(영문) 수원지방법원 2015.6.16.선고 2014구합5065 판결

A. Around 2011, the Plaintiffs wishing to engage in passenger transportation services entrusted the implementation of workplace skill development training to a company A (the name of the Plaintiffs was changed to B; hereinafter referred to as the “Development Institute”) which was recognized by the Minister of Employment and Labor as a workplace skill development training course, and the training course was conducted by means of mail training, where the Development Institute of this case delivers teaching materials to trainees to allow trainees to carry out autonomous learning, and the results of evaluation are evaluated on the Internet and completed at least a certain standard point of evaluation.

B. From May 1, 2011 to September 30, 2012, Plaintiff 00 Co., Ltd. (hereinafter “Plaintiff 00”) entrusted the workplace skill development training for 132 employees on the 12 processes, including “service innovation strategies for customer satisfaction”, and Plaintiff 00 passenger Co., Ltd. (hereinafter “Plaintiff 0”) entrusted the workplace skill development training for 89 employees from May 1, 201 to August 31, 2012.

C. Accordingly, under Article 20 of the former Act on the Development of Workplace Skills of Workers (amended by Act No. 11690, Mar. 23, 2013; hereinafter “former Act on the Development of Workplace Skills”) on the ground that between October 201 and November 2012, Plaintiff Pursuant to Article 19 of the Enforcement Decree of the Act on the Development of Workplace Skills of Workers, the Defendant, etc. was paid a total of KRW 71,420,00 with training expenses, and Plaintiff Preliminary Passenger was paid a total of KRW 32,308,000 from the Defendant, etc. during the period from October 201 to January 2013, 2013.

D. Meanwhile, the president, vice presidents, etc. operating the Development Institute of this case: (a) from early August 2010 to February 28, 2013, during the period from early February 2013, when a trainee submitted at regular times despite the deadline for submission of a training event; (b) the method of preparing temporary storage of a trainee in advance; (c) the method of causing the trainee to write down the training unit; (d) the method of providing answer paper; and (d) the employee working for each company by submitting a remote representation for the training course after receiving a normal training and then conducting the training course; and (c) the employee in charge of the Ministry of Employment and Labor, by deceiving each company, was able to receive training expenses from each company.

E. The president, vice president, etc. of the Development Institute of this case was convicted of the judgment in the Suwon District Court 2013Gohap448, 2013Gohap898 (Joint), etc. of the Act on the Aggravated Punishment, etc. of Specific Economic Crimes (Fraud), etc., and the above judgment was finalized after appeal.

F. The Defendant against the Plaintiffs on June 17, 2014, on the ground that the instant Development Institute’s temporary storage in the Intellectual Property of the trainees affiliated with the Plaintiffs after preparing and publishing Lart on behalf of the Plaintiffs, the Plaintiffs were submitted by means of the final submission servers only, but the Plaintiff’s receipt of the cost of vocational ability training for workers (hereinafter “instant misconduct”) on the ground that the Plaintiff’s receipt of the cost of vocational ability training by fraudulent or other illegal means constitutes a case where the Plaintiff received the cost of training by fraudulent or other illegal means, pursuant to Articles 5 and 56 of the former Vocational Skills Development Act.

[Attachment 1] A disposition of return, additional collection, and restriction on financing (hereinafter collectively referred to as "disposition of this case") such as the statement of administrative disposition.

[Ground of Recognition] Facts without dispute, Gap evidence 1-1, 2, 3-1, 2, 7-1, 2, 8-1 through 3, 9-1 through 7, 10-1 through 6, 11-1 through 3, 12-1 through 4, 13-1, 2, Eul evidence 1 through 7, and the purport of the whole pleadings

2. Whether the instant disposition is lawful

A. Summary of the plaintiffs' claims

1) The Plaintiffs do not constitute an object of the return of unlawful payments and additional collection as stipulated in Article 56 of the former Vocational Skills Development Act.

2) As a result of entirely entrusting the workplace skill development training course to the instant Development Institute, the Plaintiffs were unaware of the instant misconduct, and thus, the Plaintiffs cannot be deemed to have received expenses by fraud or other improper means.

3) Considering that the Plaintiffs did not actively participate in the instant wrongful act and that the employees of the Plaintiffs completed a considerable portion of the workplace skill development training course, the instant disposition was excessively harsh and abused discretion.

B. Relevant statutes

[Attachment 2] The entry into the relevant statutes is as follows.

