Whether the judgment of the court of final and conclusive which has not revoked the judgment of the first instance court of the provisional execution sentence is extinguished or not;

Even if the judgment of the first instance court of the declaration of provisional execution was revoked by the judgment of the appellate court, the grounds for a security to suspend execution of the judgment of the first instance court of the declaration of provisional execution cannot be deemed to have ceased, unless the judgment of the appellate

Articles 115 and 510 of the Civil Procedure Act

Supreme Court Order 65Ma826 Dated October 20, 1965

Limited Partnership Company, Japan Trucking Transport Agents

Gwangju High Court Order 83Ka109 dated August 8, 1983

The reappeal is dismissed.

The grounds of reappeal are examined.

The gist of the grounds of re-appeal is that the security provided by the re-appellant is a security provided for the suspension of execution of the judgment of the judgment of the provisional execution sentence between the plaintiff and the defendant-appellant, Gwangju District Court 80Kahap17, June 10, 1981, and the judgment of the court of first instance of the above provisional execution sentence is revoked by the judgment of the appellate court (Seoul High Court 81Na345, July 20, 1983) and the security becomes extinct. Thus, the judgment of the court below which rejected the application for cancellation of the security is erroneous in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the extinguishment of the security grounds under Article 115 of the Civil Procedure Act and the

However, even if the judgment of the court of first instance was revoked by the judgment of the appellate court, it cannot be deemed that the ground for security provided for the suspension of execution of the judgment of the court of first instance is extinguished unless the judgment of the appellate court became final and conclusive (see, e.g., Supreme Court Order 65Ma826, Oct. 20, 1965). Thus, the judgment of the court below cannot be viewed as a misapprehension of the legal principles as to the extinguishment of security grounds such as the theory of lawsuit, and this is a ground for not a legitimate ground for reappeal in light of Articles 13 and 11(1) of the Act on Special Cases Concerning the Promotion, etc. of Legal Proceedings, and the precedents of the party members cited in the theory of lawsuit (see, e.g., Supreme Court Order 1966, Apr. 19, 196; 66Ma107; 1163, Mar. 7, 1967; 200 reversed and remanded by the judgment of the appellate court by the judgment of final appeal.

Therefore, the reappeal is dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Yoon Il-young (Presiding Justice)