[1] Where a worker renounces the selection of a disciplinary committee member, the validity of the resolution of the disciplinary committee consisting solely of the employer's disciplinary committee members (effective)

[2] The case holding that a just reinstatement was made even if a worker was reinstated for another work different from the previous one while the worker was reinstated

[1] If a disciplinary action is brought against the organization of the disciplinary committee in violation of the collective agreement, rules of employment, or disciplinary regulations based thereon despite the fact that the representative of the worker is required to be present in the organization of the disciplinary committee, the exercise of the right to discipline shall be deemed null and void regardless of whether the grounds for disciplinary action are recognized. However, if the worker has given the worker an opportunity to select a disciplinary commissioner on his/her own even though he/she given the worker an opportunity to exercise the right to select a disciplinary commissioner, it shall not be deemed null and void even if the disciplinary action was taken by the disciplinary committee

[2] The case affirming the judgment of the court below which held that where the employer, upon the recommendation of the Regional Labor Relations Commission, returned the worker who was dismissed, and had been dismissed until the date of the dismissal, performed reasonable work to the reinstated worker in consideration of personnel order, operational needs of the employerism, and changes in the working environment, etc. under the premise that the dismissal is valid after the dismissal, such work shall be deemed to fall under the scope of management rights inherent in the principle of use, even though it is somewhat different

[1] Article 27 of the former Labor Standards Act (amended by Act No. 5305 of March 13, 1997) / [2] Article 27 of the former Labor Standards Act (amended by Act No. 5305 of March 13, 1997)

[1] Supreme Court Decision 93Da29167 delivered on June 14, 1994 (Gong1994Ha, 1941), Supreme Court Decision 95Da1323 delivered on June 13, 1995 (Gong1995Ha, 2394), Supreme Court Decision 95Da13708 delivered on February 23, 1996 (Gong1996Sang, 1053) / [2] Supreme Court Decision 94Da4295 delivered on July 29, 1994 (Gong194Ha, 2235)

Plaintiff (Law Firm citizen General Law Office, Attorneys Kim Seon-soo et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

An exemplary taxi in a limited partnership company (Attorney Im-soo et al., Counsel for defendant-appellant)

Seoul High Court Decision 96Na15512 delivered on October 2, 1996

The appeal is dismissed. The costs of appeal are assessed against the plaintiff.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. On the first ground for appeal

If a disciplinary action is brought in violation of the disciplinary procedure despite the fact that the representative of the worker, such as a trade union, is allowed to participate in the composition of the disciplinary committee under the collective agreement or rules of employment or the disciplinary action based thereon, such disciplinary action shall be deemed null and void regardless of whether the grounds for disciplinary action are recognized (see Supreme Court Decisions 94Da3612, Apr. 12, 1994; 94Da53716, Jun. 28, 1996; 94Da53716, Jun. 28, 1996; 94Da53716, etc.). However, if a worker voluntarily gives the worker an opportunity to exercise the right to select a disciplinary commissioner, it shall not be deemed null and void even if it is a disciplinary action which has been decided by the disciplinary committee in which the worker does not attend the disciplinary action (see Supreme Court Decision 93Da29167, Jun. 14, 1994).

According to the reasoning of the judgment below and the records, Articles 54 and 58 of the Rules of Employment of the defendant company stipulate that the disciplinary committee shall be composed of three disciplinary committee members commissioned by the employer and three disciplinary committee members commissioned by the employer. The disciplinary committee shall be held with attendance of a majority of the committee members. The total workers of the defendant company shall be about 40 members and 35 or 36 members among all the employees of the defendant company after the dissolution of the labor union shall be organized and operated a "Mamo-si-si-si-si-si-si-si-si-si-si-si" and the defendant company shall not be held with the disciplinary committee on February 17, 1995; the defendant company shall not be held with the disciplinary committee on March 27, 1995; it shall not be deemed that the above disciplinary committee's request for disciplinary action against the plaintiff company's employees to be dismissed on the ground that it is impossible for the defendant company to take a disciplinary action against the plaintiff company's members on the same ground of appeal.

2. On the second ground for appeal

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below affirmed the judgment of the court below, on January 21, 1995, that the defendant company's act of dismissal of the plaintiff 1 was against the former rules of employment on the premise that the above dismissal of the plaintiff 2 was valid until the dismissal of the plaintiff 1. The defendant company's act of dismissal of the plaintiff 2 was against the former rules of employment since it is not against the former rules of employment, since the former rules of employment, even though it is somewhat different from the previous rules of employment, it shall be deemed that the dismissal of the plaintiff 1 would be justified. Since the former rules of employment, the defendant company's act of dismissal of the plaintiff 2 was against the former rules of employment, which was not against the rules of employment. The court below's determination that the defendant company's act of dismissal of the plaintiff 2 was against the rules of employment of the plaintiff 1, the former rules of employment of the defendant 1, who was not against the rules of employment of the plaintiff 1, who was employed by the defendant 30, and the plaintiff 1, who was employed.

3. Therefore, the appeal is dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the plaintiff-Appellant. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all Justices who reviewed the appeal.

Justices Park Jong-chul (Presiding Justice)