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(영문) 서울고등법원 2018.6.21. 선고 2017나19434 판결
손해배상등
Cases

2017Na19434 Damage, etc.

Plaintiff Appellant

1. A stock company;

2. B;

3. C

Defendant Elives

D Corporation

The first instance judgment

Seoul Central District Court Decision 2012Gahap42739 Decided August 22, 2013

Judgment before remanding

Seoul High Court Decision 2013Na67077 Decided November 20, 2014

Judgment of remand

Supreme Court Decision 2014Da89355 Decided July 11, 2017

Conclusion of Pleadings

May 3, 2018

Imposition of Judgment

June 21, 2018

Text

1. Pursuant to the conjunctive claim filed by this court for recovery based on subrogation of the plaintiffs, the defendant shall pay to the plaintiff corporation KRW 2,124.905,023 as well as KRW 200,00,00 among them, from January 27, 2009; KRW 1,66,66,67 as from December 16, 2017; KRW 265,613,125 as to the plaintiff corporation B; KRW 25,000 as to KRW 25,333,00 as to the plaintiff corporation; KRW 208,333,00 as to the plaintiff corporation, from January 27, 2009 to December 16, 2017; KRW 796,8329; KRW 75,00,000 as to the plaintiff; and KRW 16,00 to June 21, 200; and KRW 208 as to the plaintiff's annual interest rate of KRW 16,20005.

2. All of the plaintiffs' remaining conjunctive claims are dismissed.

3. 1/10 of the total costs of litigation shall be borne by the Plaintiffs, and the remainder by the Defendant.

4. Paragraph 1 can be provisionally executed.

The purport of the appeal and the scope of the appeal by the court.

1. Purport of claim and appeal

The judgment of the first instance is revoked. The defendant revoked the judgment of 2,420,00,00 won for 2,00,000,000 won for the plaintiff corporation and 2,00,000,000 won for the tort from January 27, 2009 to 20,00,000,000 won for the tort from November 1, 2010 to 20,000,000 won for the plaintiff corporation B (hereinafter referred to as "Plaintiff B") and for 302,50,00,000,000 won for 2,50,000,000 won for the tort from October 17, 2008 to 20,70,000 won for the plaintiff corporation B (hereinafter referred to as "the plaintiff B") and 2,50,000 won for the restitution to 1,07,005,000 won for each of the following reasons:

2. Scope of the judgment of this court;

A. At the first instance court, the Plaintiffs primarily recovered from the original state due to the cancellation of the agreement made on January 5, 2009, and sought the payment of the amount stated in the claim based on the return of unjust enrichment. The first instance court dismissed all the Plaintiffs’ claim.

B. The plaintiffs appealed against this, and before the remanding of the case, the court added the plaintiffs' claim for restitution based on the rescission of the agreement dated October 17, 2008, restitution based on obligee subrogation, restitution based on obligee subrogation, and tort damages. The court dismissed all the plaintiffs' appeal and dismissed the claims for restitution based on obligee subrogation among the additional claims and dismissed all the additional claims.

C. The plaintiffs appealed against this, and the judgment of remand reversed only the part concerning the creditor subrogation's claim, among the conjunctive claims prior to the remanding judgment, and remanded the relevant part to this court, and dismissed the plaintiffs' primary claims and the appeal on the remainder of the conjunctive claims.

D. Therefore, the part of the Plaintiffs’ claim and the remainder of the conjunctive claim, except for the portion of the Plaintiffs’ claim and the claim for restitution based on subrogation, are separately determined by the judgment of remanding. Thus, the scope of the judgment of this court after remanding is limited to the part of the

Reasons

1. Basic facts

A. On October 17, 2008, G purchased land of 317,455 square meters and 2 lots of land (hereinafter “instant land”) from the Defendant (F was a sole representative at the time of the formation of the golf course with the Defendant at the time of the formation of the golf course (hereinafter “the instant golf course”) at KRW 15 billion. At the time of the conclusion of the contract, G entered into an agreement with the Defendant to transfer the name of the instant golf course and pay the Defendant simultaneously at the time of the reduction of the approval of the golf course (hereinafter “instant trade agreement”).

