Plaintiff (Appointed Party)

Kimpo-market

April 15, 2016

1. On November 12, 2014, the disposition imposing local education tax and each property tax indicated in attached Form 1, which the Defendant imposed on the Plaintiff (Appointed Party) and the designated parties, shall be revoked.

2. The costs of the lawsuit are assessed against the defendant.

The same shall apply to the order.

1. Details of the disposition;

A. The Plaintiff (Appointed Party) is the husband of the Appointed 2, and the Appointed 3 and the Appointed 4 are children of the Plaintiff (Appointed Party) and the Appointed 2 (Appointed Party) (hereinafter the Plaintiff (Appointed Party) are only referred to as the “Plaintiff”, and the Plaintiff (Appointed Party) and the Appointed are referred to as the “Plaintiffs”, including the Plaintiff (Appointed Party) and the Appointeds, and only in the name of the Appointed when they are individually specified.

B. On August 26, 2010, an urban development project association of the Kimpo-2 District (hereinafter “instant association”) obtained authorization for an implementation plan for an urban development project of the Kimpo-2 District with respect to the whole land ( Address 1 omitted) of Kimpo-si, including the land owned by the Plaintiffs from the Gyeonggi-do Governor (hereinafter “former land”). On July 5, 2012, after obtaining authorization for a replotting plan from the Defendant on September 5, 2012, the date on which the designation of a planned land substitution takes effect was designated and announced as a planned land substitution (No. 2012-7) as of September 6, 2012.

C. Specific designation details of the previous land and the land scheduled for substitution (hereinafter “land scheduled for substitution”) owned by the Plaintiffs are as listed in the following table.

The land owner included in the main sentence shall not be able to use the land as a substitute lot for replotting in the previous land ( Address 2 omitted) with 1,157 square meters 21 square meters 21 square meters 341.65.65 1,157/1,487 - 2 ( Address 3 omitted) with 990 square meters 2,346 - 3 ( Address 4 omitted) with 2,346 - 21 square meters 2,346 - 6 - 2,392.6 2,346/2,741 - 4 ( Address 4 omitted) with 395 square meters 21 -6 - 6 - 395 - 395/2,741 - 4 - 1,403 - 1,403 - 217 - 294 - 304 - 297 - 294 -1474 -297 -294 -2

D. On September 4, 2014, the Defendant calculated the tax base and tax amount of property tax in 2014 by applying 70/100 of the fair market value ratio to the current base price of the instant reserved land for replotting on the ground that the Plaintiffs are the actual owners of the instant reserved land for replotting, and issued each disposition imposing property tax and local education tax on the Plaintiffs (hereinafter “previous disposition”).

E. After receiving the notification of the previous disposition of this case, the Plaintiff lost ownership due to the acceptance of the previous land of this case to the Defendant, and raised an objection to the Plaintiffs to the effect that there is no ownership of the land reserved for replotting of this case, and submitted a document stating the list of materials and the explanation thereof as “the list of materials recognized as the adjudication of expropriation (the fact is a adjudication of compensation)” along with the relevant

F. After examining the data submitted by the Plaintiff, on September 29, 2014, the Defendant revoked ex officio the part on the imposition of property tax and local education tax on the instant previous disposition among the instant previous disposition on the ground that “misunderstanding of taxation data, such as taxable area, - Seoul High Court 2013Ra1408, ex officio revocation of reduction due to the decision on the provisional disposition for delivery of real estate.” (hereinafter “previous disposition” in this case is limited to the portion on the imposition of property tax and local education tax on the instant reserved land

G. On November 12, 2014, the Defendant imposed and notified each of the property tax and local education tax on the Plaintiffs on the ground that the Plaintiffs were the actual owners of the instant reserved land for replotting (hereinafter “instant disposition”).

H. The Plaintiffs were dissatisfied with the instant disposition and filed an objection against the Defendant on February 3, 2015, but the Defendant dismissed all the Plaintiffs’ objections on April 10, 2015.

[Ground of recognition] Facts without dispute, Gap evidence Nos. 1 through 4, 9 (including paper numbers; hereinafter the same shall apply), Eul's statement Nos. 1 through 4, 8, and 10, and the purport of the whole pleadings

2. Whether the instant disposition is lawful

A. The plaintiff's assertion

1) The instant reserved land is merely a land in the process of forming the reserved land for replotting and does not constitute subject to the property tax. In addition, the Local Tax Act does not explicitly stipulate that the reserved land for replotting should be subject to the property tax in cases where the public announcement and effect of the reserved land for replotting take place, but only stipulates that “the person who actually owns the property as of the taxable base date” is the taxpayer. Article 36 of the Urban Development Act merely grants the previous landowners the right to use and benefit from the reserved land for replotting, and does not constitute the basis for taxable purposes, but does not constitute the actual owner of the instant reserved land, under the circumstances where the Plaintiffs cannot exercise at all the same or similar rights with the previous land. Therefore, deeming the reserved land as the object of taxation of the property tax and local education tax based on Article 36

2) The defendant issued the previous disposition of this case to the plaintiffs but revoked ex officio on September 29, 2014, and again issued the previous disposition of this case. It is unlawful to reverse the previous disposition without any special reason and re-resume the previous disposition.

