[1] Where Party A terminated the golf membership use contract concluded with Party B, the case holding that Party A may terminate the contract at any time during the contract period under Article 31 of the Door-to-Door Sales Act since the contract constitutes continuous transaction under the Act on Door-to-Door Sales, Etc.

[2] Method of interpreting legal acts as indicated in a disposal document

[3] The principle of interpretation of a standardized contract

[4] In a case where Gap paid value-added tax on security deposit, membership fee, and membership fee and terminated a golf membership use contract with Eul corporation, but the contract was terminated, and Eul corporation claimed that "service fee" in the terms and conditions of the above contract stipulating that "the service fee shall be deducted from the total amount of 10% of the penalty, service fee, and the service payment shall be refunded after deducting the service completion fee from the service completion period during which the service was provided," the case holding that there was no error in the misapprehension of legal principles in the judgment below which rejected the above claim on the ground that "service fee" was not a ground for interpreting that Gap provided the service prior to the termination of the contract as the amount of discount.

[1] Article 2 subparag. 10 and Article 31 of the Door-to-Door Sales Act / [2] Article 105 of the Civil Act / [3] Article 5 of the Regulation of Standardized Contracts Act / [4] Article 105 of the Civil Act, Article 5 of the Regulation of Standardized Contracts Act

[2] Supreme Court Decision 200Da27923 Decided October 6, 200 (Gong200Ha, 2284) Supreme Court Decision 2010Da10291 Decided May 26, 201 (Gong2011Ha, 1285), Supreme Court Decision 201Da53645, 53652 Decided October 27, 201 (Gong201Ha, 2436) / [3] Supreme Court Decision 2005Da3526 Decided October 28, 2005 (Gong205Ha, 1862), Supreme Court Decision 2006Da72093 decided February 22, 2007, Supreme Court Decision 2009Da7209397 decided Oct. 27, 2009)

Newdong Golf Co., Ltd. (Law Firm CM, Attorneys Lee Won-hun et al., Counsel for the defendant-appellant)

Defendant Counterclaim (Attorney Full-time, Counsel for defendant-Counterclaim)

Seoul Western District Court Decision 2014Na33462, 33479 decided June 5, 2015

The appeal is dismissed. The costs of appeal are assessed against the plaintiff (Counterclaim defendant).

The grounds of appeal are examined (to the extent of supplement in case of supplemental appellate briefs not timely filed).

1. Regarding ground of appeal No. 1

A. “Recurring transaction” prescribed by the Door-to-Door Sales, etc. Act (hereinafter “Door Sales Act”) means a transaction under which an agreement is made to restrict the refund of the price or to pay a penalty if a contract for the supply of goods, etc. is terminated in the middle of one month or more continuously or on an irregular basis (Article 2 Subparag. 10 of the same Act), and a consumer who has entered into a contract for recurring transactions, etc. with a continuous transaction business operator, etc. may terminate the contract at any time during the contract period, except as otherwise provided for in other Acts or Presidential Decree for the safety of transaction, etc.

B. On the grounds indicated in its reasoning, the lower court determined that, on March 11, 2014, the instant contract was lawfully terminated by the Defendant (Counterclaim Plaintiff; hereinafter “Defendant”)’s filing of an application for the use of a golf course with the Plaintiff (Counterclaim Defendant; hereinafter “Plaintiff”) on the grounds that the period of use is five years, and the instant contract is subject to restrictions on the refund of the penalty provision under the Door-to-Door Sales Act, on the grounds that the instant contract constitutes a recurring transaction under the Act on Door-to-Door Sales, and therefore, the Defendant may terminate the instant contract at any time during the contract period, on the grounds that the written brief of March 11, 2014, including the Defendant’s expression of intent to terminate the instant contract, reached the Plaintiff on March 28, 2014 (hereinafter “the termination of the instant contract”).

C. Examining the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the relevant statutes and the evidence duly admitted, the lower court did not err in its judgment by misapprehending the legal doctrine on continuous transaction under the Door-to-Door Sales Act and the protection of members under the Installation and Utilization of Sports Facilities Act, contrary to what is alleged in the grounds of appeal, thereby failing to exhaust all necessary deliberations or by applying Article 31 of the Door-to-Door Sales Act, which is unconstitutional (see, e.g., Constitutional Court Decision 2015Hun-Ba371, Jun. 30,

2. As to the grounds of appeal Nos. 2 and 3

A. Interpretation of a juristic act is clearly binding upon the parties’ objective meaning given to the act of indicating the juristic act. In a case where an interpretation of a juristic act indicated in a disposal document is at issue, it shall be reasonably interpreted in accordance with logical and empirical rules, comprehensively taking into account the form and content of the language and text, the motive and background leading up to the juristic act, the purpose and genuine intent to be achieved by the parties by the said juristic act, transaction and customs, etc. (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 2000Da27923, Oct. 6, 2000; 201Da53645, 53652, Oct. 27, 2011).