B. On the date of the instant trade agreement, G paid 3 billion won as part of the down payment and intermediate payment to the Defendant. On October 17, 2008, G received money from the Plaintiffs (Plaintiff A2 billion won, Plaintiff B250 million won, Plaintiff C750 million won, and Plaintiff C) on the day of the instant trade agreement, which was on October 17, 2008, on the day of the instant trade agreement. The Plaintiff’s money was paid to the Defendant via G, as the legal team staff of the J group to which the Plaintiff A belongs.

C. After that, on November 10, 2008, the Defendant converted the instant golf course into a joint representative director system to facilitate the instant golf course licensing business. G was appointed as the Defendant’s joint representative director with the existing representative director F on November 10, 2008, and the relevant registration was completed on November 14, 2008.

D. On January 5, 2009, G was appointed as a joint representative director, without F’s consent, with respect to the collective investment of the Plaintiffs in membership golf course businesses using the instant land managed by the Defendant and G as the project site, G, without F’s consent, determined to use the project fund as 15 billion won and distribute business profits by developing the instant land as the site for golf course. However, Plaintiff A’s 40%, Defendant and G’s 40%, Plaintiff B’s 5%, and Plaintiff C’s 15% shares. The Defendant and G are responsible for the instant land, and the authorization and permission should be obtained with the membership golf course as of October 201. If Defendant and G did not obtain the authorization and permission within the period of October 10, 2010, or the Plaintiffs consider that it is unlikely for them to realize the instant project, the Plaintiffs may cancel this agreement with the Defendant’s joint investment agreement to which the terms of the instant collective investment agreement were written, and both the Defendant’s signature and seal impression were written.

E. On January 21, 2009, the Plaintiffs paid KRW 300 million (Plaintiff A20 million, Plaintiff C75 million, and Plaintiff C75 million) to G for the design of the instant golf course. On January 21, 2009, G received receipts (Evidence A 3-1, Party A-7-1, and Party 5) in the name of the Defendant (Evidence A-1, Party A-7-1, and Party 5) on January 21, 2009, stating that G was “F without the consent of the joint representative director” and affixed the seal of the joint representative director on the next side. Accordingly, Plaintiff A and Plaintiff B transferred KRW 250 million to the agricultural bank account in the name of the Defendant, which was separately managed by G, KRW 200,000,000,000,000,000,000 from the Defendant’s account under the name of Defendant No. 371, Mar. 27, 2009, respectively.

F. On the other hand, on May 3, 2011, the Plaintiffs sent a notice to the Defendant and G stating that “In spite of the payment of a total of KRW 3.3 billion under the instant investment agreement, the Defendant and G did not take all the procedures for granting the instant golf course, thereby returning KRW 3.3 billion and compensating for damages.” On July 7, 2011, the Defendant and G received a decision of provisional seizure of real estate with the claim amounting to KRW 3.3 billion.

G. On February 18, 2014, G was sentenced to a suspended sentence of two years for one year (Seoul Central District Court Decision 2013Da4656, Feb. 18, 201) due to criminal facts, etc. that “A borrowed money from several victims without any intent and ability to repay from January 6, 2010 to October 28, 201, and committed fraud” (Seoul Central District Court Decision 2013Da4656, Feb. 18, 2014) at the Seoul Central District Court, G appealed appealed on the pertinent judgment, but the relevant judgment became final and conclusive around that time on grounds of non-submission of the grounds of appeal (Seoul Central District Court Order 2014No1010, Oct. 4, 2014). G was unable to obtain from the Plaintiffs the full amount of money KRW 3.3 billion invested in the Defendant from the Plaintiff, and thus, he/she must prepare a written confirmation from the Plaintiff and deliver it to A (A).

