The case where it was found that there was a negligence on the part of the person who believed that he had ownership at the time of possession and acquisition of the abolished miscellaneous property.

The fact that the State Property Act was in force at the time of possession and acquisition, and the Act also provides for strict requirements and procedures for disposal of the publicly abolished miscellaneous property. Therefore, in concluding a contract for the acquisition of State property by an individual at the time, it shall be deemed that the ordinary person is a duty of care for the requirements, procedures, etc. in general transaction. Therefore, when concluding a contract in violation of this provision, it shall be deemed that there was a negligence in possession, unless there are special circumstances.

Articles 197 and 245 of the Civil Act

Plaintiff, Ltd.

Defendant 1 and 11 others

Seoul Central District Court (4289Domin2991) in the first instance trial

Supreme Court Decision 200Na1089 delivered on December 7, 1961

The part against Defendant 1, 2, and 3 in the original judgment and the part against Defendant 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12 in the original judgment shall be revoked.

The plaintiff's claim against the above defendant is dismissed.

The total cost of litigation shall be borne by the plaintiff.

The defendant et al. seeks a judgment as stated in the Disposition, and the plaintiff is dismissed.

The judgment was sought that the costs of prosecution should be borne by the defendant, etc.

As the Plaintiff’s actual assertion is that the acquisition of the building site and the building on the 4th anniversary of the acquisition date of the building site is null and void by the Japanese government, since it is merely a procedure for restoring rights infringed by the Japanese government, and it cannot be asserted that the Plaintiff is the owner of the building site and the building was acquired on the 4th anniversary of the acquisition date of the building site. Since the Japanese government and the Japanese government agreed that the ownership of the building site will not be acquired on the 1st anniversary of the acquisition date of the building site, the acquisition date of the building site will not be effective by the Japanese government because it would be against the Japanese government’s law because it would be against the Japanese government’s view that the acquisition date of the building site and the building site will not be effective by the initial acquisition date of the building site and that it would be against the Japanese government’s new acquisition date of the building site and would be against the Japanese government’s view that the ownership of the building site and the building site, which was acquired on the 4th anniversary of the acquisition date of the building site.

In other words, according to the State Property Act at the time of the purchase and sale of the Plaintiff’s house, it is invalid for the Plaintiff to purchase and sell the building site without any authority to dispose of it. Even if the building site of this case was miscellaneous property at the time of the purchase and sale of the building, it is not necessary for the Plaintiff to provide it for public or public services, and the exchange contract is for profit of the Plaintiff’s company. Thus, it is invalid because the Plaintiff’s purchase and sale of the building site was contrary to Article 7 of the State Property Act at the time of the purchase and sale of the building site without any authority to dispose of it. Since the Plaintiff’s purchase and sale of the building site at the time of the purchase and sale of the building site without any authority to dispose of it, it is obviously invalid for the Plaintiff to purchase and sell the building site at the time of the purchase and sale of the building site without any authority to purchase and sell the building site at the time of the purchase and sale of the building site at the time of the purchase and sale of the building site. Therefore, it is clear that the Plaintiff’s sale and sale contract is invalid for the following reasons.

With the method of proof, the plaintiff et al. submitted evidence Nos. 1-1 through 10, 2-4, and each testimony Nos. 1-2, 3, and 4 of the court below's witness Nos. 1-2, 3, and 4 and the result of the party examination prior to remand to the court below's order to seek summons from the non-party No. 5 and the non-party No. 4, 6, and answer as the site for the establishment of the evidence Nos. 8 through 10, and other evidences No. 11-2, 12, and 13 among them, the defendant et al. denies the purport of proof No. 1-5, 2-1, 3-1 through 4, 5-1 through 5, 1, 2-1, 6, 17, 1-2, 7, 8-1 and 1-2 of the evidence No. 1 of the court below's order to remand to the non-party No. 1-party No. 4, 7 evidence No.

In fact, the trade name of the Plaintiff Company was changed to the Plaintiff Company, and each of the main sites of the Plaintiff’s principal was owned by Nonparty 1, 10, 11, 12, and 13, respectively, and thereafter, the Japanese government purchased them and thereafter owned them. The fact that the ownership transfer registration was made in the name of the Plaintiff as to each of the building sites, and the fact that the Defendant, etc. owned or occupied each of the relevant buildings used in the original judgment among the buildings above the building on this site, is not a dispute between the parties.

