(a) Whether the procedure of prior trial has been followed or not is the subject of confession;

(b) The case holding that the facility equipped by the steel industry operator constitutes “a machine used directly for its own proper purpose” as provided in Article 4-2(1) of the former Regulation of Tax Reduction and Exemption Act (amended by Act No. 2276 of January 13, 1971);

C. Method of entering the judgment order ordering cancellation of taxation disposition

A. Whether a pre-trial procedure has been completed is a litigation requirement for the institution of administrative litigation, and thus, it cannot be determined solely by the fact that the Plaintiff’s attorney had not gone through the ex officio examination.

B. If a steel industry owner who has a pressure plant and produces more than 50,00 tons of voltages per year manufactures steel plates, etc. and packages and ships them in Arabic items, it is reasonable to view the production process until the date of packing, unless there are special circumstances, and, in packing them due to the weight of pressure materials, it is inevitable to use the above Arabic items unless there are special circumstances, and if there is no sanctions facilities in Korea, the steel industry owner is unable to directly install sanctions facilities and take them for packing his own products. In this case, the above sanctions facilities fall under the machinery that the steel industry owner under Article 4-2 (1) of the former Regulation of Tax Reduction and Exemption Act (amended by Act No. 2276 of Jan. 13, 197) directly uses the steel industry for its own proper purpose.

C. The order of the judgment must be specified and its contents must be specified by the order itself, and the defendant's disposition that imposed corporate tax amount of KRW 000 on the plaintiff on October 0, 00, which exceeds the tax base amount corresponding to the tax base amount of KRW 000,00 of the corporate tax amount of KRW 000 for the business year of 00 shall be revoked. The order of the judgment is unlawful because it is not clear to what extent the defendant imposed on the plaintiff, and it does not specify the cancelled part among the above tax amount imposed by the defendant, and therefore it is impossible to divide the cancelled part, and therefore the above order of the judgment is unlawful.

A. Article 56(2) of the Framework Act on National Taxes, Articles 18 and 26 of the Administrative Litigation Act. Article 4-2(1) of the former Regulation of Tax Reduction and Exemption Act (amended by Act No. 2276, Jan. 13, 1971)

A. Supreme Court Decision 82Nu343 delivered on November 22, 1983

Union Steel Industry Co., Ltd., Counsel for the defendant-appellant

Head of Central Tax Office

Seoul High Court Decision 77Gu69 delivered on April 6, 1982

The judgment below is reversed and the case is remanded to Seoul High Court.

1. We examine the Plaintiff’s attorney’s grounds of appeal.

A. As to the ground of appeal No. 7 (as to the corporate business tax of two years, 1973, the rejection of the lawsuit),

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, in order to institute an administrative litigation seeking revocation on the grounds that the disposition of imposing national tax was unlawful, the court below must undergo the procedure for a request for examination and trial under the Framework Act on National Taxes prior to the filing of the lawsuit for detailed business operations of each of the respective corporations of this case and revocation of disposition in 1973 and each of the taxable periods of 1974, and it is clear and clear in the record that the plaintiff did not undergo the aforementioned procedure prior to the filing of the lawsuit for revocation (it does not appear that the plaintiff was dissatisfied with the determination of each of the tax base amounts of the disposition of imposing corporate tax of the business year of 1973 and the corporate tax of 1974 of this case, and that the plaintiff was dissatisfied with the detailed business operations of the corporation of this case and the disposition of the disposition of this case). Thus, the above lawsuit of this case is dismissed as unlawful.

However, it cannot be determined solely by the fact that the plaintiff's attorney has gone through the previous trial procedure even though it is the litigation requirement for the administrative litigation institution. On the other hand, with respect to corporate business taxes for the 1973 taxable period, the record is considered to be identical to Gap's additional entry, and if the contents of disposition which is the object of objection are different from Gap's 11-5, which is the object of objection, in the separate entry, in the disposition of additional entry, the statement "1,161,69 won" is stated in Gap's 12-5, which is the object of the above request for examination, as stated in the above request for examination, that the contents of disposition are the same as additional entry, and it is clearly stated in the "1,61,69 won" as the object of the above 17-5, which is the object of the request for examination on the remaining portion of the taxable period which is the object of "10-5,000 won purchase and sale of the oil."

