(a)legal nature and effects of approval under Article 14 of the Land Expropriation Act;

(b) Whether the Land Tribunal is able to render adjudication identical to those in which the implementation of the project becomes impossible;

(a)The authorization of a project under the provisions of Article 14 of the Land Expropriation Act has the nature of an administrative disposition that establishes a specific right of expropriation on the condition that it shall go through a specific procedure thereafter, and the authorization of the project has the nature of the administrative disposition that establishes the scope of the object to be expropriated, and may cause the right to be expropriated to become effective as a kind of right in public law which can be set up against

(b)The Land Expropriation Act, which is the primary phase of the project approval for the expropriation and use, will be entrusted to the project approval authority in determining the public interest of the project, and further specific decisions on the expropriation and use will be entrusted to the Land Tribunal. In light of Article 29, Paragraph 2 of the same Act, which lists the two-minutes of the land expropriation procedure and the nature of the project approval and the matters to be decided by the Land Tribunal, the Land Tribunal cannot make an adjudication such as the impossibility of the implementation of the project itself unless the project approval is revoked by administrative litigation, i.e., the project approval itself cannot be made.

(a)Article 14(a) of the Land Expropriation Act; Article 89(2)(b) of the Mining Industry Act;

A. Supreme Court Decision 87Nu395 delivered on September 8, 1987 (Gong1987,1583) 87Nu1141 delivered on December 27, 198 (Gong1989,246) 92Nu10852 delivered on September 28, 1993

Plaintiff

[Defendant-Appellee] The Central Land Tribunal (Attorney Kim Jong-sik et al., Counsel for defendant-appellee

Seoul High Court Decision 92Gu15675 delivered on July 21, 1993

The appeal is dismissed. The costs of appeal are assessed against the defendant.

We examine the grounds of appeal.

1. On the first ground for appeal

According to the provisions of Article 89 (2) of the Mining Industry Act, the recognition of the chief of power resource department under the provisions of Article 88 (1) of the same Act shall be considered as the project approval under the provisions of Article 14 of the Land Expropriation Act. Such a project approval has the nature of an administrative disposition that establishes a certain right to expropriate under the conditions that it should go through a certain procedure, and the scope of the object to be expropriated is determined by obtaining the project approval, and the right to expropriate has the effect of a kind of public law right that can be asserted against the present and future right holder (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 92Nu10852, Sept. 28, 1993).

The judgment of the court below to the same purport is correct, and there is no error of law by misunderstanding the legal principles as to the project approval such as theory of lawsuit. There is no reason to discuss.

2. On the second ground for appeal

In light of the provisions of Article 29 (2) of the Land Expropriation Act, which lists the two-minutes of the land expropriation procedure and the nature of the project approval and the matters to be decided by the Land Tribunal, the land tribunal itself cannot make a judgment such as the impossibility of the implementation of the project, in other words, unless the project approval is revoked by administrative litigation, unless the project approval is determined by administrative litigation.

In the same purport, the court below is justified in holding that even if the need for expropriation was weak as alleged by the snowhouse defendant in this case where the land expropriation was recognized under Article 88 (1) of the Mining Industry Act, the defendant cannot dismiss the application for land expropriation itself so that the above acceptance can be justified and that the mining development, which is the purpose of the expropriation of this case, is impossible. There is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the scope of adjudication by the Land Tribunal, such as the theory of lawsuit. There is no ground for discussion.

3. On the third ground for appeal

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the plaintiff requested on September 29, 1989 and October 9 of the same year that the non-party who is the owner of the land of this case to lease or sell the land of this case before the application for the recognition of expropriation of this case was made, but the non-party did not respond to the request for consultation with the Do governor for the recognition of the land of this case. The plaintiff did not respond to the request on May 10, 1990. After the approval of land expropriation of this case, the plaintiff sent an opinion opposing the expropriation of this case to the non-party. The plaintiff notified the non-party for consultation on August 31, 1990 and November 24 of the same year, 199, but the non-party did not lawfully respond to the consultation with the non-party 1, 1991. The non-party 2's request for consultation with the non-party 1 and the non-party 1, 1991.

4. On the fourth ground for appeal

The recognition and judgment of the court below as to the point out of the theory of lawsuit is justified in light of the relation of the evidence as stated by the court below, and it cannot be viewed that there is an error of law that misleads the facts against the rules of evidence, such as the theory of lawsuit, and there is no error of law that misleads the judgment of evidence and the recognition of facts. In the end, the issue is nothing more than

5. Therefore, the appeal is dismissed and all costs of appeal are assessed against the losing defendant. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Kim Jong-sik (Presiding Justice)