See Attached List of Plaintiffs (Law Firm Woo et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

KS Energy Co., Ltd. and 3 others (Law Firm Hun-Ba et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

August 29, 2014

Seoul Central District Court Decision 2007Gahap114265 Decided November 9, 2012

1. The plaintiffs' appeals, 12, 17, 25, 26, 26, 34, 25, 35, 34, 36, 35, 47, 25, 36, 47, 254, 36, 47, 363, 47, 48, 254, 47, 47, 47, 47, 253, 47, 363, 47, 47, 47, 47, 47, 47, 47, 47, 47, 47, 363, 2548, 254, 263, 47, 364, 257, 364, 257, 294, 153, 156, 156, 164, 197

2. After filing an appeal, the costs of the lawsuit are assessed against the Plaintiffs.

The judgment of the first instance is revoked. The defendants paid 30% interest per annum of 5% from June 10, 204 to the date of delivery of a copy of the complaint of this case 20% to 30% from the following day to 34, 293, 248, 246, 47, 46, 47, 46, 47, 47, 67, 67, 67, 86, 86, 87, 29, 24, 297, 297, 28, 297, 294, 27, 297, 297, 294, 37, 257, 296, 297, 247, 296, 257, 257, 37, 196, 197, 197, 197

1. Basic facts

The reason why this Court is used in this part is as follows: “Defendant SK Co., Ltd. (hereinafter “Defendant SK”)” and “SK Energy Co., Ltd. (hereinafter “Defendant SK”)” in the third part of the judgment of the court of first instance except for the reason that it is deemed as “Defendant SK” and “Defendant SK” (hereinafter “Defendant SK”), and therefore, it is identical to the corresponding part of the judgment of the court of first instance. Thus, it is acceptable in accordance with the main sentence of Article 420 of the Civil Procedure Act.

2. Whether liability for damages arises;

A. As to Defendant SK, GS, and Hyundai

The reason why this Court is to use this part of the judgment of the court of first instance is the same as the corresponding part of the reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance (from 4th to 17th 19th eth eth eth eth eth eth eth eth eth e.

B. As to Defendant S-Oil

The reasons why this Court is used are as follows: “In light of the above circumstances, it is insufficient to conclude that Defendant S-Oil committed a joint tort in relation to the participation in collusion or aided and abetting the collusion by other Defendants, on the sole basis of the circumstance or evidence submitted by the Plaintiffs, in light of the circumstances as seen earlier, and there is no other evidence to acknowledge it.” This is the same as the corresponding part of the reasoning of the judgment of the first instance (from 20 to 21th 16th e.g., the 17th e., the 17th e., the 17th e.g., the e., the e., the e.

C. Sub-committee

1) As seen earlier, Defendant SK, GS, and Hyundai committed the act of collusion for the price increase of products with light oil (hereinafter “instant collusion period”) from April 1, 2004 to June 10, 204 (hereinafter “instant collusion period”). As such, Defendant SK, GS, and Hyundai have been supplied with oil through gas stations from Defendant SK, GS, and Hyundai during the instant collusion period pursuant to Article 56(1) of the Fair Trade Act (hereinafter “instant collusion period”). As such, Defendant SK, GS, and Hyundai have been liable to compensate the Plaintiffs for the damage incurred by the said collusion, if any).

On the other hand, Defendant S-Oil, which cannot be seen as participating in the instant collaborative act, has no liability for damages under Article 56(1) of the Fair Trade Act or liability for damages under the Civil Act.

2) Meanwhile, even if Defendant S-Otil did not participate in the collusion, the Plaintiffs asserts to the effect that the liability of other Defendants who participated in the collusion with respect to light oil supplied by Defendant S-Otil is recognized. However, if it is proved that the price increase by an enterprise which did not participate in the collusion was affected by the collusion price, the above legal doctrine may apply. However, even if evidence submitted by the Plaintiffs are collected, it is insufficient to conclude that Defendant S-Otil has increased the price by being affected by the collaborative act of other Defendants, and there is no other evidence to acknowledge this, the above assertion cannot be accepted without any need to further examine other points.

