The Mayor shall take measures to grant permission for the business of public bath and infringe on the rights of existing public bath business operators in violation of Article 4 of the Public Bath Implementation Rule which provides for appropriate distribution of public bath.

A. The permission for the public bath business under the former Public Bath Act is not a formative act recognizing the right to operate the business, and is merely a cancellation of the police prohibition.

B. The provisions of Article 4 of the Enforcement Rule of the Public Bath Business Act (Ordinance No. 74 of the Ministry of Bolih on April 9, 62) are invalid in violation of the mother law.

Article 10 of the Public Bath Business Act, Article 4 of the Enforcement Rule of the same Act

Cho Jae-in

Busan City Mayor

Daegu High Court Decision 63Gu3 delivered on May 21, 1963

The appeal is dismissed.

The costs of appeal shall be borne by the plaintiff.

We examine the grounds of appeal by the plaintiff's attorney

The freedom of business under Articles 15 and 28 of the current Constitution includes only the scope of freedom guaranteed by the Constitution, and it is exceptionally possible to restrict the freedom of business under the law only when it is necessary for maintaining order and promoting public welfare. Although the Public Bath Business Act (Act No. 808) carries out the permission system for public bath business, the permission is not a formative act of establishing the right to operate the public bath business, but it is merely a cancellation of the prohibition of the police, and the effect of the permission only brings about the recovery of the operator's oil. According to the above Public Bath Business Act, there is a reasonable restriction on the environment and facilities of public bath from the point of view of public health, and only the appropriate structure of the place or facilities of public bath, such as the restriction on the distance of public bath, are stipulated as the permission system for the public bath business, and the proper distribution of the house is required for public welfare, it is not possible to restrict the freedom of business guaranteed by the Constitution on the grounds that the distribution of the public bath is not in violation of Article 4 of the Public Bath Business Act (1) 6).

Therefore, as shown above, the permission for the management of the public bath business to the plaintiff is deemed to be the recovery of the business's possession due to the cancellation of the police prohibition. Thus, the freedom of business does not fall under the case where the law directly aims to protect the interests of the person who has obtained the permission for the public bath business, but the law is a case where the freedom of business is indirectly restricted as a result of protecting the public welfare of the public bath business, and so, the restriction of the freedom of business is indirectly restricted, and as long as the implementation detailed rules such as the distance restriction or the direction of the Do governor is null and void, even if the benefits of the public bath business are actually reduced due to the disposition for the permission in this case, the disadvantage is merely the mere anti-private outcome of the permission in this case, and it cannot be said to be the infringement of the rights of the plaintiff. Accordingly, the plaintiff has no legal interest to seek the cancellation of the permission for the public bath business in this case against the defendant's assistant participant. Thus, it is justified in the judgment of the court below that it is inappropriate to interpret the reasons for the plaintiff's appeal.

Therefore, it is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices, who were involved in the application of Article 14 of the Administrative Litigation Act, Articles 400, 395, and 384 (1) of the Civil Procedure Act.

Judge Lee Young-su (Presiding Judge) of the Supreme Court Justice Lee Young-chul (Presiding Judge)