【Unsatisfy-founded fact-finding, Gap's evidence Nos. 1, 3, 5, 7 through 10, 15, 19, 22, 23, and 24 (including branch numbers in the case of provisional evidence; hereinafter the same shall apply), Eul's evidence Nos. 1, 3, 5, 6, 8, and 11, Eul's testimony at the court of first instance, witness I of this court, testimony at the court of first instance, and the purport of the whole pleadings

2. Determination as to the cause of claim

A. The plaintiffs' assertion

Even if it is not recognized that the Plaintiff entered into the instant investment agreement with the Defendant, G has a loan claim equivalent to KRW 3.3 billion, and since the Defendant did not perform its obligations under the instant trading agreement entered into with G, G is entitled to exercise the right to rescind the instant trading agreement against the Defendant on the ground of nonperformance of obligations. However, the Plaintiffs’ loan claim against G and return claim following the cancellation of the instant trading agreement against G are closely related under the instant trading agreement and the instant investment agreement, and it is necessary for G to exercise the right to recover back in subrogation in order to preserve the Plaintiff’s loan claim against G due to its insolvent, thereby exercising the right to rescind the instant trading agreement against G by subrogationing the Plaintiff’s loan claim amounting to KRW 3.3 billion against G as the preserved right. As such, the Defendant is obligated to pay to the Plaintiffs restitution of KRW 3.3 billion and interest or delay damages.

B. Determination

(i)the existence of preserved claims;

Prior to the instant trade agreement, the Plaintiffs paid KRW 3 billion to G on October 17, 2008 ( KRW 2 billion, KRW 250 million, KRW 300 million, KRW 750 million, KRW 750 million, and KRW 300 million, KRW 300 million ( KRW 20 million, KRW 25 million, KRW 375 million, and KRW 300,000, KRW 3000,000, KRW 25,000) as the cost for design of the instant golf course, and Plaintiff A and Plaintiff B paid the pertinent amount to G on January 21, 2009, KRW 30,000, KRW 25,000, KRW 375,000,000, KRW 300,000 to the account in the name of the Defendant managed by G, and the Plaintiffs and G paid to G on January 21, 2009, even before the instant agreement was concluded.

In light of the progress of the payment of KRW 3.3 billion paid by the Plaintiffs (hereinafter “the instant loan”), contents of the instant trading agreement and its relevance, etc., if G did not obtain permission of the instant golf course from October 2010 under the instant investment agreement, or if it is deemed that the Plaintiffs were unlikely to realize the instant golf course even before that date, G lent the instant loan to G with the repayment of the instant loan. On the other hand, if G and the Defendant fail to obtain the instant golf course permission by October 2010, G would have agreed to cancel the instant trading agreement on the grounds of cancellation of the contract pursuant to the instant trading agreement. Meanwhile, even if the Plaintiffs paid KRW 3.3 billion to Defendant and G on May 3, 2011 under the instant investment agreement, it did not follow the instant authorization procedure, and thus, G did not have any dispute between the parties to the instant golf course and the Defendant (the instant notice of refund of the instant loan and compensation for damages).

Therefore, inasmuch as the Plaintiffs sought the return of KRW 3.3 billion of the instant loan to G on the grounds that they failed to obtain the authorization of the instant golf course until October 2010, G would pay KRW 3.3 billion of the instant loan to the Plaintiffs, G would pay interest or delay damages on the instant loan to G. The instant loan claim against G would be the preserved right of creditor of the right of subrogation exercised by the Plaintiffs.

(ii)the existence of subrogation claims

G and the Defendant paid 3 billion won as part of the down payment and intermediate payment to the Defendant at the time of concluding the instant trade agreement on October 17, 2008. After that, G paid 25 million won as part of the down payment and intermediate payment to the Defendant on January 21, 2009, under the pretext of the service cost for the permission of the instant golf course design, the amount of KRW 75 million on February 3, 2009, and the Plaintiff A (20 million), B (25 million won), and C (75 million won) directly deposited into the Defendant’s agricultural account. The fact that the Defendant did not obtain the permission of the instant golf course by October 2010 is as seen earlier.

Therefore, G may rescind the instant sales agreement due to the Defendant’s nonperformance of obligations under the instant sales agreement. If G cancels the instant sales agreement, G may seek restitution of KRW 3.3 billion paid on the basis of the instant sales agreement and the legal interest equivalent thereto after the payment date. However, G’s claim for restitution due to the cancellation of the instant sales agreement may be a subrogation claim of the obligee’s subrogation right, which is exercised by the Plaintiffs.