In addition, although the plaintiffs asserted the so-called "liability for damages based on the market share" and cited the legal principles of the judgment of the United States Sind Co., Ltd. (However, it is unclear whether the above claim is alleged to the purport of recognizing the liability for damages of Defendant S-Otil, and in the case of light oil supplied by Defendant S-Otil who did not participate in collusion, it is unclear whether other Defendants are liable to compensate for damages). The above legal principles are related to the burden of proof conversion in cases where it is unclear who manufactured and supplied the products that caused damage to the plaintiff, and they cannot be applied to this case. The above assertion cannot be accepted without any need to further examine other issues.

3. Scope of damages (whether or not damage has occurred to some plaintiffs)

A. Legal doctrine

Damage caused by an illegal bidding collusion refers to the difference between the successful bid price formed by the collusion and the price formed in the event there was no collusion (hereinafter referred to as “provisional competition price”). Here, the virtual competition price should be calculated by the method of excluding only the increase in the price caused by the collusion while maintaining the other factors for price formation in the pertinent market where the collusion occurred (see Supreme Court Decision 2010Da18850, Jul. 28, 201).

B. Method of calculating the damages of the plaintiffs' assertion

1) The method of calculating the amount of damages by the Plaintiffs’ assertion is basically based on the Plaintiff’s report on calculating the amount of damages related to the collusion with the light oil price in 2004 (Evidence No. 17; hereinafter “Plaintiff’s report”). The value calculated by adding a certain amount of incidental expenses (hereinafter “additional value”) to the MOPS price, which is the competitive market price for the international fuel-pet products, is estimated as the virtual competitive price, (i) the value calculated based on the MOPS price (hereinafter “additional value”) plus a certain amount of incidental expenses (hereinafter “additional value”). In other words, the Plaintiffs’ claim is based on the “import cost” calculated based on the MOPS price, (ii) the addition of the general administration cost, profits, petroleum fund, and customs duties to the “SPS price at the pre-existing factory”, (iii) the price at the pre-existing factory shop plus the traffic/energy/ environmental tax, driving tax, driving tax and value added tax.

2) Specific methods of calculating the amount of damages based on the Plaintiff’s report are as follows.

본문내 포함된 표 가) 기본 계산식 경유 사용량 × 경유 1리터당 담합 마진 ( = 주유소 판매기준 실제 가격 - 가상 경쟁가격) 나) 경유 사용량 산정 방법 ① 제1심 법원의 국세청에 대한 과세정보 제출명령결과(이하 ‘과세정보 자료’라고 한다) 중 개별 주유소에서 매입한 부분만을 합산하면, 원고들이 2004. 1. 1.부터 2004. 6. 30.까지 181일 동안 구입한 총 경유매입금액을 알 수 있다. ② 원고별 총 경유매입금액을 181일로 나누어 1일 평균 경유매입금액을 산정한 후 이 사건 담합기간인 71일을 곱하여 담합기간 동안의 원고별 경유매입금액을 구한다. ③ 담합기간 내 원고별 경유매입금액을 경유(가중)평균가격인 리터당 863.93원으로 나누어 원고별 경유 사용량을 계산한다. ④ 다만 당심의 각 지방자치단체에 대한 유류보조금 관련 사실조회결과(이하 ‘유류보조금 자료’라고 한다)에 의한 경유 사용량이 과세정보 자료에 따른 경유 사용량보다 많거나, 과세정보 자료만으로는 경유 사용량을 알 수 없으나 유류보조금 자료에 의하면 경유 사용량을 알 수 있는 원고 301, 313, 316, 334, 338, 359, 361, 385의 경우에는, 유류보조금 자료에 따른 경유 사용량을 손해액 산정의 기준이 되는 경유 사용량으로 본다. 다) 주유소 판매기준 실제 가격 ⇒ 한국석유공사 공시 자료 라) 가상 경쟁가격 산정 과정 ① 수입원가 ( = ㉢ + ㉦) ㉠ MOPS 가격 : 유류완제품 국제시장인 싱가포르 석유제품 시장에서 거래된 1주 전(주6) 경유 가격(달러 표시 MOPS 가격)을 그 당일의 대미 송금 기준 환율에 따라 원화로 환산한 경유 1리터당 원화표시 MOPS 가격 ⇒ 한국 석유공사 공시 자료 ㉡ 운임보험료 ( = MOPS 단가 × a(주7)%) ㉢ 물자대소계 ( = MOPS 단가 + 운임보험료) ㉣ LC 개설료 ( = MOPS 단가 × 0.15%) ㉤ 통관료 ( = ㉢ × 0.2%) ㉥ 국내운반비 (리터당 고정가격)(주8) ㉦ 추가비용소계 ( = ㉣ + ㉤ + ㉥) ② 세전 정유사 공장도 가격 ( = 수입원가 + ㉠ + ㉡ + ㉢ + ㉣) ㉠ 일반관리비 ( = 수입원가 × b(주9)%), ㉡ 이윤 [ = (㉠ + ①의 ㉦)(주10) × 10%] ㉢ 석유기금 ( = 2003년 ~ 2005년 리터당 14.0원) ㉣ 관세 [ = 원유 1리터 가격(달러화) × 환율 × 관세율] ③ 세후 정유사 공장도 가격 ( = ② + 교통/에너지/환경세, 교육세, 주행세, 부가가치세) ⇒ 주유소가 정유사로부터 공급받는 경유 1리터당 원가 ④ 최종 소비자 가격 ( = ③ + 마진, 부가가치세) ⇒ 주유소의 최종 소비자에 대한 판매가격 ㉠ 마진 ( = 세후 정유사 공장도 가격 대비 3%(주11)), ㉡ 부가가치세 마) 경유 1리터당 담합 마진 ⇒ 76.00원 1주 단위 [‘다)항’ 주유소 판매기준 실제 가격 - ‘라)항’ 가상 경쟁가격]을 산정하여 담합기간 중 평균 담합마진을 계산한 후 이를 피고들의 시장점유비율로 가중평균함 바) 원고별 손해액 : 위 2)의 나)항의 원고별 경유 사용량 × 담합 마진 76.00원

