[1] The scope of union members and the scope of union members subject to collective agreements

[2] The meaning of "worker of the same kind" who is subject to the general binding force of a collective agreement under Article 35 of the Labor Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act

[1] According to Articles 5 and 11 of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act, workers may freely organize a trade union or join it. Specifically, the scope of union members of a trade union shall be determined in accordance with the trade union's bylaws. Workers are qualified for union members by free admission to the trade union in accordance with the trade union's bylaws. Collective agreements entered into between an employer and a trade union shall be applied to all union members who join the trade union as parties to the agreement unless there are special circumstances such as the provision that only a certain scope of workers shall be applied by special agreements.

[2] The "worker of the same kind" who is subject to the application of the collective agreement as a general binding force pursuant to Article 35 of the Labor Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act refers to a person who is expected to be subject to the agreement pursuant to the provisions of the collective agreement in question, and a person who is not qualified as a member pursuant to the provisions of the collective agreement in question is not entitled to the application of the collective agreement.

[1] Articles 5, 11, and 31 of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act / [2] Articles 5, 11, and 35 of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act

[2] Supreme Court Decision 92Nu13189 delivered on December 22, 1992 (Gong1993Sang, 625), Supreme Court Decision 95Da39618 delivered on December 22, 1995 (Gong1996Sang, 505), Supreme Court Decision 95Da4056 delivered on April 25, 1997 (Gong1997Sang, 1555 delivered on October 28, 1997), Supreme Court Decision 96Da13415 delivered on December 10, 199 (Gong197Ha, 3620), Supreme Court Decision 9Du6927 delivered on December 10, 200 (Gong2000Sang, 2008).

Plaintiff 1 and one other (Law Office, Attorneys Lee Young-young et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

The Chairperson of the National Labor Relations Commission

Suwon Automobile Sales Co., Ltd. (Law Firm Shin & Kim, Attorney Hun-tae, Counsel for the defendant-appellant)

Seoul High Court Decision 2000Nu7423 delivered on October 24, 2001

All appeals are dismissed. The costs of appeal are assessed against the plaintiffs.

1. As to the effect of the scope of union members under the collective agreement

According to Articles 5 and 11 of the Labor Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act (hereinafter referred to as the "Act"), workers may freely organize or join a trade union. Specifically, the scope of union members of a trade union shall be determined in accordance with the regulations of the trade union. Workers are qualified for union members by freely joining the trade union as prescribed by the regulations of the trade union. Collective agreements entered into between an employer and a trade union shall be applied to all union members who have joined the trade union as parties to the agreement unless there are special circumstances such as the provision that only a certain scope of workers shall be applied by a special agreement.

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below acknowledged the facts based on the adopted evidence, and rejected the plaintiffs' assertion that Article 3 of the collective agreement on disciplinary action (Article 30, Article 50, etc.) shall apply to the plaintiffs' Intervenor (hereinafter referred to as "participating") company and the trade union on October 15, 1996, which provides that Article 6 of the collective agreement applies to the company and its partnership and union members. In particular, in stipulating the scope of union members, Article 6 of the agreement lists class members of class 5 (management, technical, and technical) or higher, since it is not possible to become union members as above. At the time of the disciplinary action in this case, Article 6 of the collective agreement provides that workers of class 4 or class 3 of the management position who are not members of the union under the collective agreement shall be excluded from the scope of union members by mutual agreement between the labor and management, and thus, it appears that Article 15 of the above collective agreement was null and void or excluded from the above provision of the collective agreement.

In light of the above legal principles and records, the above fact-finding and decision of the court below is just, and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the validity of the provision on the scope of union members under the collective agreement as otherwise alleged in the ground of appeal, and the Supreme Court decision that the plaintiffs pay taxes is not appropriate

2. As to the general binding power of a collective agreement

The term "worker of the same kind" who is subject to the general binding force of a collective agreement pursuant to the provisions of Article 35 of the Act refers to a person who is expected to be subject to the agreement pursuant to the provisions of the collective agreement in question, and a person who is not entitled to be a partner pursuant to the provisions of the collective agreement in question shall not be subject to the collective agreement since the application of the agreement is not expected (see Supreme Court Decisions 96Da13415 delivered on October 28, 1997; 99Du6927 delivered on December 10, 199; 2002Da23611 delivered on June 27, 2003).

Upon examining the facts acknowledged by the court below in light of the records, the plaintiffs at the time of the disciplinary action in this case do not fall under the scope of union members under Article 6 of the collective agreement, and therefore, it cannot be said that the application of the collective agreement is expected, and therefore the plaintiffs cannot be deemed as workers of the same kind who are subject to general binding force of the collective agreement pursuant to Article 35 of the Act (in addition, the plaintiff's union members were not less than half of union members at the time when the plaintiffs were subject to disciplinary action, and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the general binding force of the

3. As to the interpretation of the personnel committee regulations

In addition, the court below also rejected the plaintiffs' assertion on the defects in the composition of the committee for reexamination, in light of the following facts: the intervenor company's personnel committee's provision on the grounds that the intervenor company's qualification and authority are distinguished from the chairperson and the committee member's provision on the grounds that the chairperson cannot be deemed to be included in the "committee member subject to replacement" in the case of a retrial prescribed in 16.3. of the personnel committee regulations on the disciplinary dismissal of this case; even if it is interpreted that only 1/2 of the members of the committee for reexamination of the court below's disciplinary action of this case is included in the "committee member subject to replacement of the above household affairs," the above regulations are replaced only in principle by 1/2 or more of the members; therefore, even if the intervenor company's personnel committee was organized by replacing only two members, including the chairperson, according to the circumstances of the intervenor company, it cannot be deemed that the disciplinary action of this case against the plaintiffs is a serious defect in the retrial procedure that becomes invalid.

In light of the records, the above fact-finding and decision of the court below are just, and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the interpretation of the regulations of the personnel committee.

4. Conclusion

Therefore, all appeals are dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition.

Justices Lee Yong-woo (Presiding Justice)