(iii) the need for conservation;

An obligee may exercise the obligor’s right on behalf of the obligor in order to preserve the obligor’s claim. An obligee is closely related to the obligee’s right to preserve and the obligor’s right to exercise the obligee’s right in subrogation, and the obligee’s exercise of the obligee’s right in subrogation is at risk of not being able to obtain the complete satisfaction of his/her claim unless the obligee exercises his/her right in subrogation of the obligor’s right, and it is necessary to ensure that the obligor’s exercise of the obligee’s right in subrogation of the obligee’s right in subrogation of the obligor’s right is an unreasonable interference with the obligor’s free act of property management (see Supreme Court Decision 2013Da71784, Nov.

In light of these legal principles, the instant case is examined. The evidence Nos. 22, 23, 24 and 5 as well as evidence Nos. 22, 23, and 24 as well as evidence Nos. 5 as well as the testimony of the witness H and witness I of the first instance court, and the following circumstances recognized as being added to the overall purport of the pleadings, etc., the Plaintiffs are closely connected with the instant loan claims against G intended for conservation and the instant claim for restitution due to the cancellation of the instant transaction agreement against the Defendant, which the Plaintiffs intend to exercise on behalf of the Plaintiffs, and the Plaintiffs’ exercise on behalf of the Plaintiffs’ rights is necessary to ensure the validity and proper implementation of the instant loan claims, and there are no special circumstances such as unfair interference with the acts of free management of G’s property, the Plaintiffs may exercise on behalf of the Defendant the right to return due to the cancellation of the instant transaction agreement against G (the fact that G is insolvent is not disputed by the Plaintiffs

① The purpose of the instant trade agreement and the instant investment agreement is to carry out the instant golf course business in the instant land, and the Plaintiffs specifically paid G to use the instant golf course for the business purpose of establishing the instant golf course when paying the instant loan to G. With respect to the instant trade agreement, G paid KRW 3.3 billion to the Defendant, G did not bear any of its entirety and provided money from the Plaintiffs. G was present with I, a legal team of the J Group to which the Plaintiff was affiliated, at the time when G paid the Defendant the amount of KRW 3.3 billion out of the pertinent KRW 3.3 billion to the Defendant. Accordingly, with respect to the Plaintiffs, G was obligated to obtain the authorization of the instant golf course from G in sequence by October 2010, and it is reasonable to deem that the Defendant agreed to pay G the amount paid by the Plaintiffs to G in relation to the instant golf course and the amount paid by G to the Defendant on the grounds of unfulfillment of conditions or rescission of the contract. It is determined that there was a series of economic purposes to achieve the same economic purpose as the instant economic purpose due to return agreement.

② Until now G appears to be impossible to grant authorization for the instant golf course, G does not exercise its right to rescission of the instant trade agreement and right to recover from the original state.

③ G prepared a confirmation document to the effect that, as the Plaintiffs are currently unable to repay the instant loan claims due to lack of financial resources, G received KRW 3.3 billion from the Defendant and received interest, etc., it must deliver to the Plaintiffs.

4) Sub-committee

The Plaintiffs entitled to claim restitution following the cancellation of the instant purchase and sale agreement on behalf of the Defendant by subrogation of G as the preserved right, and the Plaintiffs’ written brief dated August 14, 2014, which included the Plaintiffs’ declaration of intent to claim restitution of restitution, was delivered to the Defendant on August 20, 2014 (e.g., record). Accordingly, the instant purchase and sale agreement between G and the Defendant was lawfully rescinded at that time.

Therefore, the defendant is obligated to pay the legal interest or delay damages calculated at the rate of 3.3 billion won (the plaintiff A2.2 billion won, the plaintiff B.275 billion won, the plaintiff C.825 billion won) and the rate of 6.6% per annum as stipulated in the Commercial Act from the date of each payment of the relevant money, as the restoration to original state following the cancellation of the contract of this case, upon the plaintiffs' request by the plaintiffs who exercise the right to return the purchase and sale of this case by subrogation against the defendant of G.