㉠ MOPS 가격 : 유류완제품 국제시장인 싱가포르 석유제품 시장에서 거래된 1주 주6) 전 경유 가격(달러 표시 MOPS 가격)을 그 당일의 대미 송금 기준 환율에 따라 원화로 환산한 경유 1리터당 원화표시 MOPS 가격 ⇒ 한국 석유공사 공시 자료

Insurance premium = Insurance premium = MPS unit price x 7 per week)

Scope of Purpose Domestic Transportation Expenses (Welth 8) Fixed Price per liter)

General management expenses for the Corporation: = Admission price 】 9) b)

Maritime Affairs and Maritime Affairs and Trades, etc. (Ar., 10%) x 10%

(A) Dominated Corporation ( = 11%) 3% of the ex post facto similar factory price;

C. As to the volume of light oil used by each plaintiff

1) As seen earlier, in order for the Plaintiffs to seek damages against Defendant SK, GS, and Hyundai due to the instant collaborative act, the Plaintiffs should first be identified as the transit volume (a week 12 supplied from Defendant SK, GS, and Hyundai during the instant collaborative period) (i.e., prior to the issue of calculating the amount of damages, it is the matter of the damage itself).

However, there is no evidence to prove the fact that a considerable number of the plaintiffs provided light oil including through Defendant SK, GS, and Hyundai during the instant collusion period. The taxation information data, oil subsidy data, and fact inquiry results on the gas station association (hereinafter “gas station association data”), alone, most of the remaining plaintiffs cannot specify the light oil supplied from Defendant SK, GS, and Hyundai during the instant collusion period, and there is no other evidence to prove otherwise.

In other words, according to the taxation information data, the kinds of oil purchased by the plaintiffs, accurate timing of purchase, volume of purchase, etc., and even if the materials of the gas station association are neglected, most of the plaintiffs can not be found to have received transit supply from any of the companies, and accordingly, the possibility of including the transit supplied by the defendant S-Otil, etc. who did not participate in the instant collaborative act cannot be ruled out

Meanwhile, according to the oil subsidy data, the volume of light oil used and the timing for purchasing light oil can be inferred to a certain extent. However, even if Plaintiff 301, 313, 316, 334, 335, 338, 356, 359, 361, 368, 385, 394, 394, 385, 394, 401, and 404 were submitted only, and in the case of the plaintiffs except Plaintiff 313,404, it cannot be seen that they received light oil from any company even if other evidence, such as the data on taxation or the data on the gas station association.

2) The following are examined specifically by each plaintiff.

