[1] Whether the right of revocation of a guardian's act without the consent of family council can be the object of creditor's subrogation right (negative)

[2] The internal effect of title trust and the effect of the death of the title trustee

[1] In a case where the guardian does not obtain the consent of the family council while doing an act under each subparagraph of Article 950(1) of the Civil Code, the right of the ward or family council to cancel the guardian's act (right of cancellation) pursuant to the provision of paragraph (2) of the same Article is a right of the right of subrogation, and therefore, it cannot be an object of creditor's subrogation.

[2] The basic principle of the trust agreement for establishing a title trust relationship is to be held by the truster in an internal relationship between the truster and the trustee, so the ownership of the subject matter is always held by the truster, so the right arising out of the subject matter is also attributed to the truster in an internal relationship between the truster and the trustee. If the truster terminates the trust agreement, the trustee is obligated to transfer the right to the truster. If the trustee dies, the title trust relationship continues to exist between the truster and

[1] Articles 404 and 950 of the Civil Act / [2] Article 103 of the Civil Act / [title trust] and Article 105 of the Civil Act

[2] Supreme Court Decision 80Da2809 delivered on June 23, 1981 (Gong1981, 14091) Supreme Court Decision 86Meu2653 delivered on May 12, 1987 (Gong1987, 968)

Plaintiff 1 and five others (Attorney Lee Jong-soo et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Defendant 1 and two others (Attorney Kim Young-soo et al., Counsel for the defendant-appellant)

Defendant 4 and one other (Attorney Kim Jong-il, Counsel for the defendant-appellant)

Seoul High Court Decision 91Na2221 delivered on May 27, 1994

Each appeal shall be dismissed. The costs of appeal shall be assessed against each party.

1. The plaintiffs' grounds of appeal of Lee Jong-su and Kim Hong-su (the grounds of appeal on the supplementary appellate brief submitted after the lapse of the submission period are limited to the extent of supplement in case of the plaintiff's supplemental appellate brief) are examined.

A. As to the first, third, and fourth points

원심이, 그 내세운 증거에 의하여 1963.경부터 경일양행이라는 상호로 한일시멘트공업 주식회사의 특약점을 경영하여 오던 원고들의 소송피수계인 망 소외 1(1995. 4. 26. 사망)이 재무부 소속 고위공무원으로 재직하고 있던 관계로 1964.경부터는 위 특약점의 사업주 명의를 위 특약점의 직원으로 근무하며, 생질로서 동거중이던 망 소외 2 명의로 하여 두고 있던 중, 1965. 6. 3. 소외 3 외 9인으로부터 서울 강서구 (주소 1 생략) 임야 49,885㎡(이하 이 사건 임야라고 한다)를 매수하면서 편의상 위 망인에게 이 사건 임야를 명의신탁하여 판시와 같이 위 망인의 명의로 소유권이전등기가 마쳐진 사실, 이 사건 임야는 1985. 12. 19. 서울 강서구 (주소 1 생략) 임야 47,954㎡(이하 이 사건 제1임야라고 한다)와 위 (주소 2 생략) 임야 1,931㎡(이하 이 사건 제2임야라고 한다)로 분할된 사실, 국가는 군사적 목적으로 이 사건 제2임야를 협의취득하고자 하였으나 그 등기명의자인 위 망인 및 그 상속인들의 소재를 알 수 없어 협의가 불가능하게 되자 공공용지의취득및손실보상에관한특례법에 따라 신문에 그 취지를 공시송달하면서 1985. 12. 30. 위 망인의 최후의 주소지 관할법원인 서울민사지방법원 소속 공탁공무원에게 같은 법원 금 제22401호로 위 망인을 공탁받을 자로 하여 손실보상금 8,689,500원을 공탁하고, 1986. 1. 28. 이 사건 제2임야에 관하여 국가 명의로 소유권이전등기를 마쳤고, 이 사건 제1임야에 관하여는 1986. 7. 10. 위 망인의 상속인인 피고 5(1/6지분), 피고 4(2/6지분), 제1심 공동피고 소외 4(3/6지분) 명의의 상속등기가 마쳐진 사실, 한편 피고 5와 미성년자인 위 소외 4 및 피고 4의 조모로서 법정대리인인 후견인 소외 5를 대리한 망 소외 6은 1986. 7. 6. 소개인 망 소외 7, 소외 8의 입회하에 피고 2, 피고 3에게 이 사건 제1임야를 대금 326,430,000원(계약금과 1차 중도금 각 금 30,000,000원은 계약당일, 2차 중도금 100,000,000원은 같은 달 21., 잔금 166,430,000원은 같은 해 8. 5. 각 지급하기로 하되 매도인들이 소유권이전등기 소요서류를 완비하면 지급기일 전이라도 매수인들이 잔금을 지급하기로 함)에 매도하는 계약을 체결한 사실(이하 이 사건 매매계약이라 한다. 다만 그 매매계약서상에는 편의상 매수인으로는 피고 2만이 서명날인하고, 매도인으로서는 피고 5와 위 소외 4가 서명 날인 또는 무인하고, 위 소외 6이 위 소외 5를 대신하여 위 소외 5의 이름 아래에 날인하였고, 피고 2, 피고 3은 내부적으로 이 사건 제1임야 14,506평 중 1,305평을 피고 2의 공유지분으로, 나머지를 피고 피고 3의 공유지분으로 하기로 정하였다.), 피고 2, 피고 3은 위 계약당일 피고 5측에게 계약금 및 1차 중도금으로 합계 금 60,000,000원을 지급하고, 같은 달 18. 피고 피고 3이 피고 1로부터 금 210,000,000원을 차용하여 위 금원을 잔대금조로 지급한 다음, 위 매매계약에 터잡아 이 사건 제1임야에 관하여 피고 2, 피고 3 명의로 판시와 같이 소유권이전등기를 하고, 다시 위 대여금 담보를 위하여 판시와 같이 피고 1 명의로 가등기를 한 사실을 각 인정한 다음, 이 사건 매매계약이 공서양속에 반하고, 불공정한 계약으로서 무효라는 원고들의 주장을 그 판시와 같은 이유로 모두 배척하고 있는바, 기록에 비추어 보면 원심의 이러한 사실인정과 판단은 옳다고 여겨지고, 거기에 상고이유의 주장과 같은 대리권에 관한 법리오해와 민법 제103조 , 제104조 에 관한 법리오해 및 채증법칙 위배로 인한 사실오인이나 심리미진의 각 위법이 있다고 할 수 없다. 상고이유의 주장은 필경 원심의 전권에 속하는 증거의 취사판단과 사실의 인정을 비난하는 것이거나 원심이 인정한 사실과 상치되는 사실을 전제로 원심의 판단을 부당하게 흠잡는 것에 지나지 아니하여 받아들일 수 없다.