3. Judgment on the defendant's defense of set-off

A. The parties' assertion

The Defendant asserts that, as the Defendant or F lent money to G on the pertinent date set forth in the table 1 below, the Defendant or F transferred F’s lending to the Defendant on December 7, 2017, the Defendant asserts that, as the Defendant or F transferred the lending claim to G to the Defendant on December 7, 2017, the loans and the lending claim are offset by the same amount as the repayment claim following the cancellation of the instant trading agreement in G.

As to this, the plaintiffs asserted that the defendant's defense of offset constitutes a means of actual attack and defense, or that the defendant's acquisition of the claim from F constitutes invalid in accordance with the analogical application of Article 6 of the Trust Act, as it is similar to the lawsuit trust, and even if not, there is no loan or claim for acquisition claimed by the defendant.

B. Determination as to the plaintiffs' assertion of actual attack and defense method

The plaintiffs' right of subrogation was claimed by adding the plaintiff's right of subrogation to the preliminary claim before the remanding. The judgment before remanding, the appeal against the plaintiff's primary claim is dismissed, the plaintiff's right of subrogation was dismissed, and the remainder of the conjunctive claim was dismissed. The plaintiff reversed and remanded only the part of the creditor's right of subrogation on the ground that the court did not complete all the deliberation on the necessity of subrogation in the judgment of remand. While the trial on the preliminary claim is pending after the remand, the plaintiff set-off was made through the preparatory document dated November 14, 2017.

In light of the following: (a) the process of filing a defense of offset; and (b) the fact that the offset of offset of this case has a preliminary nature; and (c) as seen earlier, both the automatic claim and the passive claim are related to the sales agreement of this case and the investment agreement of this case; and (d) it appears that G and the defendant or F would have planned to settle each other; (b) it cannot be deemed that the defendant submitted the means of attack defense either intentionally or by gross negligence late or delayed the conclusion of the lawsuit; (c) thus, this part of the plaintiffs' assertion cannot be accepted (the plaintiffs asserted that the offset of this case is not permissible as it interferes with the exercise of the obligee's subrogation right as of May 24, 2018, after the closing of argument. The third obligor is the obligee's third obligor's exercise of the obligee's subrogation right against the third obligor; (c) there is no reason to be more unfavorable than the obligor's exercise of the obligee's subrogation right; and therefore, (d) it cannot be accepted in light of the relationship between the automatic claim and the claim of this case.

C. Judgment on the plaintiffs' assertion on the lawsuit trust

In a case where the assignment of a claim mainly takes place with the intent to conduct procedural acts, even if the assignment of claim does not fall under a trust under the Trust Act, Article 6 of the Trust Act shall be deemed null and void, even if the said assignment of claim does not fall under a trust under the Trust Act. In light of the following circumstances, such as: (a) the claims the Defendant acquired from F are related to the instant trade agreement for the instant golf course business; and (b) the fact that F borrowed money to G was lent by the Defendant for the first time due to the Defendant’s financial situation; (c) in light of the nature of the claims that the Defendant acquired, and the background leading up to the occurrence of the claims, it is difficult to deem that the Defendant primarily took over the claims against G from F with the intent to conduct procedural acts.

Therefore, this part of the plaintiffs' assertion cannot be accepted.

D. Judgment on the defendant's defense of set-off

(i) the existence of automatic claims

In full view of the purport of the arguments in evidence Nos. 22, 23, and 10, 11, and 12 as a whole, the following facts are as follows: ① Defendant and F have lent KRW 1,487,30,000 to G as stated in the part as “O” in the items as to whether the following Table 1 is recognized; ② Defendant acquired KRW 767,30,000, which is the whole amount recognized as F’s loans from F on December 7, 2017; ③ It is difficult to recognize the fact that the F has received the notification to G on December 13, 2017, and that the notification has been given to G on December 17, 2017; and on the other hand, it is difficult to recognize the existence of the following part as evidence only based on the evidence stated below’s claims and evidence.