(a) Plaintiffs 9, 13, 14, 18, 24, 39, 47, 48, 67, 67, 69, 77, 86 through 89, 91, 92, 93, 98, 101, 112, 117, 136, 139, 148, 171, 177, 180, 180, 188, 343, 363, 201, 205, 210, 212, 214, 2278, 239, 247, 247, 363, 364, 257, 297, 305, 363, 205, 205, 218, 2228, 2304, 24625

나) 원고 1, 2, 4, 5 내지 8, 10, 11, 12, 17, 19 내지 23, 27, 28, 30, 31, 37, 41, 42, 44, 45, 49, 54 내지 59, 61 내지 66, 70, 73 내지 76, 78, 79, 80, 82, 85, 90, 94, 95, 102, 104, 106, 107, 108, 113, 114, 118, 120, 121, 122, 125, 128, 129, 131, 132, 138, 140, 141, 142, 144, 145, 146, 147, 149, 151, 153, 154, 156, 157, 158, 160, 161, 164, 166, 167, 169, 172 내지 176, 178, 179, 185, 186, 187, 191, 192, 196, 198, 199, 200, 203, 204, 207, 208, 213, 215, 216, 217, 219 내지 222, 224, 226, 232, 233, 236, 237, 239, 245, 247, 249, 250, 251, 254 내지 259, 261, 262, 264, 273, 275, 278, 279, 280, 282, 283, 287, 288, 290, 294, 296, 301, 303, 305, 307, 310, 316, 317, 318, 320, 322 내지 326, 328, 329, 332, 334, 335, 338, 339, 342, 343, 345, 346, 349 내지 353, 356, 357, 359, 360, 361, 366, 368, 370, 372, 374, 376, 377, 380, 384, 385, 388, 392, 394, 398, 401, 409, 414, 415, 416, 419, 420, 423, 424, 426 내지 430, 432, 435, 441 내지 445, 447, 450, 452 내지 457, 460 내지 466, 468, 472, 473, 474, 476, 479, 480, 484, 485, 486, 490 내지 494, 497 내지 505, 507 내지 528, 530 내지 540, 542 내지 547, 549 내지 565, 567, 569, 571 내지 575, 580 내지 583의 경우, 과세정보 자료에 의하면, 그 상호에 “주유소”, “에너지”, “오일”, “석유” 등이 포함되어 있는 업체를 매입처로 하는 2004. 1.부터 2004. 6.까지의 부가가치세 신고 내역 및 첨부 서류가 증거로 제출되어 있을 뿐이다.

However, such circumstance alone does not reveal the fact that the above plaintiffs received the above plaintiffs' supply of other light oil, and if they received the supply of light oil, it cannot be seen that they received the supply of light oil from any of the companies, and there is no evidence that can be inferred otherwise. Moreover, the possibility that the above plaintiffs were provided with light oil from the defendant S-Otil or other suppliers who did not participate in the collusion act of this case cannot be ruled out.

C) In the case of Plaintiff 143, 231, 293, 298, 300, 302, 390, 400, 406, and 411, the Plaintiff is supplied with light oil from Defendant S-Oil or S-Net Korea which did not participate in the instant collaborative act. In the case of Plaintiff 25, 105, 119, 133, 235, 337, 440, and 529, the Plaintiff 127 was supplied with light oil from Defendant S-Oil or S-Oil, and the Plaintiff 371, 393, and 417 was supplied with light oil from the supply source. However, there was no evidence that Plaintiff 371, 393, and 417 had an impact on the price of the instant collusion, or that Plaintiff 127 was supplied with light oil from the supply source.

(d) Plaintiffs 15, 29, 32, 34, 5, 96, 10, 103, 124, 162, 170, 184, 190, 225, 230, 242, 246, 277, 3333, 397, 40, 463, 46, 46, 47, 46, 46, 46, 46, 46, 47, 471, 363, 47, 486, 47, 471, 486, 47, 486, 364, 47, 471, 487, 485, 567, 57, 569, 3636, 47, 57, 169.

However, among the above plaintiffs, the submission of oil subsidy data that enables them to know that they received oil subsidies during the collusion period in this case is only Plaintiff 313 and Plaintiff 404. The remaining plaintiffs were submitted only the taxation information data and the materials of the gas station association. Such evidence alone does not specify the quantity of fuel used during the collusion period in this case, and further, in light of Gap evidence No. 7, it is not impossible to prove whether the above plaintiffs purchased the fuel during the collusion period in this case ( therefore, it cannot be viewed that Article 57 of the Fair Trade Act can be applied).

