[1] In a case where Gap urban development project association imposed property tax, etc. on Eul, etc. on the ground that Eul, etc. was the actual owner of the land scheduled for substitution, the case affirming the judgment below that Eul, etc. constitutes a person who actually owns the land scheduled for substitution as at the time of the tax base date, which was after the effect of the disposition of the land scheduled for substitution, in relation to the whole land owned by Eul, etc.

[2] In a case where a tax authority revokes a taxation disposition ex officio by deeming the taxpayer’s grounds for filing an objection in the procedure of filing an objection against a taxation disposition as justifiable, whether it is unlawful to reverse it without any special reason, such as the revocation of ex officio by submitting false data, etc. (affirmative)

[3] In a case where Gap urban development project association imposed property tax, etc. on Eul et al. on the land owned by Eul et al. on the ground that Eul et al. was the actual owner of the land scheduled for substitution with the authorization of an urban development project implementation plan and a land substitution plan with regard to the land owned by Eul et al., and the competent authority filed an objection against Eul et al. on the ground that Eul et al. was the actual owner of the land scheduled for substitution with the land scheduled for substitution, the case holding that the judgment below erred by failing to specifically examine and determine such circumstances, even though it is difficult to find out circumstances to deem that Eul et al. was revoked ex officio based on unlawful methods such as submitting false data

[1] In a case where Gap urban development project association imposed property tax, etc. on Eul, etc. on the land owned by Eul, etc. on the ground that it was the actual owner of the land scheduled for substitution, the case affirming the judgment below which held that Article 36 (1) of the Urban Development Act, on the ground that Article 36 (1) of the same Act provides that if a land scheduled for substitution is designated, the previous landowner may exercise his right as to the land scheduled for substitution from the effective date of the designation of the land scheduled for substitution to the date of the public announcement of the disposition of replotting, and that the previous land cannot be used or profitable, it constitutes a person who actually owns the land scheduled for substitution as of the tax base date after

[2] In a case where the grounds for objection are deemed justifiable in the course of appeal procedure, and accordingly necessary disposition was rendered accordingly, it is not permissible to reverse the same matter without any special reason and to make the same disposition identical to the previous one, in light of the purport of the Framework Act on National Taxes, which recognizes the objection procedure and the method of correction. Therefore, in a case where the tax authority ex officio revokes the taxation disposition by deeming the grounds for objection by the taxpayer as justifiable in the procedure of filing an objection against the taxation disposition, it is unlawful to reverse the same without any special reason, such as submission of false data by the taxpayer

[3] In a case where Gap Urban Development Project Association: (a) filed an objection against the previous disposition with the authorization of an urban development project implementation plan and the authorization of a land substitution plan with regard to the whole land owned by Eul; (b) the competent administrative agency imposed property tax, etc. on Eul et al. on the ground that Eul et al. was the actual owner of the land substitution plan; (c) Eul et al. filed an objection with Gap et al. on the ground that there was an expression that Eul et al. accepted the land substitution plan; or (d) the urban development project of Gap et al. was conducted by the replotting method; and (d) the competent administrative agency accepted the previous disposition and subsequently revoked the previous disposition on the ground that Eul et al. was the actual owner of the land substitution plan, the case held that Eul et al. filed an objection against the previous disposition with the purport that "the imposition of property tax on the land substitution is improper because Eul et al. illegally expropriated the land substitution plan and dispute over the land substitution plan; and (d) the competent administrative agency did not err in examining and determine such circumstances.

[1] Article 107 (1) of the Local Tax Act, Article 36 (1) and (3) of the Urban Development Act / [2] Articles 55, 64, 65, and 66 of the Framework Act on National Taxes / [3] Article 107 (1) of the Local Tax Act, Article 36 (1) and (3) of the Urban Development Act, Articles 55, 64, 65, and 66 of the Framework Act on National Taxes

[2] Supreme Court Decision 2007Du18161 Decided June 24, 2010 (Gong2010Ha, 1488), Supreme Court Decision 2011Du14227 Decided July 24, 2014 (Gong2014Ha, 1685)

Plaintiff (Appointed Party) (Attorney Kim Sang-woo, Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Kimpo-si (Attorney Kim Jong-sub, Counsel for defendant-appellant)

Seoul High Court Decision 2016Nu47460 decided October 11, 2016

The judgment below is reversed and the case is remanded to Seoul High Court.

The grounds of appeal are examined (to the extent of supplement in case of supplemental appellate briefs not timely filed).