[Attachment 1] - Of recognized amounts, the amounts set forth in sequence 1, 12, 22 shall be lent by the Defendant, and the remainder shall be lent by the F.

A person shall be appointed.

A person shall be appointed.

A person shall be appointed.

A) At the time of undergoing an investigation in G-related criminal cases, K stated that: (a) the Defendant loaned KRW 55,300,000 to an investigative agency, G; (b) the Defendant or F lending approximately KRW 16 times from February 25, 2009 to July 25, 201; and (c) the Defendant or F lending KRW 755,30,000 to KRW 16 times (Evidence A22); and (d) the lending is in comparison with the amount recognized as at the corresponding period in Table 1 (see, e.g., the Defendant’s reference document as at June 12, 2018); and (e) the portion inconsistent with the relevant period as at June 12, 2018, according to the evidence described in Table 1 (Evidence evidence).

B) On January 21, 2009, which was not recognized in Table 1, KRW 203,00,000 on January 22, 2009, KRW 100,000 on January 22, 2009, KRW 110,000 on May 14, 2010, and KRW 30,000 on November 18, 2010, the said money is deemed to be the money paid to ADD Design Co., Ltd., which entered into a design service contract with the Defendant (the Defendant’s preparatory document on November 3, 2017, the document submitted by the Defendant alone cannot be deemed to have been leased to the Defendant or G, and it does not include the content of G related criminal cases in G at the time of the investigation.

(ii)a offset;

If the assignee offsets the assignee's claim against the assignee after the assignment of the claim, the set-off date is the time when the requisites for setting up the assignment of claim are met. In addition, in the event of declaration of intention of set-off, the obligation is extinguished retroactively from the equal amount at the time of set-off, and thus, the calculation of the difference between the two claims due to set-off and the appropriation of set-off will be based on

Inasmuch as G’s restitution claim against the Defendant and the Defendant’s repayment claim against G are all claims with no fixed time limit, the said time limit becomes due and the said time limit becomes due, and each time limit becomes due. Meanwhile, KRW 767,300,000 against F’s loan claim against G taken over by the Defendant F from F reaches G, and the notification that F transferred the loan claim to the Defendant would be offset on December 15, 2017, when the notification that F transferred the loan claim to the Defendant reaches G.

(iii) calculation;

In a case where a debtor set-off with automatic claims that fall short of extinguishing the whole amount of several claims for creditors, the legal doctrine on appropriation of performance under Articles 476 through 479 of the Civil Act shall apply mutatis mutandis pursuant to Article 499 of the Civil Act. The defendant set-off in this court the defendant's loans and the assignee-paid claims in proportion to the amount of the plaintiffs' subrogation claims, but the defendant set-off claims by designating that the original amount is the large amount of claims among the plaintiffs' respective claims.

Therefore, among G’s claim to return KRW 2 billion related to the Defendant on October 17, 2008, and claim to return KRW 200 million related to KRW 200,000,000,000,000,000,000 as of January 21, 2009, the original amount of which is the maximum amount, and G’s claim to return related to KRW 2 billion related to KRW 17,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 won as of October 17, 2008, the original amount of which is the maximum amount, and the amount of claim to return KRW 7,50,000,00,00 related to the original claim to G’s Defendant on January 21, 2008.

According to these legal principles, if a set-off is appropriated in proportion to the plaintiffs' subrogated claims, the defendant's loans and the acquired-off claims are as listed below 2, 3, and 4, and the defendant's defense of set-off is reasonable within the scope below.

[Attachment 2, Plaintiff A]

A person shall be appointed.

[Attachment 3, Plaintiff B]

A person shall be appointed.

[Attachment 4, Plaintiff C]

A person shall be appointed.

4) Sub-committee

Therefore, according to the plaintiffs' claim by subrogation of their claim for restitution following the cancellation of the purchase and sale agreement of G. G. 2, with respect to KRW 2,124,905,022) and KRW 20,00 as of January 21, 2009, which is the date of payment, the defendant is obligated to pay KRW 1,66,66,67 as of December 16, 2017; KRW 265,125,125,23) and KRW 25,00 as of KRW 20 and KRW 20,00 as of KRW 20 and KRW 30,00,00 as of KRW 25,00,00, KRW 20,000, KRW 20,000, KRW 365,000, KRW 20,000, KRW 30,000, KRW 20,000, KRW 3631,37,2038.

