Seoul Administrative Court 201Guhap42932 ( October 11, 2012)

Seocho 2011west 2115 (Law No. 19, 2011)

Online video lectures provided without reporting as a remote lifelong educational facility is not exempt from tax.

As long as educational services are provided without obtaining permission or filing a report in accordance with the Educational Facilities-Related Act that sets the standards for specific facilities, equipment, etc. related to education, it shall not be deemed to fall under the educational services subject to tax exemption provided for in the Value-Added Tax Act.

Article 12 of the Value-Added Tax Act

Article 30 of the Enforcement Decree of the Value Added Tax Act

2012Nu35384. Revocation of the imposition of value-added tax

AA

Head of Mapo Tax Office

Seoul Administrative Court Decision 201Guhap42932 decided October 11, 2012

July 9, 2013

August 16, 2013

1. The plaintiff's appeal is dismissed.

2. The costs of appeal shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

The judgment of the first instance shall be revoked.

The imposition of each value-added tax and additional tax in the separate sheet No. 1 that the defendant has filed against the plaintiff.

Recognizing that a disposition is void.

Preliminaryly, the imposition of each value-added tax and additional tax in the attached Form 1 revoked filed by the Defendant against the Plaintiff shall be revoked.

1. A cited part;

The reasons for this case are the same as the reasons for the decision of the court of first instance, except for the addition to the following 2.2., and they are cited in accordance with Article 8(2) of the Administrative Litigation Act and the main sentence of Article 420 of the Civil Procedure Act.

2. The addition;

The following parts shall be added between the six pages 9 and 10 of the judgment of the first instance:

On the other hand, Article 12 (1) 5 of the Value-Added Tax Act, and Article 30 of the Enforcement Decree of the Value-Added Tax Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 22043, Feb. 18, 2010; hereinafter the same) provides that the education services provided by the Plaintiff are exempt from taxation in schools permitted or authorized by the Government, educational institutes, training institutes, training institutes, teaching institutes, and other non-profit organizations under the direction and supervision of the government. However, it is argued that the education services provided by the Plaintiff are for both purposes under the direction and supervision of the government. The Plaintiff did not violate the administrative law within the period of providing the education services, and there was no room for the Plaintiff to direct and supervise the competent authority as a result, so deeming the education services exempted from value-added tax to be in conformity with the principle of substantial taxation and tax equity.

In light of the principle of tax law, the interpretation of tax law must be strict, and the expanded interpretation or analogical interpretation shall not be permitted (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 98Du1192, Dec. 26, 2000). Value-added tax is originally imposed on all goods and services as a general consumption tax in principle. However, as an exception to this principle, value-added tax is exempted only in certain cases in order to achieve policy objectives in society, culture, and public interest, it is necessary to strictly and narrowly interpret the provision of the service subject to tax exemption as stated in the general tax law.

Education is the basic purpose of fostering people's character completion and independent ability for living, and it is necessary to protect the service cost as tax exemption because the government needs many support from the social development sources.On the other hand, education is various kinds of laws and regulations, and the form, name, and content of educational institutions are various kinds of laws and regulations, so it is also necessary to guide and supervise the corresponding government.

Accordingly, Article 12 (1) 5 of the Value-Added Tax Act provides that the education service shall not be subject to tax exemption, and Article 30 of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act provides that the education service provided by the government, i.e., the school under the direction and supervision of the government, the school under the permission or authorization of the government, and the educational service provided by the training institute, etc. shall be exempted from tax exemption. In addition, if the relevant educational institution is included within the scope of the direction and supervision by a report or registration to the competent administrative agency, it is reasonable to deem that the education service provided by the educational institution is included in tax exemption because the purpose of the establishment of the concept of the government's permission or authorization has been achieved. Therefore, the "government's permission or authorization" includes the "registration or report to the competent administrative agency" under the Education Facilities Act, and the fundamental reason for the government's permission and authorization is to guide and supervise the relevant educational institution (see Supreme Court Decision 2007Du23255, Jun. 12, 2008).

Therefore, the education service provided without obtaining permission or filing a report in accordance with the Educational Facilities-Related Act that sets the standards for specific facilities and equipment related to education, and it cannot be viewed as an education service subject to tax exemption under Article 12(1)5 of the Value-Added Tax Act and Article 30 of the Enforcement Decree of the Value-Added Tax Act.

The Plaintiff asserts that the taxation and tax exemption should be separated not by the government's permission or authorization, but by whether there was a violation of the administrative laws and regulations at the time of taxation at the time of taxation. However, this is not only inconsistent with the express provisions of the Value-Added Tax Act, but also if the Plaintiff provided educational services without permission or reporting from the beginning in light of the purport of the above provision, it is difficult to view that the provision of services is included within the scope of the direction and supervision of the competent authority, and as a result, the mere fact that there was no violation of the relevant administrative laws and regulations within the taxable period is not the same as the provision of educational services that were conducted through permission or reporting in accordance with the Education Facility Act

Therefore, the plaintiff's above assertion is without merit.

3.In conclusion

Then, the plaintiff's main claim and ancillary claim are all dismissed as they are without merit, and the judgment of the court of first instance is just, and the plaintiff's appeal is dismissed, and it is so decided as per Disposition.