The defendant's appeal is dismissed.

Expenses for appeal shall be borne by the defendant.

Purport of claim and appeal

purport.

1. The grounds for this part of the facts of recognition are as stated in the reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance, except for those written by the court as follows. Thus, they are cited in accordance with the main sentence of Article 420 of the Civil Procedure Act.

Defendant B shall be deemed to be “B”, and Defendant C shall be deemed to be “C”, and “Defendant C” shall be deemed to be “C”, on the grounds of the first instance judgment.

Defendant H and Defendant I's "Defendant I" in the third 7th tier judgment of the first instance court shall be applied to each "B".

The defendant D Association (hereinafter referred to as the "Defendant Association") shall be referred to as "the defendant's association") in six parallels below the third judgment of the first instance."

3rd of the judgment of the court of first instance, the Act on Certified Brokerage shall be amended to the "Licensed Real Estate Agents Act".

2. Summary of the parties’ assertion

A. In mediating the instant lease agreement as a licensed real estate agent, Plaintiff C neglected the duty to verify the relationship of ownership of the instant housing, which is the leased object, and whether there is the right of representation in B, and thereby, the Plaintiff sustained damages equivalent to KRW 45 million.

Therefore, the Defendant is jointly obligated to pay the said money and damages for delay to the Plaintiff in accordance with the instant mutual aid agreement with C.

B. Defendant 1) C is merely involved in the preparation of a contract without being commissioned by B or the Plaintiff to intermediate the conclusion of the instant lease agreement, and is not a separate intermediary, and C does not be liable for damages arising from an intermediary act against the Plaintiff. 2) At the time of the conclusion of the instant lease agreement, the Plaintiff was aware that the owner of the instant house was G, and could easily be confirmed as to whether B was delegated the authority to conclude the lease agreement from G.

In addition, the instant house was provided by B as a security for transfer to G, and in such a case, the authority to conclude a lease contract is against B as a security for transfer.

Therefore, there is no brokerage negligence in C.

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