4. Conclusion

In this Court, the plaintiffs' claims are accepted within the scope mentioned above according to the plaintiffs' claims for restitution based on subrogation of creditors, and the remaining preliminary claims are dismissed as they are groundless.

Judges

Judges Kim Yong-dae

Judges Lee Dong-dae

Judges Kim Jong-Un

Note tin

1) 2/3 of KRW 500,000 (=the ratio of Plaintiff A’s claim, 2,000,000,000 won/3,000,000,000,000 won, and more than KRW 3,000,00, hereinafter the same shall apply)

2) 6% interest per annum under the Commercial Act for KRW 1,66,66,67 from October 17, 2008 to October 10, 2009.

3) 20,000,000 won 2/3 (=the Plaintiff’s claim ratio, 2,000,000,000 won 3,000,000,000 won)

4) 6% interest per annum under the Commercial Act on KRW 1,66,66,67 from October 2, 2009 to July 25, 2011

5) 200,000,000 won ¡¿ 2/3(=the Plaintiff’s claim ratio, 2,000,000,000 won/3,000,000,000 won)

6) The annual interest of KRW 1,66,66,67 under the Commercial Act for KRW 1,67 from July 7, 2011 to December 12, 2017; and

7) 767,300,000 won ¡¿ 2/3(=the Plaintiff’s claim ratio, 2,000,000,000 won/3,000,000,000 won)

8) 1/12 (=the ratio of Plaintiff B’s claim to Plaintiff B, 250,000,000/3,000,000,000,000)

9) 6% interest of 208,33,333 won per annum as prescribed by the Commercial Act from October 17, 2008 to October 10, 2009.

10) 20,000,000 won x 1/12(=the ratio of Plaintiff B’s claim, 250,000,000 won 3,000,000 won)

11) 6% interest under the Commercial Act for KRW 208,33,333 from February 10, 2009 to July 25, 201

12) 200,000,000x1/12 (=the ratio of Plaintiff B’s claim, 250,000,000 won/3,300,000,000 won)

13) From July 26, 201 to December 15, 2017, 6% interest under the Commercial Act on KRW 208,33,333 per annum;

14) 1/12 (=the ratio of Plaintiff B’s claim, KRW 250,000,000/3,000,000,000)

15) 3/12 of KRW 500,000 (=the ratio of Plaintiff C’s claim, KRW 750,000,000/3,000,000,000)

16) Interest at 6% per annum under the Commercial Act for 625,00,000 won from January 1, 2008 to October 1, 2009

17) 20,000,000 won x 3/12(=the ratio of Plaintiff C’s claim, 750,000,000 won / 3,000,000,000 won)

18) 6% interest under the Commercial Act on 625,00,000 won from October 2, 2009 to July 25, 2011

19) 200,000,000 won x 3/12 (=the Plaintiff C’s claim ratio, 750,000,000 won / 3,000,000,000 won)

20) 6% interest under the Commercial Act for KRW 625,00,000 from December 15, 2011 to December 15, 2017

21) 7,300,000 won 3/12(=the ratio of Plaintiff C’s claim, 750,000,000 won/3,000,000,000 won)

22) After offsetting the refund claims related to the 1,66,66,66,67 won + Interest 258,238,356 won + Principal of the refund claims with KRW 200,00,000,00 won on January 21, 2009

23) After offsetting the refund claims related to October 17, 2008, the principal amount of KRW 208,33,333 + interest of KRW 32,279,792 after offsetting in question + the principal amount of the refund claims amounting to KRW 25,00,000,000 on January 21, 2009

24) After offsetting the refund claim related to October 17, 2008, the principal of KRW 625,000,000 + Interest KRW 96,839,382 after offsetting in question + the principal of the refund claim amounting to KRW 75,00,000,000 on February 3, 2009

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