The case holding that the solicitation cannot be deemed to be a solicitation for another person's case or affairs, even if the request was received with the request for the request to the relevant public officials for the solicitation, and the request was not made.

The case holding that if the defendant received money from the executive secretary in charge of the promotion committee to request the relevant public officials in exchange for teaching expenses in order to approve housing construction projects belonging to the affairs in charge of the affairs as the executive secretary of the promotion committee for literature-related development under the Korean Association, such solicitation cannot be deemed as a solicitation for another person's case or affairs.

Subparagraph 1 of Article 78 of the former Attorney-at-Law Act

[Plaintiff-Appellant] Plaintiff 1 and 1665 delivered on November 11, 1980 (Gong1981, 13379) (Gong1984, 52) and 92Do2733 delivered on November 8, 1983 (Gong193, 1422)

Defendant

Defendant

Seoul Criminal Court Decision 93No8297 delivered on July 14, 1994

The judgment of the court below is reversed, and the case is remanded to Seoul District Court Panel Division.

Judgment ex officio is made.

With respect to the violation of the Attorney-at-Law Act, the court below found that the defendant received KRW 20,00,000 from the public officials of the Gyeonggi-do Planning Secretary-at-Law at the request of Non-Party 1, who is in exclusive charge of the practice of the Association-at-law association, and that the defendant's act constitutes Article 78 subparagraph 1 of the Attorney-at-Law Act (amended by Act No. 4544 of Mar. 10, 193) on the ground that he received KRW 20,00 from the public officials of the Gyeonggi-do Planning Secretary-at-Law at the request of the relevant government office, when the forest purchased by the Association for the construction of a literature-at-law as a member of the literature-at-law promotion committee of the Korea Association of Korea (hereinafter referred to as the "Association"), and that the defendant's act constitutes the act of the defendant under Article 78 subparagraph 1 of the Attorney-at-Law Act (amended by Act No. 454

However, in light of the records, the Association wishes to promote the construction of modern literature memorial hall and literature village from 1986 to 198, and to purchase forest land at the time of original adjudication and sell it to the members of the Association as housing site. On February 1989, the Association formed a literature village housing association and planned to build a house, and the chairperson of the Association formed a literature village housing association and entrusts the president of the Association with the operation committee and executive secretary, and the executive secretary is assigned to Nonindicted 2. The executive secretary, the executive secretary of the Association, was the executive secretary of the Association, and the defendant, as the executive secretary of the Association, was in charge of the recruitment of the housing association members, the settlement of land purchase price, the registration-related work of land, and the approval of the project to the related administrative agencies. The defendant was not informed of the change of the form and quality of land and the approval of the housing construction project from the committee of promoters and Gyeonggi-do to 19. The defendant's request to the above public official of Gyeonggi-do to receive money from the above public official of Gyeonggi-do.

Therefore, the court below should have deliberated on the above facts in order to find the defendant guilty of the above acts and determined that the above solicitation's business was a violation of the Attorney-at-Law Act without doing so, although it should have confirmed whether the above solicitation's business was about another person's case or business. The court below erred by misapprehending the legal principles on the above provision of the law or failing to exhaust all necessary deliberations, and it is clear that such illegality affected the conclusion of the judgment.

Therefore, without any need to determine the defendant's grounds of appeal, the part of the judgment of the court below which violated the Attorney-at-Law Act cannot be reversed. Since the above violation of the Attorney-at-Law Act and the remaining crimes are concurrent crimes under the former part of Article 37 of the Criminal Act, the judgment of the court below is reversed in its entirety, and the case is remanded to the court below for further proceedings consistent with

Justices Ahn Yong-sik (Presiding Justice)