A. Whether the riot police officer is a soldier

B. Whether the riot police officer falls under “police officer” under the proviso of Article 2(1) of the State Compensation Act

A. In full view of the provisions of Articles 1, 2, 2-3(1) and (2) of the former Act on the Establishment of combat Police Units (amended by Act No. 4685 of Dec. 31, 1993), and Articles 2 subparag. 1 and 5 of the former Act on the Special Regulation of Military Service (amended by Act No. 4685 of Dec. 31, 1993), those who were enlisted in active duty service and were appointed as combat police officers shall lose their status as soldiers and obtain their status as riot police officers, so they shall not be soldiers.

B. Article 29(2) of the Constitution which limits a public official's claim for national compensation is intended to exclude a person engaged in duties with high risk of legislative intent from the claim for national compensation for social security risks by separately preparing a state compensation system as a burden of social security, and the "police officer" under the proviso of Article 2(1) of the State Compensation Act refers to the above constitutional provisions, and the riot police officer belongs to the combat police force under the National Police Agency and performs counter-espionage operations and assist in public security operations, and the risk of performing his duties is not lower than the case of other police officers, and it is difficult to conclude that Article 4 of the Act on the Establishment of combat Police Units applies mutatis mutandis to some provisions of the Police Officers Act. In light of the above, it is difficult to conclude that the "police officer" under the proviso of Article 2(1) of the State Compensation Act is limited to a "police officer under the Police Officers Act." Rather, the riot police officer should be regarded as a "police officer" under the proviso of Article 2(1) of the State Compensation Act.

A. Articles 1, 2, and 2-3 of the former Act on the Establishment of Reference Police Units (amended by Act No. 4685 of Dec. 31, 1993); Articles 2 subparag. 1 and 5 of the former Act on the Special Regulation of Military Service ( repealed by Act No. 4685 of Dec. 31, 1993)

A. (B) Supreme Court Decision 94Da16106 delivered on March 28, 1995 (dong). Supreme Court Decision 90Da15907 delivered on April 26, 1991 (Gong1991, 1493) 92Da4395 delivered on April 9, 193 (Gong193Sang, 1363)

Plaintiff 1 et al., Counsel for the defendant-appellant-appellee and 5 others, Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant-appellee and 9 others.

Korea

Seoul High Court Decision 93Na49194 delivered on April 19, 1994

The judgment of the court below is reversed.

The case is remanded to Seoul High Court.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

According to the reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance cited by the court below, the court below acknowledged the death of the deceased non-party 1 on September 4, 1992, on the ground that he was unable to receive the training conducted on the day in the bus belonging to the above service unit, which was parked in the above service unit, on February 25, 1993, while he was transferred to the police officer on November 7, 1992 and was on duty in the third service unit, he was on the duty of the police officer on September 25, 1993. The court below rejected the defendant's claim under the proviso of Article 2 (1) of the State Compensation Act on the ground that the non-party 2, who was the captain of the above service unit, was an assault against the deceased and the plaintiffs due to the act of violence committed by the deceased non-party 1 in the course of performing his duties. In light of related Acts and subordinate statutes, the riot police officer lost his status as a soldier and was newly acquired as a riot police officer, which is separate from the police officer or police officer under the Act.

However, in full view of the provisions of Articles 1, 2, 2-3(1) and (2) of the former Act on the Establishment of combat Police Units (amended by Act No. 4685 of Dec. 31, 1993), and Articles 2 subparag. 1 and 5 of the former Act on the Special Regulation of Military Service (amended by Act No. 4685 of Dec. 31, 1993), the part that is not a riot police officer in the judgment of the court below is justifiable since the person enlisted in active duty service and was transferred for the first time and was appointed as a riot police officer shall lose his status as a soldier and obtain his status as a riot police officer (see Supreme Court Decision 90Da15907, Apr. 26, 1991; 92Da4395, Apr. 9, 1993).

However, Article 29 (2) of the Constitution which limits a public official's claim for national compensation is intended to exclude a person engaged in duties of high risk of legislative purpose from the State compensation by separately preparing a state compensation system as a burden of social security risks. The "police officer" under the proviso of Article 2 (1) of the State Compensation Act refers to the provisions that lead to the above constitutional provisions, and the riot police officer belongs to the combat police force under the National Police Agency and performs counter-espionage operations and assist in public security affairs, and the risk of performing his duties is not lower than the case of other police officers, and it is difficult to conclude that the "police officer" under the proviso of Article 2 (1) of the State Compensation Act is limited to the "police officer under the Police Officers Act" in light of the fact that Article 4 of the Act on the Establishment of combat Police Units applies mutatis mutandis to some of the provisions of the Police Officers Act. Rather, the riot police officer should be deemed to fall under the "police officer" under the proviso of Article 2 (1) of the State Compensation Act.

Therefore, the judgment of the court below that the riot police officer did not include the police officer under the proviso of Article 2 (1) of the State Compensation Act is erroneous in the misapprehension of legal principles as to the scope of police officers under the above provision, which affected the conclusion of the judgment. Therefore, the part of the grounds for

Therefore, the judgment of the court below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the court below for a new trial and determination. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Park Jong-chul (Presiding Justice)