3) Since the instant disposition of designating reserved land was retroactively revoked by the judgment of the relevant case, the instant disposition taken on the premise that the instant disposition of designating reserved land is valid shall also be revoked illegally.

(b) Related statutes;

Attached Form 2 shall be as listed in attached Table 2.

C. Determination on the assertion that the taxpayer does not actually belong to the person liable to pay the reserved land for replotting

1) The main sentence of Article 107(1) of the Local Tax Act provides that "a person who actually owns a property as of the property tax base date shall be liable to pay the property tax." Here, "a person who actually owns a property" means a person who has a real ownership of the property, regardless of whether it is registered as an owner on the public register (see Supreme Court Decision 2005Du15045, Mar. 23, 2006, etc.).

In addition, Article 36(1) of the Urban Development Act provides that “If a reserved land for replotting is designated, the previous owner of the land may exercise the same right as that of the reserved land for replotting from the effective date of the designation of the reserved land for replotting to the date of the public announcement of the replotting disposition, and shall not use or profit from the previous land.” Article 36(3) provides that “If the designation of the reserved land for replotting takes effect, the previous owner of the reserved land for replotting shall not use or profit from it, and shall not interfere with the exercise of rights pursuant to paragraph (1).” In addition, the previous owner of the land may dispose of the reserved land for replotting after the designation of the reserved land for replotting takes effect, and if a sales contract is concluded for the reserved land for replotting, the object of the sale shall be deemed to be the object of the reserved land (see Supreme Court Decision 89Meu14998, May 2

In light of this point, the owner of the previous land shall be a person who actually controls the reserved land for replotting and has a tax-bearing force to the extent that the property tax is scheduled to be levied on the reserved land for replotting. Therefore, the owner of the previous land shall be a de facto owner under Article 107 (1) of the Local Tax Act.

Based on the foregoing legal doctrine, given that the validity of the disposition of designating the previous land as a reserved land for replotting was occurred on September 6, 2012, as to the instant case based on the foregoing, the Plaintiffs, the owners of the previous land, are obligated to pay the property tax and local education tax as those who actually own the reserved land for replotting as of June 1, 2014, which is the property tax assessment basis date of the property tax in 2014. This does not change even if there are circumstances, such as whether the land for replotting is moved, the possibility of changing the reserved land for replotting, and the possibility of using the reserved land for replotting as the site place of work for the implementation of the urban development project

2) In addition, according to the overall purport of the evidence Nos. 11 and 12 of this case, the instant association obtained authorization for the alteration of a replotting plan from the Defendant on April 23, 2015, and through the public announcement and public inspection of a proposed land substitution plan from April 30, 2015 to May 16, 2015, and the disposition of the designation of a land substitution plan pursuant to the modified replotting plan was recognized on May 21, 2015, but there is no evidence to prove that the instant disposition of the designation of a land substitution plan was retroactively revoked, and the Defendant issued the instant disposition based on the previous land substitution plan as of June 1, 2014, which was effective as of June 1, 2014, the Plaintiff’s assertion on this part is without merit.

D. Determination as to the allegation of illegality due to the previous disposition after ex officio revocation

1) In a case where the tax authority recognized that the grounds for objection are correct in the course of appeal procedure, and accordingly made the necessary disposition accordingly, in view of the purport of the aforementioned statutory provisions recognizing the objection procedure and the method of correction, the former disposition cannot be reversed without any justifiable reason, and the previous disposition cannot be rescheduled. As long as the tax authority revoked ex officio the tax disposition by deeming the grounds for objection as justifiable in the procedure of filing an objection regarding the taxation disposition, it is not allowed to reverse it without any justifiable reason and re-resume the previous disposition (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 77Nu266, Jan. 31, 1978; 2007Du18161, Jun. 24, 2010).

