2012Du9031 Requests for the confirmation, etc. of teaching status

A person shall be appointed.

Korea

Seoul High Court Decision 2011Du24974 Decided March 30, 2012

November 26, 2015

The appeal is dismissed.

The costs of appeal are assessed against the Plaintiff.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. On the first ground for appeal

The lower court determined that it cannot be deemed that there is no provision on the criteria or requirements for excluding the reappointment or extension of contract of public officials in this specialized contract service (amended by Presidential Decree No. 22373, Sept. 10, 2010; hereinafter the same) of the former Regulations on Public Officials in Contract Service, as it was introduced to strengthen the expertise and competitiveness of the public service society and efficiently manage government human resources through the opening of public service, and the period of employment expires, barring any special circumstance, barring any special circumstance, for which the status relationship as public officials engaged in work for a certain period according to their employment contracts with the State is terminated as a matter of course, and whether they are reappointed after the expiration of the period of employment is in discretionary action based on the decision of the appointing authority.

Examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the relevant legal principles, the lower court’s determination is justifiable, and contrary to what is alleged in the grounds of appeal, there were no errors by misapprehending the legal doctrine on relevant

2. On the second, fourth, and fifth grounds

A. Article 2(3)3 of the former State Public Officials Act (amended by Act No. 10342, Jun. 8, 2010; hereinafter the same) provides that public officials engaged in business that requires expertise and skills or require flexibility, etc. in accordance with an employment contract with the State shall be classified as public officials in contractual service for a certain period, and are classified as public officials in contractual service. According to Articles 5(1), 6(1) and 7 of the former Regulations on Public Officials in contractual Service, the head of each agency may appoint public officials in contractual service within the scope of a fixed number and budget pursuant to an employment contract within the scope of a fixed number of public officials, but the period of appointment as public officials in contractual service shall be within the period necessary for the performance of the relevant business, and when the need to maintain contractual business or contractual position becomes extinct, or when public officials fall under any other condition stipulated in the employment contract, the contract shall be terminated or terminated.

According to the respective contents, forms, etc. of the former State Public Officials Act and the former Public Officials Regulations, where a public official in contractual service is appointed by an employment contract with a certain period of time, unlike a public official who is appointed by election or who acquires the status of a public official by appointment, and the employment period stipulated in the employment contract expires, a public official in contractual service shall lose his/her status. In such cases, whether to renew his/her employment contract or extend the employment period shall be deemed to have been placed at the discretion of the head of each agency (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 2002Du1496, Nov. 26, 2002; 2010Du20348, Jan. 13, 2011).

B. The court below rejected the plaintiff's allegation that the contract term of the plaintiff's contract was terminated on September 2, 2004 to 2 years from September 2, 2004, and that the contract term of unification education was terminated on the ground that the plaintiff did not expire on September 2, 2004 to 3 years from September 1, 2006, and that the contract term of the plaintiff's new appointment was terminated on the ground that the contract term of the plaintiff's new appointment was terminated on the ground that the contract term of the plaintiff's new appointment was invalid on the ground that the contract term of the plaintiff's new appointment was terminated on the ground that the contract term of the plaintiff's new appointment did not expire on the ground that the contract term of the plaintiff's new appointment term was terminated on the ground that the contract term of the plaintiff's new appointment term was invalid on the ground that the contract term of the plaintiff's new appointment term was terminated on the ground that the contract term of the plaintiff's new appointment term was terminated on the plaintiff's 10 months from September 2, 20001.

Examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the aforementioned legal principles and records, such determination is justifiable, and contrary to what is alleged in the grounds of appeal, the lower court did not err by misapprehending the legal doctrine regarding the renewal of contract public officials, the right to receive a fair examination, and the deviation and abuse of discretionary power, or by omitting judgment.

3. Regarding the third ground for appeal, since the unification education officer does not fall under the various levels of schools under each subparagraph of Article 2 of the Higher Education Act or the educational institutions under Article 2 (3) of the Public Educational Officials Act, it cannot be deemed that the unification education officer falls under the teachers of national and public universities or private universities. The unification education officer employed as a public official in a specialized contract pursuant to an employment contract setting a certain period cannot be deemed as having a position equivalent to the teachers of national and public universities or private universities. Therefore, it cannot be deemed that the Plaintiff, who is a public official in a specialized contract, should be guaranteed the procedural rights and

Therefore, this part of the ground of appeal on a different premise is without merit.

4. Conclusion

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Lee Ki-taik

Justices Lee In-bok

Justices Ko Young-han

Justices Kim Gin-young