Whether a public official is a Gu office cleaning vehicle operator under the Seoul Metropolitan Government

1. If an operator of a cleaning vehicle belonging to the Gu office under the jurisdiction of Seoul Metropolitan Government conducts only simple labor services in accordance with the Local Staff Regulations, he shall be a public official in extraordinary civil service who is engaged in simple labor under Article 2 (2) 7 of the Local Public Officials Act;

2. The operation of a vehicle belonging to Seoul Metropolitan Government for cleaning within its affiliated Gu office is an exercise of public authority.

Article 2 (2) 7 of the State Public Officials Act, Article 2 of the State Compensation Act

Supreme Court Decision 70Da2955 Delivered on April 6, 1971

Attorney Han-chul et al., Counsel for the defendant

Defendant 1 and two others

Seoul High Court Decision 79Na2922 delivered on March 19, 1980

The appeal is dismissed.

The costs of appeal shall be borne by the plaintiff.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. According to the plaintiff's assertion, it is clear that Defendant 1 is a public official in extraordinary civil service engaged in simple labor service under Article 2 (1) 7 of the Local Public Officials Act as a cleaning vehicle operator belonging to the ○○○○ Office under the plaintiff's control, and it is an exercise of public authority to operate a vehicle for cleaning within the Gu office under the plaintiff's control (see Supreme Court Decision 70Da2955 delivered on April 6, 1971). Therefore, it is just that the judgment of the court below concluded that Defendant 1 was an act of a public official under Article 2 of the State Compensation Act that caused the accident while operating the cleaning vehicle for the purpose of cleaning the plaintiff's business, which is the plaintiff's business (see Supreme Court Decision 70Da2955 delivered on April 6, 1971). It cannot be said that there is a misapprehension of legal principles as to public officials such as theory of lawsuit.

2. In examining the record, the judgment of the court below in this regard is just and there is no ground for appeal that the vehicle accident in this case occurred due to Defendant 1’s gross negligence.

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed, and the costs of the appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Park So-young (Presiding Justice)