Accordingly, the plaintiffs asserted that the period of collusion in this case constitutes the period of cargo transport volume, and thus, the calculation of the amount of light oil consumption based on the tax information data from January 2004 to June 2004 is rather remuneration. Accordingly, according to the traffic volume information system of the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport, the plaintiffs stated that according to the traffic volume information system of the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport from January 2004 to March 2004 is less than the traffic volume from April 2004 to June 2004. However, it is insufficient to readily conclude that the plaintiffs except the plaintiffs 313, 404, purchased light oil during the period of collusion in this case, and there is no other evidence to prove otherwise (i.e., oil subsidy data, there is no evidence to prove that only the plaintiffs 334, 335, 338, 356, 369, 368, 394, 401, 404, 204.

Meanwhile, in the case of Plaintiff 313, according to the taxation information data, the fact that the Plaintiff purchased an amount equivalent to KRW 14,598,00,00 presumed to be light oil from January 2004 to June 2004 is recognized. If the materials of the gas station association are included, the Plaintiff supplied an amount equivalent to KRW 3,182,00 among the oil. In addition, according to the oil subsidy data, it is recognized that the Plaintiff received the oil subsidy on the premise that the Plaintiff purchased KRW 12,944 liters from April 2004 to June 2004.

Next, according to the data on taxation, Plaintiff 404 acknowledged that he purchased an amount equivalent to KRW 19,097,00,00 presumed to be light oil from January 2004 to June 2004, and when examining the data from the association data of the gas station, the fact that he supplied an amount equivalent to KRW 300,000 out of that amount to KRW 16) is recognized. In addition, according to the oil subsidy data, it is recognized that the above Plaintiff received the oil subsidy on the premise that he purchased 6,197 liter on April 204.

D. As to the method of calculating virtual competitive price

1) The plaintiffs asserted that the calculation method of virtual competitive price of the plaintiff's report (in accordance with the standard market comparison method, the method of calculating virtual competitive price is appropriate after adding additional price factors in accordance with the calculation standard of the estimated price for military milk after 2001 agreed between the Ministry of National Defense and the equivalent associations according to the comparison method of the standard market) is appropriate.

A) In support of the fact that oil refinings set the prices of petroleum products by adding additional factors to the MOPS prices, there are the following data:

(1) Report materials (Evidence No. 31) of the Ministry of Knowledge Economy on April 6, 2011: The purport that oil refinings shall calculate the base price by adding customs duties, surcharges, distribution expenses, and profits to the MOS price and determine the price by additionally adjusting the price reflecting the domestic market situation at the business stage.

(2) Documents about discussions held on April 2010 (Evidence A 32): The purport that the prices of domestic petroleum products have been determined based on international petroleum products prices from around 201.

(3) Materials from the date of March 11, 2009 of the Korea Petroleum Association (Evidence A of subparagraph 33): The purport that the domestic prices of petroleum products are linked to crude oil prices from January 1, 1997 to the mid-term 2001, but the change is made to the linkage with the international prices of petroleum products after the mid-2001.

(4) Research papers (Evidence A, No. 40, 41): The purport that the prices of petroleum products shall be determined on the basis of MOPS prices, exchange rates, market competition conditions, etc., respectively.

B) After import liberalization, there is proven evidence that there is a co-ordination phenomenon between domestic petroleum product prices and international petroleum product prices.

In addition, even if the market structure of the domestic market, which is the main market, is different from the market structure of the Singapore spot market, the result of the theoretical analysis is derived from collecting the prices of domestic petroleum products with the price added to the international petroleum products price.

C) The content of the Plaintiffs’ additional price factors is based on the criteria for calculating the estimated price for military oil supplied in the Ministry of National Defense, which is adopted with the consent of domestic oil refinings to the reasonable method for calculating the estimated price.

In addition, the Supreme Court pointed out that "after the Ministry of National Defense has set the estimated price for military oil in accordance with the MOPS price since 2001 and has changed the monthly contract price by the MOPS price, the defendants will set the bid price in consideration of their production costs and profits based on the MOPS price in the MOP market near the complete competition market, so the defendants will have to set the bid price in consideration of their respective production costs and profits. Therefore, the correlation between the MOPS price and the actual bid price for military oil is high."

On the other hand, around September 2012, the Board of Audit and Inspection pointed out that the above estimated price of military oil was calculated in excess of the above estimated price in the audit and inspection by the Defense Acquisition Program Administration, and the defendant SK asserted that the criteria for calculating the estimated price of military oil for military supply are appropriate in civil litigation against the Republic of Korea.