1. Regarding ground of appeal No. 1

The Local Tax Act provides that a person who actually owns property as of the property tax assessment basis date shall be liable for property tax (Article 107(1)). Here, the term “person who actually owns property” refers to a person who actually owns the relevant property, regardless of whether it is registered as an owner on the public register (see Supreme Court Decision 2005Du15045, Mar. 23, 2006, etc.).

After finding the facts as indicated in its holding, the lower court determined that Article 36(1) of the Urban Development Act provides that the previous owner of the land may exercise the same right as the previous land to the land to be reserved from the effective date of the designation of the land to the date when the replotting disposition is publicly announced, and that the previous land cannot be used or profitable; Article 36(3) of the same Act provides that if the designation of the land to be reserved comes into force, the previous owner of the relevant land to be reserved cannot use or profit from it, and cannot interfere with the exercise of the right pursuant to paragraph (1) of the same Article; and that the previous owner of the land after the designation of the land to be reserved may actually dispose of the land to be reserved after the effect of the designation of the land to be reserved, and that the previous owner of

Examining the record in light of the aforementioned provisions and legal principles, the lower court did not err in its determination by misapprehending the legal doctrine regarding the de facto owner’s determination in urban development by replotting, contrary to what is alleged in the grounds of appeal.

2. As to the grounds of appeal Nos. 2 and 3

A. In a case where the grounds for objection in the process of appeal regarding a tax disposition are deemed justifiable and accordingly necessary disposition was rendered accordingly, it is not permissible to reverse the same matter without any special reason and to make the same disposition identical to the previous one, in light of the purport of the Framework Act on National Taxes, which recognizes the objection system and the method of correction accordingly. Therefore, in a case where the tax authority ex officio revokes the tax disposition by deeming the grounds for objection by the taxpayer as justifiable in the procedure of filing an objection against the tax disposition, and there is no special reason, such as ex officio revocation based on the wrongful method, such as submission of false data by the taxpayer, it is reversed and to render the previous tax disposition identical to the previous one (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 2007Du18161, Jun. 24, 2010; 201Du14227, Jul.

B. Review of the reasoning of the lower judgment and the record reveals the following facts.

1) On August 26, 2010, an urban development project association of Kimpo-2 district (hereinafter “instant association”) obtained authorization for an urban development project implementation plan with respect to the whole zone of Kimpo-dong, including the land owned by the Plaintiffs, on August 26, 2010, and was designated and announced as a planned land substitution on September 5, 2012 after obtaining authorization for a replotting plan on July 5, 2012.

2) On September 4, 2014, the Defendant imposed property tax and local education tax on the Plaintiffs in 2014 on the ground that the Plaintiffs were the actual owners of the instant reserved land for replotting (hereinafter “previous disposition”).

3) Accordingly, the Plaintiffs filed an objection with the Seoul High Court Order No. 2013Ra1408, Seoul High Court Order No. 2013, Dec. 23, 2013; a written ruling of April 17, 2014 by the Central Land Expropriation Committee; and a certificate of land substitution verification as well as the documents attached thereto, stating that the instant association accepted the instant land; or that the instant association’s urban development project was conducted by the replotting method; and the Plaintiffs filed an objection with the said Seoul High Court Order No. 2013Ra1408, Apr. 29, 2014. The Defendant accepted this and revoked the previous disposition ex officio on September 29, 2014.

4) On November 12, 2014, the Defendant again imposed property tax and local education tax in 2014 on the same content as the previous disposition on the ground that the Plaintiffs were the actual owners of the instant reserved land for replotting (hereinafter “re-disposition of this case”).

C. Examining the above facts in light of the legal principles as seen earlier, the Plaintiffs filed an objection against the previous disposition of this case with the purport that “the instant association should compensate for losses with respect to the obstacles to the land of this case, and there exists disputes arising from unlawful expropriation.” The Defendant appears to have revoked the previous disposition of this case ex officio by deeming that the grounds for filing an objection are justifiable, and it is difficult to find any circumstances to deem that the revocation ex officio was made based on unlawful methods, such as submission of false data by the Plaintiffs.

Nevertheless, without examining and determining these circumstances specifically, the lower court rejected the Plaintiff’s assertion seeking revocation of the instant disposition on the ground that the Defendant had a special reason to reverse ex officio revocation of the previous disposition on the grounds as indicated in its reasoning. In so doing, the lower court erred by misapprehending the legal doctrine on the prohibition of re-disposition following the revocation of tax disposition in the appeal procedure, thereby failing to exhaust all necessary deliberations. The allegation contained in the grounds

3. Conclusion

Therefore, the lower judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to the lower court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

[Attachment] List of Appointeds: Omitted

Justices Lee Ki-taik (Presiding Justice)