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1. Revocation of a judgment of the first instance;
2. As to the real estate No. 6 listed in the attached Table No. 6 in the real estate list between the Defendant and B, 2012
Reasons
1. The court's explanation on this part of the basic facts is the same as the corresponding part of the reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance, and thus, citing it as it is by the main text of Article 420 of the Civil Procedure Act
2. The judgment of this Court
A. The court's explanation concerning this part of the establishment of the fraudulent act is identical to the statement No. 4 through No. 5 of the judgment of the court of first instance, and therefore, this part is acceptable in accordance with the main sentence of Article 420 of the Civil Procedure Act.
B. The defendant's defense is a bona fide beneficiary who has lent money to himself/herself and is duly established with the right to collateral security of this case.
Since the beneficiary's bad faith is presumed in a fraudulent act revocation lawsuit, the beneficiary is responsible for proving his/her good faith in order to be exempted from liability.
In such a case, whether the beneficiary acted in good faith shall be determined reasonably in light of the logical and empirical rules, comprehensively taking into account the following: (a) relationship between the debtor and the beneficiary; (b) details of and the process or motive for the act of disposal between the debtor and the beneficiary; (c) whether there are no special circumstances to doubt that the terms and conditions of the act of disposal are normal and reasonable; and (d)
(1) In order for a beneficiary to be deemed to have acted in good faith at the time of a fraudulent act to be recognized, it cannot be readily concluded that the beneficiary was acting in good faith at the time of the fraudulent act (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2007Da74621, Jul. 10, 2008). In addition, the evidence submitted by the Defendant alone is insufficient to acknowledge that the Defendant acted in good faith at the time of the acquisition of the instant collateral security (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2014Da205607, Mar. 20, 2015).