However, there is a dispute as to whether the ownership of each building occupied by Defendant 1, 2, and 3 belongs to the Plaintiff. First, the Plaintiff asserted that each building site and each house owned by the Plaintiff were originally owned by state property at a specified time, but the Plaintiff acquired each building site and each house under the exchange contract with the Government of Japan on November 5, 1943. Thus, each building site and each house were state property at the time of the conclusion of the exchange contract, and each building site and each house were owned by the Plaintiff. Thus, if the building site and each house were owned by state property at the time of the above exchange contract, if they were owned by public or public property, the contract with the purport of acquiring them is null and void automatically. If they were owned by a building site and each house were owned by public or public property, it is necessary to acquire them only for public, public, or public use, and it is clear that the acquisition of miscellaneous property at the time of the exchange contract should be made invalid even if they were acquired by public or public use.

Therefore, in this case, even if the plaintiff's main land and house were miscellaneous property for the purpose of public use or disuse of the land and house, it is not recognized that the plaintiff's acquisition of the land and house was necessary for the public use, or for the public service, even if the land and house were to be used for the purpose of the public use or disuse of the land and house, and rather, the plaintiff acquired the land and building of this case in order to construct a high-rise building in line with the four streets by the above exchange contract, and the plaintiff acquired a new department store and a modern film hall request the defendant to remove the building and remove the site on this case, and there is no conflict between the plaintiff's assertion that the new department store and the modern film hall were requested to do so over several hundreds of the new ones on this case and the Gap evidence No. 4 (Plan for New Construction of New Center) and Eul evidence No. 13 (Certified Copy of the register of the company)'s testimony in the court below as a whole, it is argued that the plaintiff company's sale or sale of goods, warehouse, export and import, and sale of the building site.

Therefore, the plaintiff's assertion that the plaintiff acquired the main building site and the above house of the plaintiff's assertion under the exchange contract is groundless.

Then, the plaintiff asserts that he acquired the ownership of the site in this case by the completion of ten years of acquisition by prescription. If we combine the whole purport of pleading with the testimony of non-party 1, non-party 4, and non-party 6, the original owner of the site in this case, and the non-party 1, and four non-party 1, who were the original owner of the site in this case, owned each house on the building site in this case, but the Japanese government agreed to remove the house at any time and order the non-party to continually occupy the site in this case, under the mutual agreement that the non-party et al. shall remove the building site in this case to order the non-party et al. to continually occupy the building site in this case after acquiring the right of possession of the building site in this case by proxy, the Japanese government had the plaintiff acquire the right of possession of the building site in this case and had the plaintiff acquire the right of possession of the building site in this case for the first time after the exchange contract between the Government of Japan and the non-party et al. to acquire the building site in this case.

However, prior to the determination of the period of the Plaintiff’s continued possession, it is deemed that there was no negligence on the part of the Plaintiff with respect to the belief that the Plaintiff had ownership at the time of the conclusion of the above exchange contract, and that the notice was in force at the time of the above exchange contract, and the Act also provides for strict requirements and procedures as stated earlier with respect to the disposal of the State property belonging to the so-called miscellaneous property that has discontinued public use or public use. Therefore, in the case of a contract to acquire a state-owned real property at the time of the conclusion of the contract to a private individual, it shall be deemed that the contract would be in close attention as to whether it complies with all the requirements or procedures stipulated in the State Property Act, and thus, it shall be deemed that there was negligence on possession in violation of the requirements or procedures stipulated in the State Property Act, and thus, the exchange contract is null and void as it does not meet the requirements stipulated in the State Property Act, and there was no other evidence to prove that there was any special situation otherwise at the time of the Plaintiff’s initial possession of the land in this case.

Accordingly, the plaintiff cannot acquire the original site as the completion of the short-term acquisition by prescription for ten years, and even if the period for which the plaintiff occupied the same site itself is less than 20 years, it is less than 20 years, and it is not possible to acquire the original site as the completion of the acquisition by prescription for twenty years.

Therefore, the Plaintiff’s assertion that the Plaintiff acquired each of the instant lands due to the completion of acquisition by prescription also seems to be without merit. If so, it is deemed that the Plaintiff did not have any title to acquire the instant land and the instant house owned by Defendant 1, 2, and 3 in the process of acquisition by prescription, and the registration of transfer of ownership as to the instant site in the name of the Plaintiff is null and void in that the cause of the registration of transfer of ownership is null and void. Therefore, the Plaintiff’s claim against the Plaintiff under the premise that each of the instant land and the instant house are owned by the Plaintiff was lost without waiting the judgment on the remainder of the issues, and thus, the lower judgment that differs from this conclusion is unfair, and the prosecution by the Defendant, etc. is reasonable, and therefore, Article 386 of the Civil Procedure Act shall be governed by Article 96 and Article

Judge Term of Office (Presiding Judge) Egradro