A. Method of determining admissibility and voluntariness of the suspect interrogation protocol against the defendant prepared by the prosecutor

(b) Document which is the object in regard to the preparation of a false public document;

C. Purport of Article 16 of the Criminal Act

A. The protocol of interrogation of the accused prepared by the public prosecutor is admissible unless there is any reason to suspect that the accused's statement recorded in the protocol is not voluntary, when the accused's statement recorded in the protocol is acknowledged to have been made in the court room. In the event that there is a dispute over whether the protocol is voluntary, the court shall make a decision with free evaluation of evidence in accordance with the specific case, by taking into account all the circumstances, such as the form and contents of the protocol

(b)a document which is the object of the offence of preparation of a false official document shall be exempted to the extent that it can be inferred from the document itself, such as the form, content, etc. of the document, even though the person under whose name the document is prepared does not specify, as well as from the case where the person under whose name the document

C. Article 16 of the Criminal Act provides that his act of misunderstanding that his act does not constitute a crime under the law shall not be punishable only when there is a justifiable reason for the misunderstanding. It does not mean a simple site of law, but it is generally accepted that his act constitutes a crime but, in his special circumstances, it does not constitute a crime under the law, and that he shall not be punishable when there is a justifiable reason for misunderstanding that his act does not constitute a crime.

A. Articles 307, 308, and 312(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act

A. Supreme Court Decision 90Do646 delivered on June 8, 1990 (Gong1990, 1500) 90Do741 delivered on June 22, 1990 (Gong1990, 1623) 93Do318 delivered on February 8, 1994 (Gong1994Sang, 104), Supreme Court Decision 73Do1765 delivered on September 29, 197 (Gong1973, 7535 delivered on April 15, 1994) (Gong194Do1793 delivered on June 16, 1995)

A

Defendant

Law Firm B, Attorneys C et al.

Seoul District Court Decision 95No1765 delivered on July 27, 1995

The appeal is dismissed.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. On the first ground for appeal:

In light of the records, the judgment of the court below and the court of first instance, which found the defendant guilty of the facts charged in this case, shall not be deemed to have any error of misconception of facts due to a violation of the rules of evidence as alleged in the grounds for appeal.

In addition, the protocol of interrogation of the defendant prepared by the public prosecutor is admissible unless there is any reason to suspect that the defendant's statement recorded in the protocol is not free, in particular, if the defendant's statement in the protocol is acknowledged to be made in the court room, and if there is a dispute over whether it is voluntary, the court shall determine it free in accordance with a specific case by taking into account all the circumstances such as the form and contents of the protocol, the academic background, career, intelligence of the person who made the statement, etc. (see Supreme Court Decision 93Do318 delivered on February 8, 194; Supreme Court Decision 90Do741 delivered on June 22, 190, etc.). In the same purport, the court below did not find any reason to suspect that the defendant's statement made before the public prosecutor is not arbitrarily made in accordance with the contents and form of the above protocol of interrogation, and the statement related to the crime in the court of the defendant, and it is reasonable to recognize the voluntariness of statement

2. On the second ground for appeal:

A. A document which is the object of the crime of preparation of a false official document is a document which can be the object of the crime in case where the person in charge of preparation of the document is specified, and in case where the document itself, such as the form, content, etc. of the document, can be inferred even if the person in charge does not specify it (see Supreme Court Decision 73Do1765 delivered on September 29, 1973).

In the same purport, the court below held that each protocol of interrogation of Nonindicted Party D, E, and F does not have the signature and seal of the originator at the end of each protocol, but each protocol of interrogation of each of the above protocol is written in the position and name of the judicial police assistant and the participating judicial police assistant, and thus, each of the above protocol of interrogation can be deemed as an official document which is the object of the crime of preparing a false official document, on the ground that it can be inferred by the document itself. In light of the records, the court below found the defendant guilty of the crime of preparing a false official document of this case and the crime of uttering of that document. In light of the records, such recognition and judgment of the court below are reasonable, and there

B. According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below acknowledged facts as stated in its holding, and rejected the defendant's assertion that there is no possibility of legitimate assertion and expectation of the defendant's act on the ground that the defendant's act was caused to commit the crime of this case in order to arrest the persons who committed narcotics of higher organization, but it appears that the act of arbitrarily preparing official documents without the prosecutor's investigation direction is an act which is reasonable to the extent permitted in light of ordinary people's common sense, or that there is no inevitable circumstance in which the prosecutor should prepare a false official document without making oral investigation instructions through telephone, etc. on the ground that the situation is urgent. In light of the records, the court below's recognition and determination is reasonable, and there is no error of law by misunderstanding the legal principles on legitimate act and expectation, as alleged in the grounds of appeal

C. Meanwhile, the court below erred by failing to determine the argument that the defendant's act was not punishable under Article 16 of the Criminal Act because the defendant's act was committed with the knowledge that it would be legitimate if the defendant had done all of the acts according to the prosecutor's investigation order, and that his act was not punishable under the law. However, Article 16 of the Criminal Act provides that his act of misunderstanding that it does not constitute a crime pursuant to the law shall not be punishable only when there is a justifiable reason. Generally, it does not mean a simple case of law, but it is generally a case where a crime is committed, but it is recognized that it does not constitute a crime as permitted under the law, and it is not punishable if there is a justifiable reason for misunderstanding that the defendant's act was committed with the knowledge that it would not constitute a crime under the law, and thus, it would not be punishable (see Supreme Court Decision 94Do365, Apr. 15, 199; Supreme Court Decision 94Do1793, Jun. 16, 1995).

3. Therefore, the appeal is dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating judges.

Justices Park Jong-ho (Presiding Justice)