortgage contract.

B) However, the representative of a non-corporate church does not have the right to act on behalf of the members without going through a resolution of the general meeting of the members concerning the disposal of the properties of the church which are collectively owned by the representative of a church, and therefore the provisions concerning the expression agency under Article 126 of the Civil Act concerning the disposal of the properties of the church without the authority (see Supreme Court Decision 2006Da23312, Feb. 12, 2009) are not applied mutatis mutandis to the above cases where the provisions of the church articles are stipulated in the church articles concerning the disposal of the properties of the church and the procedures under those provisions are not followed. Thus, even if we examine whether the plaintiff is liable for the expression agency under Article 126 of the Civil Act, it is without reason that the plaintiff is not entitled to act on behalf of the non-party 1 to act on behalf of the members [Article 126 of the Civil Code, in the rules concerning the "documents to obtain loans from the plaintiff 1 et al., the right to act on behalf of the plaintiff 1 church.

(iii) argument for ratification of invalidation

A) The defendant church asserts that the whole or part of the contract to establish the right to collateral security was ratified after the date of the sale of the plaintiff church. ① The evidence No. 4, which is the rules of the plaintiff church, was forged, and a majority of the members of the plaintiff church agree explicitly or implicitly to the first contract to collateral security right. ② The plaintiff church paid interest rate of 20 million won to the defendants every month from October 2007 to July 2009. As such, the situation in which large amount of money is paid was not known to the members of the plaintiff church, ③ the party members were aware of the fact that the plaintiff church did not know about the first loan contract of this case from the 10th, the budget to be reported to the association, the settlement of accounts, and the fact that the plaintiff church visited the 105th of the plaintiff church to the 100th of the 10th of the 10th of the 10th of the 100th of the 100th of the 100th of the 208th of the 128th of the 200th of the 1.

B) Ratification of an invalidation or an unauthorized representation is a single act with knowledge of the invalidation, etc. and with the effect of such an act to vest in his/her own, and can be said to have been ratified by implied means. Thus, in cases where there are circumstances to deem that the principal sufficiently understood the legal status faced by such an act and thus, based on his/her truth that the outcome of such act belongs to himself/herself, it may be deemed that ratification has been made impliedly (see Supreme Court Decision 2010Da8319, 83205, Feb. 10, 201).