2) However, the method of calculating the virtual competitive value of the Plaintiff’s report may not be adopted for the following reasons:

A) The method of comparison with the standard market is basically a method of estimating the amount of damages for collusion by deeming the price at the market where collusion has not occurred among the markets having characteristics similar to the market where collusion occurred as the competitive price.

However, it is difficult to see that the domestic transit market is the same or similar market in general because the price formation factors, such as the structure and terms of the market, are different in comparison with the domestic transit market that is close to the complete competition market.

B) In particular, domestic oil refinings, not importing the transit, etc. sold in the complete competitive market and returning it to consumers, but selling the transit, etc. obtained as a kind of tobacco products in the process of refining it at the oil refining facilities located in Korea and importing crude oil to consumers, and on the premise that it imports finished products and sells them in Korea, the method of calculating the competitive price based on the cost accounting method (19) is wrong from its start to its start.

Furthermore, the period of collusion in this case is the time after the import company, who lost the price competitiveness as a result of rapid increase in the international petroleum products price, has been removed most of the import company, and lost its influence on the domestic petroleum products market. Therefore, the assumption that the Plaintiff’s report is premised on the Plaintiff’s side, i.e., the assumption that the domestic sales price of refined goods was collected at least in the same amount as the price set by the importer, cannot be established in the case of the collusion period.

C) Specifically, the MOPS price is the price formed in the spot market in which most countries making the 20th staticism are not consumed in their country or where surplus quantity is traded after consumption. If variable costs are guaranteed, it is a kind of limit price in which transaction is conducted. Therefore, it is considerably lower than the domestic product price in the refined country that is formed by reflecting fixed costs in addition to variable costs, and since the Singapore’s spot market was in excess of the supply by substitution in around 2000, it was formed at a lower price in kind (Evidence 45). In addition, the 199-year data were generated, but since the Singapore’s refining facilities were constructed for a long time and completed depreciation, it is assumed that the domestic product price is higher than the petroleum product price in Korea due to high financial costs, etc. of domestic oil refinings (Evidence 41).

D) Meanwhile, the Plaintiffs asserted to the effect that there was a relationship between the MOPS price and the actual transit price in the case of military oil after 2001. However, in the case of military oil, based on the premise that the MOPS price was applied by reflecting the opinions of similar names from 2001, the bidding procedure was conducted based on the price calculation method added to the import unit cost, and thus, the difference between the actual successful bid price and the MOPS price has no choice but to be higher. Since 2001, the mere fact that the correlation between the actual successful bid price and the MOPS price was high can not be inferred that the correlation between the domestic supply price and the MOPS price after 2001.

E) The Plaintiff’s survey report appears to have set “additional Price element” according to the calculation method of unit price per liter based on the MOPS price standard used by the appellate court in the military oil collusion case.

However, in the successful bid of oil for military supply since 2001, the “budget price” is determined by the method of basically adding the incidental expenses prescribed in the government accounting standards. Therefore, the content of “additional Price element” is relatively clear, but in the case of domestic transit price, even if domestic oil prices are determined based on the MOPS price, it is not clear whether the factors that add to the MOPS price are to be determined in addition to the MOPS price (it is not clear that the additional price elements are specific, and the accurate amount is determined in addition to the MOPS price) and each kind of oil can be different. In addition, it is unreasonable to regard the factors that calculate the estimated price used for the determination of the successful bid price of government-purchasing goods as the factors that constitute the price formation for general consumers.

F) Specific issues regarding “additional Price element” of the Plaintiff’s report are as follows.

① Since domestic transit supply market is an over-point market, there are special factors for forming prices that can be enjoyed in the over-point market when domestic oil refinings determine the transit price. The above “additional pricing factors” as determined by the Plaintiffs do not include all factors for forming prices in the over-point market.

② Of the additional pricing factors of the Plaintiff’s report, “profit ratio” refers to the profit ratio of the importing company based on the cost calculation method of the imported goods. It cannot be deemed that the profit ratio of the similar entity is reflected in consideration of the investment in facilities of a large scale, necessity of employment maintenance, debt ratio, etc.

