1. All of the plaintiff's claims are dismissed.

2. The costs of lawsuit shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

On March 27, 2008 and May 1, 2008, the Defendant’s imposition of KRW 196,136,960 in total, education tax of KRW 58,840,910 in total, value-added tax of KRW 25,497,820 in total shall be revoked.

1. Details of the disposition;

A. The Plaintiff imported 39 passengers from Da○ ○○ ○○ ○○ ○○ ○○○ ○○ ○○ ○○ ○○ ○○ ○○ ○○ ○○ ○○ ○ ○○ ○○ ○○ ○ ○ ○○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○○ ○○ ○ ○○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○.) in the U.S. and filed an import declaration with the Defendant subject to non-taxation under Article 1 of the Enforcement Decree of the former Special Consumption Tax Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 20516, Dec. 31, 2007; hereinafter the same).

B. The instant motor vehicle has nine seating capacity in the seat divided into four columns, and four seats are allowed to easily escape and attach three seats in front and rear the left of the vehicle in preparation for cases where it is necessary to secure the rear space. The shape of the vehicle in front and rear the left of the vehicle is the etrop type, the Gu method is the four-wheeled type, the external shape is the structure of the H type, the length is 5,700m, the width is 2,080m, the height is 2,350m, the vehicle weight is 2,610km, the vehicle weight is 5,328cc.

C. On March 27, 2008 and May 1, 2008, the Defendant: (a) deemed that the instant automobile falls under a franking passenger car that is subject to special consumption tax under the above related Acts and subordinate statutes; and (b) on May 1, 2008, the Defendant imposed the Plaintiff a total of KRW 196,136,960, total of education tax, KRW 58,840,910, total of value-added tax, KRW 25,497,820, total of value-added tax, and KRW 63,236,260, respectively (hereinafter “instant disposition”).

D. On June 24, 2008, when the Plaintiff filed an objection against the instant disposition, but was dismissed, on November 13, 2008, the Plaintiff filed an appeal against the instant disposition with the Tax Tribunal on Apr. 29, 2010, and received a decision on Apr. 20, 2010 that “The instant disposition against the Plaintiff by the Defendant against the Plaintiff on Apr. 27, 2008 and May 1, 2010, did not add additional tax of KRW 63,236,260, and was corrected.”

[Reasons for Recognition] There is no dispute, the entry of Gap evidence Nos. 1 through 13, Eul evidence Nos. 1 through 5, and the purport of the whole pleadings. 2. Whether the instant disposition is legitimate or not for the following reasons of the plaintiff's assertion, and thus, the instant disposition should be revoked.

1) Article 1 [Attachment 1] of the former Enforcement Decree of the Special Consumption Tax Act and the Enforcement Decree of the same Act do not provide for the concept of a temporary motor vehicle, and Article 1 [Attachment 1] of the former Enforcement Decree of the Special Consumption Tax Act provides that the part of a temporary motor vehicle is excessively abstract and unclear to the extent that it may cause arbitrary interpretation and enforcement by the tax authority, and thus

2) In general, balp-type vehicles mean vehicles with a height of height, front and rear, and with two or four wheels used for military or mountain areas or for the purpose of test operation. As such, balp-type vehicles can not be regarded as balp-type vehicles with a two-wheeled type, a four-wheeled type, a four-wheeled type, a two-wheeled type, and a two-wheeled type, a two-wheeled type, a two-wheeled type, and a two-wheele

3) Prior to the instant disposition, even though the Defendant already classified 9-type passenger cars similar to the instant automobiles as passenger cars, it is against the principle of trust and good faith and the principle of protecting trust.

(b) Related statutes;

It is as shown in the attached Table related statutes.

C. Determination

1) Even if the general, abstract, and general provision on the first argument is a general, abstract, and general provision, if its significance can be embodied and clarified through the interpretation as a supplement of the judge's law, such provision cannot be viewed as contrary to the principle of clarity of taxation requirements due to lack of clarity (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2000Du9076, Apr. 27, 2001).

In the instant case, there is no provision on the concept of a temporary motor vehicle, which is a taxable goods of the former Special Consumption Tax Act, but can specify and clarify the concept of a temporary motor vehicle as seen below in light of the spirit of no taxation without the law, the legislative intent of the Special Consumption Tax Act, the type, use, nature, and other important factors of the relevant goods, etc., and thus, it cannot be deemed that Article 1 [Attachment Table 1] of the Enforcement Decree of the Special Consumption Tax Act is too abstract and unclear to the extent that the part of a temporary motor vehicle is likely to cause arbitrary interpretation and enforcement by the tax authorities.

Therefore, the above part of the Enforcement Decree of the former Special Consumption Tax Act cannot be deemed to violate the principle of clarity of taxation requirements required under the Constitution. Therefore, the plaintiff's above assertion is without merit.