다) 위와 같은 법리를 전제로 하여 원고 교회가 이 사건 제1 근저당권설정계약을 추인했다고 볼 수 있는지를 살피건대, ① 제1심 증인 소외 5의 증언에 의하면 갑 제4호증(원고 교회 규약)의 진정성립이 인정되고 달리 갑 제4호증이 위조되었다는 점을 인정할 증거가 없는바, 그렇다면 교회 재산의 처분행위인 이 사건 제1 근저당권설정행위에 관하여는 원고 교회 규약 제35조 제5항에 따라서 당회원 2/3 이상의 출석과 전원의 찬성에 의한 의결을 거쳐야 하므로 이 사건 제1 근저당권설정행위가 추인되었다고 하기 위해서는 적어도 위와 같은 요건을 갖추어야 하는바, 피고 조합 주장 자체에 의하더라도 위와 같은 요건을 갖추지 않았다는 점이 명백한 점, ② 원고 교회가 2007. 10.부터 2009. 7. 사이에 피고 조합에 납부한 대출 이자는 소외 1이 당회의 결의 없이 이 사건 제1 근저당권설정계약을 체결하였다는 점이 원고 교회에 발각되기 전에 납부한 것이므로, 이러한 대출 이자의 납부 사실이 추인의 근거가 될 수는 없고, 원고 교회의 당회원 전부가 이 사건 제1 근저당권설정계약의 체결 사실을 알고 있었다는 점을 인정할 증거도 없으며, 설령 당회원들이 이를 개별적으로 알고 있었다 하더라도 이로써 원고 교회가 이 사건 제1 근저당권설정계약에 따른 결과가 원고 교회에 귀속된다는 점을 승인하였다고 볼 수는 없는 점, ③ 원고 교회 규약에 의하면 원고 교회의 예산, 결산은 당회에 보고하게 되어 있고 원고 교회의 결산 및 예산서(을 제14호증의 기재 참조)에 이 사건 제1 근저당권설정등기의 원인채권에 대한 이자의 지출이 기재되어 있기는 하나, 을 제14호증에는 단순히 이자 액수만 기재되어 있어 그 기재 내용만으로는 이 사건 제1 근저당권설정계약의 존재를 알 수 없고, 당회원인 소외 7, 5도 소외 1 및 소외 1의 편에서 일하는 사람들이 이자의 구체적 내역 등을 알려주지도 않고 당회에 상세하게 보고하지도 않아 2009. 9.경 이전에는 이 사건 제1 근저당권설정계약의 존재를 알지 못하였다고 제1심에서 증언하고 있는 점에 비추어 볼 때 원고 교회의 당회원 전원이 원고 교회의 결산서 및 예산서를 통하여 이 사건 제1 근저당권설정계약의 존재를 알았다고 볼 수 없는 점, ④ 을 제10호증의 1, 2, 을 제11호증의 1, 2, 3의 각 기재, 제1심 증인 소외 20, 5의 각 증언에 변론 전체의 취지를 종합하면, 원고 교회가 2009. 12. 29. 원고 교회 소유의 서울 영등포구 당산동4가 (지번 생략) 및 그 지상건물을 매각하여 확보한 자금의 일부로 이 사건 대출원리금 중 68,053,804원을 변제하고, 원고 교회의 집사인 소외 19가 2010. 3. 2. 원고 교회를 대신하여 이 사건 대출원리금 중 24,966,432원을 변제한 사실, 당회원 중 소외 5가 2009. 11. 30.경 소외 1 목사 소유의 김포 소재 부동산을 매각한 금원으로 대출금을 변제하겠다고 말한 사실을 각 인정할 수 있으나, 원고 교회와 소외 19 등이 위와 같이 대출원리금의 일부를 변제한 것은 이 사건 제1 근저당권설정등기가 무효라는 점이 아직 대외적으로 확정되지 않은 상황에서 피고 조합이 위 근저당권을 실행함에 따라 별지 제1 목록 기재 각 부동산이 타에 경락되는 상황을 방지하기 위한 것으로 보이고, 당회원 중 소외 5가 한 위 변제 약속은 소외 1로 하여금 이 사건 제1 근저당권설정계약 체결에 따른 사태를 모두 책임지도록 하여 문제를 해결할 것을 추진하는 상황에서 한 약속으로 보이므로(갑 제9호증의 1의 기재, 제1심 증인 소외 5, 7의 각 증언 참조), 위 변제 또는 변제 약속에 이 사건 제1 근저당권설정계약의 효력을 인정한다는 묵시적인 의사까지 포함되어 있다고 보기는 어려운 점, ⑤ 갑 제9호증의 1의 기재에 제1심 증인 소외 5의 증언에 의하면 이 사건 제1 근저당권설정계약의 존재를 모르던 원고 교회의 당회원 일부가 그 존재 사실을 알게 된 후인 2009. 9. 5. 소외 1로부터 그 확인서면을 교부받으면서 이 사건 제1 근저당권설정계약과 관련하여 대출된 금원 중 1,560,000,000원은 원고 교회가 책임지는 것으로 한 사실은 인정되나, 이는 위 금원에 해당하는 돈으로 원고 교회의 농협중앙회에 대한 대출금을 변제하였기 때문에 위 금원 상당액은 원고 교회가 소외 1을 대신하여 변제하겠다는 내부적인 약정에 불과하여 위와 같은 사실만으로 원고 교회의 당회가 이 사건 제1 근저당권설정계약을 추인한 것으로 보기에 부족한 점, ⑥ 원고 교회의 임시당회장인 소외 2가 피고 조합에 소 취하서를 교부한 사실은 원고도 다투지 않으나, 갑 제31호증, 을 제26호증의 각 기재와 당심 증인 소외 2의 증언에 의하면 피고 조합 주장의 2011. 7. 4.자 공동의회는 이 사건 교회 규약 및 이 사건 교회 헌법에서 정한 절차를 따르지 않아서 무효일 뿐만 아니라, 이 사건 제1 근저당권설정계약에 대한 추인의 주체는 원고 교회의 당회이므로 설사 공동의회에서 이 사건 제1 근저당권설정계약을 추인하였다 하여도 추인의 효과가 발생하지 않는 점 등을 종합하여 보면, 피고 조합이 들고 있는 근거들을 종합하여 원고 교회가 이 사건 제1 근저당권설정계약의 전부 또는 일부를 추인하였다고 볼 수는 없다고 할 것이다.

D) Therefore, this part of the Defendant Union’s assertion is without merit.

4) Claims by analogy of Article 39 of the Commercial Act or the proviso of Article 107(1) of the Civil Act

The defendant association asserts that since the plaintiff church is responsible for by analogy application of Article 39 of the Commercial Act or the proviso of Article 107 (1) of the Civil Act, the registration of establishment of the creation of the first neighboring church of this case is valid.

However, Article 39 of the Commercial Act provides that "A person who has registered any matter different from the fact due to intention or negligence shall not oppose the difference to a third party acting in good faith," and there is no room to apply to the plaintiff church, which is a non-corporate body.

In addition, the act of the representative of a church, which is not a non-corporate association, disposing of the church properties without going through the rules of the church or the resolution of the general meeting of the members is null and void, and the church can oppose the invalidation of the disposition against the bona fide party (see Supreme Court Decision 87Meu1574, Mar. 14, 1989). Thus, the proviso to Article 107(1) of the Civil Act cannot be inferredly applied to the act of the non-corporate representative setting up the first right to collateral security without going through the procedures prescribed by the rules of the plaintiff church.