Meanwhile, an administrative appeal required as a prior trial procedure of an administrative litigation does not require a strict form to be raised in light of the fundamental purpose of the appeal system, which is to relieve a person whose rights or interests have been infringed due to an unlawful and unfair administrative disposition. Thus, if it is evident that the explanatory materials submitted by the taxpayer contain the purport of appeal against the tax authority seeking revocation of the taxation disposition, even if the written objection and its name and form are different from that of the written objection under Articles 54(1) and 50(1) of the Enforcement Decree of the Framework Act on National Taxes, it is reasonable to deem the submission of the written objection as an objection under Article 66 of the Framework Act on National Taxes (see Supreme Court Decisions 86Nu540, Oct. 28, 1986; 97Nu13627, Nov. 28, 1997, etc.). The same applies to the appeal procedure under the Framework Act on Local Taxes.

2) In light of the above legal principles, according to the health stand, Eul evidence No. 8, and the purport of the entire pleadings, the plaintiff raised an objection to the purport that the previous land of this case was expropriated on September 4, 2014, after being notified of the previous land of this case, the plaintiff lost ownership due to the expropriation of the land of this case, and the plaintiffs do not own ownership of the land reserved for replotting, and submitted the relevant documents and relevant materials. The above written statement contains the purport that "the previous land of this case is subject to the adjudication of expropriation, although the previous land of this case is subject to the adjudication of expropriation, the association of this case shall expropriate the previous land of this case by unlawful means, acquire ownership, acquire ownership, complete ownership transfer registration, and complete ownership transfer registration." Accordingly, according to the above facts of recognition, it is apparent that the above documents and materials submitted by the plaintiff contain the purport of objection against the defendant seeking the cancellation of the previous disposition of this case. Therefore, it is reasonable to view that the objection under Article 118 of the Framework Act on Local

Furthermore, according to the above evidence, the defendant accepted the plaintiff's objection against the previous disposition of this case, and revoked the previous disposition of this case ex officio, and thereafter, it is recognized that the plaintiffs were the actual owner of the previous disposition of this case on the ground that the previous disposition of this case was the same as the previous disposition of this case. Thus, as long as the defendant accepted the plaintiff's objection against the previous disposition of this case and revoked the previous disposition of this case ex officio, it is not allowed to reverse it without any special reason, and make the previous disposition of this case by re-afforesting the previous disposition of this case. Thus, the disposition of this case

3) As to this, the Defendant notified the Plaintiff at the time of ex officio revocation of the previous disposition, that the ownership relationship of the previous land of this case may be imposed again if the Plaintiff alleged otherwise by the Plaintiff. On September 15, 2014, Seoul High Court 2013Kahap2033 decided that the previous land was not expropriated contrary to the Plaintiff’s assertion, and thus, the instant disposition was lawful.

According to the evidence Nos. 5 through 9, each of the documents submitted by the Plaintiff to the Defendant in the purport of raising an objection, the following documents are written in the Seoul High Court Order No. 2013Ra1408, Seoul High Court Decision No. 2013, Dec. 23, 2013, which was filed by the instant association to seek delivery, etc. of the previous land and its ground buildings against the same mining valve industry corporation (the representative director of the Plaintiff) which occupies obstacles to the previous land of this case, and the Central Land Expropriation Committee on Apr. 17, 2014 on the adjudication of compensation for damages for obstacles to the previous land of this case. In addition, there is a statement that the ownership transfer registration of the association of this case, which was completed in relation to the previous land factory building of this case on which the real estate registration injury on the real estate registration, stated the grounds for the registration of ownership transfer in the name of the association of this case as " expropriation", and there is an expression that the association of this case accepted the previous land of this case.

However, the following circumstances acknowledged by the evidence, i.e., ① the documents submitted by the Plaintiff at the time of filing an objection against the previous disposition of this case, including the above written ruling and the written ruling on provisional disposition for delivery of real estate, and the copy of the register of real estate register, were recorded, and the defendant's reply on July 15, 2013 to the local Land Tribunal of Gyeonggi-do or the association of this case on September 4, 2013, and the fact inquiry reply by the defendant's inquiry by September 2013, which included documents showing that the previous land, etc. of this case was conducted by the replotting method, and the defendant's previous provisional disposition of this case, such as the certificate of provisional disposition for delivery of real estate, was stated as "urban development project according to the replotting method" and "the designation of land scheduled for substitution", and the above provisional disposition of this case cannot be seen as being modified by the Seoul Land Tribunal's previous provisional disposition of 2014. 3. 9. 25. 2014.

4) Therefore, the Defendant’s disposition of this case must be revoked as unlawful.

3. Conclusion

Therefore, the plaintiff's claim of this case is justified, and all of them are accepted, and it is so decided as per Disposition.

[Attachment]

Judges Kim Tae-hun (Presiding Judge)