Ultimately, the judgment of the court below as above is erroneous in the misapprehension of the rules of evidence or failing to exhaust all necessary deliberations.

B. As to the part of the No. 1 of the Grounds of Appeal No. 1, I:

According to the reasoning of the judgment of the court below, the court below acknowledged that the plaintiff purchased 170 tons in total at 38,250,00 won at the time of the original adjudication from the non-party Young Commercial Co., Ltd., at the time of the original adjudication, in full view of the contents of the evidence Nos. 2-4, 7-7, and 8 of the evidence Nos. 2-2, 7-7, and 8 without any dispute in the establishment of the court below, but it did not have any documentary evidence as to the plaintiff, and that even if the sales of the non-party company held the above non-party company's sales, it did not contain any sale to the plaintiff, and there is no evidence other than the non-party's witness's testimony that the above purchase price for the so-called Gao that was entered in the plaintiff's account book,

However, according to the evidence cited by the court below, Eul evidence Nos. 7-7 and Eul evidence Nos. 8 cannot be used as evidence in determining the propriety of the case, both of which are the case, by the decision of the Commissioner of the National Tax Service and by the decision of the National Tax Tribunal of the National Tax Tribunal of this case, and Eul evidence Nos. 2-4 is not specified by the investigator, and there is only a vague statement that "the gross income which was processed or purchased," and therefore, the actual evidence is rarely nonexistent. Thus, the fact-finding by the court below is made only with the purport of the pleading, and it is unlawful. Thus, the argument that points this out is just.

C. As to the ground of appeal No. 4 (Investment Deduction Amount in 1972),

According to Article 4-2 (1) 3 of the Regulation of Tax Reduction and Exemption Act (No. 2276, Jan. 13, 1971) which was in force at the time of the instant taxation, an amount equivalent to 10/100 of the total amount of investment in machinery directly used for its own business purposes by a steel factory operator who manufactures voltage not less than 50,000 tons (including products) shall be deducted from corporate tax for the business year to which the date of completing such investment belongs. According to the reasoning of the lower judgment, the lower court rejected the Plaintiff’s corporation’s application for a restriction on manufacturing of not less than 100,000 tons of tensions annually from September 29, 1967, and the Plaintiff’s application for a restriction on the manufacturing process of the above steel industry for which it is no dispute that the Plaintiff would be a person who produces tensions of the above Regulation of Tax Reduction and Exemption Act, and the Plaintiff’s application for a restriction on the manufacturing process of the raw materials at the time of its production.

However, as decided by the court below, it is reasonable to view the manufacturing process until the date of packing, unless there are other special circumstances, if the plaintiff, who was a steel engineer and a steel plate produced a voltage and steel plate, and then shipped them in packages for the plaintiff's own proper purpose of business. Furthermore, according to the witness's partial testimony of the non-party witness, it seems that it would be inevitable to use the above AF in packaging due to the weight of the above AF. However, as decided by the court below, if the above AFF is more solid and solid than the above AFF and there is no sanctions in Korea, and if there is no sanctions in this case, it is reasonable that the plaintiff as the plaintiff had no choice but to make the plaintiff's product packaging with the sanction facilities. In particular, in this case, it is reasonable to view that the AFF facility at the time of the original trial constitutes a machine directly used for the plaintiff's own proper purpose of business. Therefore, the argument pointing this out

2.The following are examined ex officio:

The main text of the judgment must be specified and its main text must be specified (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 82Nu294, Mar. 8, 1983). Examining the original decision, the main text of the judgment on the merits is that the defendant imposed corporate tax amount of 419,95,178, Apr. 1, 1976 on the plaintiff (1) and 1,003,984,292, and the amount exceeding the tax base amount of 283,137,043,043, and the amount of the corporate tax amount of 274,867,800, and the amount of the tax base imposed on the plaintiff (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 82Nu294, Mar. 8, 1983). Accordingly, it is impossible to revoke the remaining portion of the tax base amount imposed on the plaintiff, which exceeds the tax base amount of 2,115,693, and it cannot be revoked.

3. Therefore, the judgment of the court below cannot be maintained without any further determination on the grounds of appeal as to the remainder of the plaintiff's attorney and the grounds of appeal by the defendant litigation performer. Thus, all of these cases are reversed, and the case is remanded to the Seoul High Court which is the court below for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent

Justices O Sung-sung(Presiding Justice)