B. On the second ground for appeal

The court below rejected the plaintiffs' assertion on the ground that the plaintiffs' assertion that the part against the defendant 4 and the above non-party 4 in the contract of this case was cancelled on behalf of the family council without the consent of the above non-party 5, on the ground that the plaintiffs' assertion that the above part of the contract of this case was cancelled on behalf of the plaintiffs as to the plaintiff's assertion that the above part of the contract of this case was cancelled on behalf of the above non-party 4 and the non-party 5, based on the evidence of the plaintiff's assertion that the above non-party 4 and the non-party 4 were decided to dispose of the forest land of this case for the future of the above non-party 4 and the defendant 4, and the above non-party 6 was decided to open the family council with the help of the non-party 9, and the court appointed the above deceased, the non-party 10 and the non-party 11 as the family council member, and the above non-party 5 decided to dispose of the forest land of this case as a legitimate resolution.

However, in a case where the guardian does not obtain the consent of the family council while performing the act under each subparagraph of Article 950 (1) of the Civil Code, the right of the ward or family council to cancel the above act of the guardian (right of cancellation) pursuant to the provision of paragraph (2) of the Civil Code is a right of the right of subrogation in the exercise of right of subrogation.

Therefore, the court below rejected the plaintiff's assertion that the above non-party 4 and defendant 4 exercise the right of revocation under Article 950 (2) of the Civil Act based on the subrogation right, on the ground that it cannot be the object of the subrogation right without having to inquire into the substantive judgment. The court below acknowledged that the court below decided on the substantive judgment under the premise that the above right of revocation can be the object of the subrogation right, and that there was a legitimate decision of the family council on the ground that the court below rejected the above assertion on the ground that the court below erred in the misapprehension of the legal principles as to the above right of revocation. However, it is obvious that the above argument of the above plaintiffs should be rejected for the reasons as seen above, so long as the court below rejected it, the error does not affect the conclusion of the judgment.

Therefore, the plaintiffs' above ground of appeal, which is based on the premise that the right of revocation can be exercised by the creditor's subrogation right, should not be justified.

2. The grounds of appeal by Defendant 4 and Defendant 5 are examined.

A. The basic principle of the trust agreement for establishing a title trust relationship is that the truster holds the ownership of the subject matter in an internal relationship between the truster and the trustee. Thus, the right arising from the subject matter is also attributed to the truster in an internal relationship. When the truster terminates the trust agreement, the trustee is obligated to transfer the right to the truster (see Supreme Court Decision 86Meu2653, May 12, 1987). If the trustee dies, the title trust relationship remains between the truster and the property heir (see Supreme Court Decision 80Da2809, Jun. 23, 1981).

B. In the same purport, the court below found that the plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against the above deceased non-party 2's heir 5, defendant 4 and the above non-party 4 to claim payment of KRW 8,689,50, which is the object of the second forest land due to the termination of title trust and that the duplicate of the complaint was delivered to the defendant 5 on May 28, 1986, to the defendant 4 who was a minor on August 8 of the same year and to the above non-party 5, who is the legal representative of the above non-party 4, the right to receive the above deposit, which is the object of the second forest land, belongs to the plaintiffs as the termination of title trust. The judgment of the court below is justified, and it is not erroneous in the misapprehension of legal principles as to real estate title trust, contrary to what is alleged in the grounds of appeal.

3. Therefore, each appeal shall be dismissed, and all costs of appeal shall be assessed against each party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Park Jong-ho (Presiding Justice)