In addition, the content of a standardized contract shall be objectively and uniformly interpreted on the basis of the average customer's performance possibility without considering the intent or specific circumstances of individual contract-holders. When the contents of a standardized contract are not clear or doubtful in terms of customer protection, it shall be interpreted in favor of customers and disadvantageously against the drafter of the standardized contract (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 2005Da35226, Oct. 28, 2005; 2006Da72093, Feb. 22, 2007; 2009Da79644, Aug. 25, 2011).

B. The lower court, on the grounds indicated in its reasoning, determined as follows.

(1) Upon entering into the instant contract, the Defendant paid KRW 15.95 million to the Defendant, which is the sum of KRW 7.7 million, 7.7 million, 7.5 million, 7.7 million, and 7.7 million, out of which the deposit amount is the amount to be returned to the Defendant at the maturity of the instant contract.

(2) According to Article 7 of the contract terms and conditions of this case, the above contract terms and conditions provisions apply to the termination of this case by the defendant under the door-to-door Sales Act in light of the contents and nature of the above contract terms and conditions.

(3) Accordingly, from 15.9 million won paid by the Defendant, ① KRW 1,595,00, which is equivalent to 10% of the total amount of penalty, and ② KRW 1,826,080, which is the sum of the 8.250,000 won including the 1,826,080 won for the period during which the service was provided (the above 8.250,000 won x 4,520 won) shall be deducted.

(4) However, it is not defined in Article 7 of the above terms and conditions as the meaning of "service fees", and there is no ground to interpret the terms and conditions as KRW 1870,000,000,000, which received discount benefits prior to the cancellation of the instant contract, as alleged by the Plaintiff, and thus, the Plaintiff's assertion that the above KRW 1870,000,000 should be deducted as "service fees."

C. (1) According to the reasoning of the judgment below and the records, the "service completion fee" which the court below acknowledged the deduction from the total subscription fee is related to the admission fee expected to be extinguished as a result of the performance of the contract of this case and the period during which the service was provided prior to the termination of this case among the value-added tax, and thus, constitutes an amount equivalent to the price for the provision of the service, including discount benefits, which was actually claimed before the termination of this case, and thus, the payment for the "service usage fee", which is alleged by the plaintiff, can be recovered through

In addition to these circumstances, examining the evidence duly adopted and the reasoning of the lower judgment in light of the foregoing legal doctrine, the lower court did not err in its judgment by misapprehending the relevant legal doctrine, such as interpretation of legal act, or by failing to exhaust all necessary deliberations, etc.

(2) Meanwhile, the Plaintiff, among the reasoning of the lower judgment, claimed that the amount of “service progress fee”, which is recognized as a result of the Plaintiff’s rejection of the claim on “service use fee” does not exceed KRW 8,250,000,000,000, should be calculated within the limit of the total amount of 8,250,000. However, the lower court’s determination on this part of the lower judgment, including “service use fee,” does not affect the conclusion. Therefore, the allegation in the grounds of appeal that the lower judgment in this part of the lower judgment is erroneous by misapprehending the legal doctrine on the interpretation of the contract law and legal acts and the interpretation of the terms and conditions, or by failing to exhaust all necessary deliberations, and thus, should be reversed.

3. Regarding ground of appeal No. 4

This part of the ground of appeal is the first argument in the final appeal and cannot be a legitimate ground of appeal. Furthermore, even upon examining the above, the defendant's termination of the contract of this case, as seen earlier, is exercising a consumer's right against a continuous transaction business entity pursuant to the Door-to-Door Sales Act, and Article 7 of the Contract Terms and Conditions of this case concerning early termination can be applied to the termination of the contract of this case, so it is possible to avoid damage equivalent to the deducted amount or to coordinate interests. Thus, in light of these circumstances, it is difficult to view that the ground alleged by the plaintiff alone leads to a situation to the extent that the termination of this case is not acceptable in light of the concept of justice.

4. Conclusion

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Park Sang-ok (Presiding Justice)