③ Although light oil for automobiles can be used only for less than 0.043% of sulfur content at the time of the instant collusion period, the MOPS price prior to one week, which the plaintiffs considered as the basis, is 0.5% of sulfur content, is presumed to have occurred, and as a matter of course, it is apparent that considerable additional costs would have been incurred, the virtual competition price is higher and the collusion margin would be lower, but such points are not reflected in the Plaintiff’s report.

④ The Plaintiffs cited evidence No. 40 on the basis of the 3% margin of each gas station in the Plaintiff’s report. However, even from the content of the report itself, it is unreasonable to quinate the level of progress solely by simply subtracting the final consumer price from the distribution phase by using annual average data. In addition, the price itself supplied to the agency or gas station by the Defendants is diverse according to the terms of discount depending on each agency, the volume of the gas station purchased, the transaction period, etc., and the individual gas station’s purchase price is not limited to a certain amount, but rather, there is a voluntary factor of price formation due to the difference in preference between its location, subsidies, and oil supply companies.

In particular, in the case of the plaintiffs, it is difficult to see that the factors such as the price determination of gas stations, etc. and the general transit price determination factors are the same as those engaged in the cargo transport business that regularly purchases large quantities of transit.

⑤ Even if all the materials submitted by the Plaintiffs are collected, it is recognized that an increase or decrease in the MOPS price may affect the domestic oil price, and it is not sufficient to conclude that the virtual competitive price is formed by adding the additional price factors proposed by the Plaintiffs, and it does not coincide with some of the materials listed as additional price factors and the content that the Plaintiff’s report made as additional price factors.

G) The gist of the Board of Audit and Inspection’s point of view is that the revenue cost should be considered in determining the price of military oil for the sake of reflecting the reality that it is not necessary for the Plaintiffs to take into account (a detailed examination of the details pointed out by the Board of Audit and Inspection), and the content of Defendant SK’s assertion in related civil cases constitutes a military oil for military supply, the structure of which differs from the structure of the determination of the price of the transit supplied to general consumers, and thus, cannot affect the instant case.

E. Sub-committee

Ultimately, in the instant case, it cannot be deemed that part of the Plaintiffs’ assertion itself caused damages, and even in the case of the other Plaintiffs, the method of calculating the virtual competitive price claimed by the Plaintiffs cannot be accepted, and there is no other assertion or proof as to the method of calculating the amount of damages. In addition, it cannot be deemed that the instant case constitutes “a case where it is extremely difficult to prove the fact necessary to prove the amount of damages, even if it is recognized that the damage occurred, by nature of

Therefore, all of the plaintiffs' claims for damages cannot be accepted.

4. Conclusion

Then, the plaintiffs' claims against the defendants shall be dismissed for 12, 17, 25, 26, 25, 38, 344, 25, 364, 253, 254, 364, 257, 364, 257, 364, 257, 364, 257, 364, 257, 254, 364, 364, 257, 364, 257, 364, 364, 257, 364, 257, 364, 257, 364, 257, 364, 97, 364, 254, 257, 97, 254, 165, 16415, 197

[Attachment]

Judges Kim Jong-soo (Presiding Judge)

Note 1) Defendant KS Co., Ltd. was divided into KS and KS Energy Co., Ltd., and KS Energy Co., Ltd. was divided into KS Energy Co., Ltd., and KS comprehensive chemical Co., Ltd., after its trade name was changed into KS, and the rights and obligations in this case were reverted to KS Energy Co., Ltd..

2) Business entities may not jointly agree on the determination or change of price that unfairly limits competition through a contract, agreement, resolution, or any other method (Article 19(1)1 of the Fair Trade Act). In the event there is a person damaged by the implementation of such an agreement, business entities are liable for damages to the relevant victim (main sentence of Article 56(1) of the Fair Trade Act). The liability for damages under the above provision provides that the damages shall be paid to the market participant who made the transaction at the price as a result of the distortion of the market by the prohibited act and the formation of an unfair price. Unless the business entity proves that there was no intention or negligence, the illegality is recognized by an agreement that unfairly limits competition (Article 56(1) proviso of the Fair Trade Act), barring special circumstances, and there is a difference between the household interest situation in which the business entity would have existed without such unfair collaborative act and its implementation, and the current status of interest changed by such unfair collaborative act and its implementation. Moreover, not only the direct purchaser who purchased the goods directly from the business entity but also the so-called one purchaser who purchased the goods as its raw materials.

3) An act of setting a price higher than that under normal conditions of competition, taking into account that the market price has been increased due to collusion by an enterprise which did not participate in collusion.