Therefore, the above assertion by the defendant union is without merit.

5) The assertion that registration is consistent with the substantive legal relationship

Defendant Union is clear that the Plaintiff church should be liable for damages equivalent to the amount of loans to Defendant Union in accordance with Article 35 of the Civil Act. Therefore, the registration of establishment of the establishment of the first place of the instant case is valid since it is registered consistent with the true legal relationship. However, even if the Plaintiff church is liable for damages to the Defendant, the same fact alone cannot be deemed as a registration consistent with the actual relationship. Thus, this part of the Defendant Union’s assertion is without merit.

4. Claim for counterclaim against the plaintiff of the defendant union

Defendant Union primarily sought repayment of loans under the loan agreement of this case against the Plaintiff church and sought compensation for damages arising out of the tort of Nonparty 1 who was the representative of the Plaintiff. Thus, we first consider the primary claim.

A. The fact that Nonparty 1, who was the representative of the Plaintiff, concluded the instant loan agreement with the Defendant on behalf of the Plaintiff and borrowed KRW 4.2 billion from the Defendant was revealed in the facts on the basis of the foregoing facts. In addition to the purport of the entire pleadings in the statement in the evidence Nos. 5-1 and 13, the repayment period of the instant loan is June 29, 2010, and the agreed delay rate is 17% per annum, and the loan remaining as of March 30, 201 is recognized as the fact that the principal amount is 2,474,989,453.

Thus, the plaintiff is obligated to pay the above principal of the loan and damages for delay remaining in the defendant union, unless there are special circumstances.

B. On this issue, the Plaintiff asserts that the loan from financial institutions also constitutes the act of disposing of the property of the Plaintiff church, while Nonparty 1 concluded the instant loan agreement with the Defendant union without going through the procedures stipulated in the rules of the Plaintiff church. Therefore, the instant loan agreement is also null and void.

Therefore, the loan contract of this case was concluded on the same opportunity as the contract of the first mortgage. However, since the contract of this case was separate legal act from the contract of the first mortgage, the validity of the loan contract of this case should not be considered separately. However, the reason why the contract of this case is invalid is that the non-party 1, who was the representative of the plaintiff church, entered into the contract of this case against Articles 275(2) and 276(1) of the Civil Code. The "management and disposition of the collective ownership" of the above provisions refers to the act of using or improving the collective ownership itself or the act of disposing of legal and private affairs. The act of borrowing money as stated in the loan contract of this case, as it does not comply with the management and disposition of the collective ownership itself, and it cannot be viewed as the act of managing and disposing of the collective ownership (refer to Supreme Court en banc Decision 2004Da607908 Decided April 19, 207, it cannot be viewed as the act of performing the management and disposition of the collective ownership.

Meanwhile, if the rules of the Plaintiff church stipulate that the mere act of bearing obligations, such as the instant loan agreement, shall be subject to resolution of the party, this constitutes a provision that limits the representative authority of the Plaintiff, and if the other party knew or did not know such violation due to negligence, the instant loan agreement may be invalidated. In this regard, the Plaintiff, the representative of the Plaintiff, is the general duty of attending the Plaintiff’s church against the expected members, and even according to the church constitution of the instant church, the Plaintiff does not have the authority to conclude the instant loan agreement as his duties. However, in general, since the organization’s representative has the nature of comprehensive business, the Plaintiff’s general business is limited to the worship and related acts, and thus, the Plaintiff church’s general business is not subject to restriction on the Plaintiff church’s representative authority (which refers to the act of acquiring the above church’s properties as a factual act, and the Plaintiff church’s properties are not subject to restriction on the Plaintiff church’s right to represent and manage the properties, and thus, the Plaintiff church’s properties are not subject to restriction on the Plaintiff church’s properties No. 4 of the instant church.

C. Sub-committee

Therefore, the Plaintiff is obligated to pay damages for delay at each rate of KRW 2,474,9,453 remaining after March 30, 201 and KRW 20% per annum as stipulated in the Act on Special Cases Concerning the Promotion, etc. of Legal Proceedings from the following day to the date of full payment, as sought by the Defendant Union, to the extent that it is reasonable for the Plaintiff to dispute on the existence and scope of the obligation to perform as of April 1, 201 as to the existence and scope of the obligation.

5. Conclusion

Therefore, all of the plaintiff's lawsuit against the defendant bank shall be dismissed including a part of the claim that has been changed in exchange at the trial, and the plaintiff's claim against the defendant union shall be accepted with merit, and the plaintiff's main claim against the defendant union shall be accepted within the extent of the above recognition, and the remainder of the claim shall be dismissed with merit. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the first instance judgment by accepting part of the appeal against the defendant bank and the claim for additional trial as to the counterclaim against the defendant union.

[Attachment]

Judges Kim Jong-soo (Presiding Judge)