2) A) (1) As to the second argument, it should be judged from an independent standpoint in accordance with the purpose of legislation and the contents of the Special Consumption Tax Act and the Enforcement Decree of the same Act, which aims to create a sound consumption climate, and it should not be determined in accordance with the classification of model under the Automobile Management Act which differs from the purpose of legislation and the method of classification. In addition, whether a certain product constitutes a spun type passenger car which is a taxable object of special consumption should be determined reasonably by comprehensively taking into account the type, purpose of use, nature, and other important characteristics of the relevant product together with the above legislative intent (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 9Du7180, Jun. 12, 2001; 94Nu6574, Apr. 21, 1995)

(2) Article 1(2)3 of the former Special Consumption Tax Act provides for passenger cars that are subject to imposition of special consumption tax, and Article 1 [Attachment 1] of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act provides that among passenger cars referred to in Article 3 of the Automobile Management Act, passenger cars are included in two-wheeled automobiles with a total engine capacity of not more than eight persons, a fp-type vehicle, and an engine engine, the total engine displacement of which exceeds 125 cc, and a motor vehicle for camping.

On the other hand, Article 3 of the Automobile Management Act (amended by Act No. 8852 of Feb. 29, 2008) classify automobiles into passenger cars, buses, trucks, special automobiles, and two-wheeled automobiles according to their size, structure, type of engine, total engine displacement, etc., and classify automobiles into passenger cars, passenger cars, freight cars, special automobiles, and two-wheeled automobiles, and Article 2 (1) 1 of the Enforcement Rule of the same Act provides that automobiles are manufactured suitable for transport of not more than 10 persons and buses are manufactured in combination for transport of not less than 11 persons. Article 2 (2) [Attachment 1] of the Enforcement Rule of the same Act provides that two or four parts of passenger cars are listed in the passenger cars and the two or three seats seated in the two or three seats before and after them are installed, and it is not a general type of automobile or a type of passenger freight, which is designed as a type of examination (including a type of passenger car and a type of car.).

(3) Comprehensively considering the above relevant laws and regulations, i.e., the term "Jep" means the trademark name of a vehicle manufactured by a mercator in the U.S., and of a similar structure, which is a four-wheeled vehicle, but generally means a small four-wheeled vehicle that can use four wheels in the world. As such, the scope of automobiles can be seen as a mercatory vehicle is relatively wide, and as the type and size of a mercatory vehicle are similar to those of a mercatory vehicle manufactured by a mercator in the U.S., which can be recognized as being combined with the above relevant laws and regulations, such as the provision of the Enforcement Decree of the Special Consumption Tax Act. However, considering the fact-finding of a mercatory vehicle that can be seen as a mercatory vehicle or a similar type and size of a mercatory vehicle, the former Enforcement Decree of the Special Consumption Tax Act is more than the provision of Article 3 of the Motor Vehicle Management Act.

B) In full view of the foregoing facts and the above evidence, the instant motor vehicle is deemed to be included in the paper-type motor vehicle as provided in Article 1 [Attachment Table 1] of the Enforcement Decree of the Special Consumption Tax Act, on the ground that the shape of the instant motor vehicle is in the shape of the body, the Gu-dong method, the bottom structure, and the fact that it was manufactured suitable for the use as a passenger motor vehicle rather than being used for the purpose of passenger transport. Therefore, the Plaintiff’s assertion is without merit.

3) In general, regarding the third argument, the tax authority should state the public opinion that is the object of good faith and trust protection to the tax authority's act in a tax law relationship first, and second, the tax authority must state the public opinion that the taxpayer is the object of good faith, and second, there should be no cause attributable to the taxpayer on the trust that the tax authority's statement of opinion is justifiable, third, the taxpayer must trust the name of the opinion and act what it is, and fourth, the tax authority should make a disposition contrary to the above opinion statement, thereby infringing the taxpayer's interest (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 84Nu593, Apr. 23, 1985). It should not prevent the tax authority from disposing of retroactively against the past's speech and behavior, and it should not prevent the disposition to the future by correcting the past's speech and behavior.

B) In full view of the purport of the argument in the statement of evidence Nos. 6 and the statement of evidence No. 6 of this case, it can be recognized that the automobile similar to the automobile of this case imported by the plaintiff on June 24, 2002 and July 20 of the same year as of July 24, 2002 is not a frane automobile as provided in Article 1 [Attachment 1] of the former Enforcement Decree of the Special Consumption Tax Act, but a passenger automobile with a fixed number of not more than eight persons, and the special consumption tax, etc. was imposed. However, even if the disposition of this case, such as the special consumption tax, constitutes a public opinion list of the tax authorities, and thus the disposition of this case is contrary to the above public opinion list, even if the disposition of this case was made contrary to the above public opinion list of the tax authorities, the disposition of this case was corrected to be a frant type as provided in Article 1 [Attachment 1] of the former Enforcement Decree of the Special Consumption Tax Act. Therefore, the plaintiff's assertion cannot be justified.

3. Conclusion

Therefore, the plaintiff's claim of this case is dismissed as it is without merit. It is so decided as per Disposition.