Note 4) Sinllied v. Abott Lbot Lbotor, 26 Cal. 3d 588, 1980 (the reference method expressed by the plaintiffs in the briefs).

5) However, in the case of some plaintiffs, the fact-finding results on fuel subsidies to each local government in the party deliberation are reflected, and there is a difference in the calculation method of light oil consumption.

Note 6) The price fluctuation in the MOPS price is reflected in the domestic petroleum product price, assuming that the general period of time is required.

Note 7) A value changes according to the year, and 2.8, 2003, 2.58, 2004, 2005.8

Note 8) October 6, 2003, October 27, 2004, November 49, 2005

Note 9) The b value changes according to the year, and 3.12 in 2003, 2.76 in 2004, and 2.91 in 2005

(10) The first instance court determined on the premise that the Plaintiff’s report “import cost + general management cost” calculated 10% of the total general management cost as profit. Although the Defendant Hyundai Hospital Hospital should be deemed as profit, the Plaintiff’s report asserts that the amount of 10% of the total general management cost should be calculated as 10% of the “additional cost + general management cost” is erroneous. However, the method of calculating profits employed in the above report is deemed to be based on Article 6(2) Subparagraph 8 of the Enforcement Rule of the Act on Contracts to Which the State is a Party, and the actual calculation result of the Plaintiff’s report was also calculated as 10% of the “additional cost + general management cost” as profit. Meanwhile, the main text of the report first submitted by the Plaintiffs stated “(2) x 10% of the total management cost calculated in [1] x 2.0% of the total management cost” x 10% of the total management cost (2) x 10% of the Plaintiffs’ additional total management cost (2) x 18.0% of the report [1%).3].

Note 11) As a result of the truth calculation method, two categories of “the amount calculated by subtracting the price of a refined factory from the average consumer price of each gas station at the end of each gas station” and “3% of the price of a refined factory at the end of each tax year.”

Note 12) The correct means the volume of light oil purchased by the Plaintiffs at gas stations handling light oil supplied by Defendant SK, GS, and Hyundai, but the same shall apply to this indication for convenience.

Note 13) It cannot be readily concluded that all purchased oils go through.

Note 14) The amount of light consumption by June 10, 2004, the period of collusion, is not specified.

15) It cannot be readily concluded that all oil purchased are transit.

(16) Plaintiff 404 was supplied with an amount equivalent to KRW 18,497,00 from the Jinnam Oil station, “Scarx (main) Jinnam,” and “Skknex (main) book.” According to the materials of the gas station association, it is recognized that only the “Jinnam Oil station” among them handles the oil of Defendant GS only. However, in light of the name, etc. of the gas station, it is reasonable to deem that all the oil supplied by Plaintiff 404 was supplied by Defendant GS.

[17] Supreme Court Decision 2010Da18850 Decided July 28, 2011

Note 18) Seoul Central District Court Decision 2012Gahap96798 decided January 10, 2014

Note 19) It is in accordance with Article 6 of the Enforcement Rule of the Act on Contracts to Which the State is a Party in a way of calculating the price, including the cost of the occurrence, until the imported goods are imported from a foreign country and

Note 20) In such a case by introducing crude oil and procuring oil products consumed in that country, multiple kinds of oil products are produced in the refining process, among which oil products not consumed in that country are traded in the spot market.

Note 21) It means the method of calculating the basic reserve price by adding the incidental costs to the MOPS price, and then concluding a contract with the amount invested by the successful bidder through the tender after concluding the contract with the amount invested by the successful bidder, and then adjusting the price in accordance with the basic reserve price calculation criteria (Evidence A 43).

Note 22) From 10th of the preparatory document dated December 6, 2013, the Plaintiffs made it clear that “the fact that the goods are the factory price that forms the basis of the competitive price in this case are in accordance with the criteria for calculating the estimated price for the military supply oil under the Ministry of National Defense.”

23) According to the evidence No. 40, the purport of the evidence No. 40 includes that “The sales price of the fixed and similar prices shall be determined autonomously by the current management strategy of each oil refining,” “The specific calculation method for the price-fixing factors shall not be externally known with information related to the internal management activities of each oil refining,” and that “the price at the distribution stage shall be determined by the management policy of the current agency and the business operator operating the oil station, so it shall not be able to accurately grasp the specific price-fixing factors.”