C. Determination

1) As to the plaintiffs' allegation in Article 20 (1) 1 of the former Vocational Skills Development Act, the Minister of Employment and Labor provides that "the Minister of Employment and Labor may provide subsidies or loans to employers who entrust workers with vocational skills development training," and Article 55 (2) of the same Act provides that "the Minister of Employment and Labor may order employers who have entrusted workers with vocational skills development training to return the amount of subsidies or loans received by fraudulent or other illegal means, or employers who have already received subsidies or loans, to obtain subsidies or loans by fraudulent or other illegal means, the Minister of Employment and Labor shall not provide subsidies or loans under Article 20 for a period prescribed by Ordinance of the Ministry of Employment and Labor within three years from the date of receipt, or for a period prescribed by Ordinance of the Ministry of Employment and Labor within three years from the date of receipt," and Article 56 (2) of the same Act provides that "the Minister of Employment and Labor may order employers whose subsidies or loans are restricted pursuant to Article 55 (2) to return the amount of subsidies or loans received by means of fraudulent or other unlawful means."

Therefore, the plaintiffs' above assertion is without merit.

2) As to the plaintiffs' assertion in Article 20 (2) of the former Vocational Skills Development Act, Article 20 (1) of the same Act provides that the Minister of Employment and Labor may limit subsidies for expenses incurred by employers who conduct workplace skill development training by fraud or other improper means. Article 55 (2) of the same Act provides that employers may order the return of the amount subsidized by fraud or other improper means out of the amount already subsidized, and the amount not exceeding the amount of the unlawful receipt may be additionally collected. "False or other improper means" as provided in the above provision refers to any kind of fraudulent act conducted by employers who are not generally entitled to receive benefits in order to conceal the eligibility or lack of eligibility to receive workplace skill development training costs (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2009Du4272, Jun. 11, 2009).

According to Article 41(4) of the Enforcement Decree of the Employment Insurance Act, and Article 8(1)3 of the former Regulations on Assistance to Workplace Skill Development Training for a business owner entrusted under Article 60(1) of the Enforcement Rule of the same Act (amended by Ordinance of the Ministry of Employment and Labor No. 2013-41, Sept. 9, 2013), the standards for completion of the standards for granting subsidies for postal remote training are at least 60 points of all kinds of grades in the evaluation conducted during the training period, other than the above evaluation at least once a week, to conduct learning activities granted by the training institution, such as preparation of learning tasks and participation in debate, and the completion standards established by the training executor, other than the above two requirements. Accordingly, a business owner is entitled to receive subsidies only if the training trainee satisfies the above standards for completion of the training course. However, considering the purport of the statement of evidence No. 3, evidence No. 4, and the purport of the whole pleading, the Plaintiffs who completed the training course by submitting temporary training materials for which they belong to the Plaintiffs.

Therefore, the plaintiffs' above assertion on different premise is without merit.

3) As to the plaintiffs' assertion of the above A-3

In full view of the above-mentioned facts and the overall purport of the arguments as seen earlier, it is difficult to criticize that the instant disposition is an unlawful disposition that deviates from and abused discretion, by taking account of the following circumstances.

① The Plaintiffs were likely to properly carry out postal remote training because their employees were aged and have high academic background. Accordingly, the Development Institute of the instant case conducted the instant training course with the belief that the Plaintiffs would have taken part in the preparation and taking part in the instant site. Therefore, even if the Plaintiffs did not have any active intent to commit the instant wrongful act, there is no justifiable reason to believe that the Plaintiffs could not be negligent in neglecting their duty.

② The Plaintiffs were paid a total of KRW 103,728,00 on seven occasions every two years through the instant wrongful act, and there is a little possibility of criticism in light of the payment period and amount.

③ The instant wrongful act was committed by the president and vice president of the instant Development Institute, and the process of detection was found to have been found, unlike the case where voluntary reports were made. The instant disposition was conducted in accordance with the standards prescribed by the relevant statutes.

(5) In order to improve workers’ financial soundness and operate the workplace skill development training system in an efficient and transparent manner, it cannot be deemed that the public interest to be strictly controlled and managed is less than the Plaintiffs’ private interest to be restricted due to the disposition of this case.

Therefore, the plaintiffs' above assertion is without merit.

3. Conclusion

Therefore, the plaintiffs' claims are dismissed in entirety as it is without merit. It is so decided as per Disposition.