The judgment of the court below is reversed.

A defendant shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than two years and six months.

However, the period of three years from the date this judgment became final and conclusive.

1. Summary of grounds for appeal;

A. The sentence imposed by the lower court (two years of imprisonment, three years of suspended execution, etc.) is too unreasonable.

B. A prosecutor 1) misunderstanding the legal principles as to profits derived from the operation of a market price under the Financial Investment Services and Capital Markets Act includes unrealistic profits equivalent to realizing profits realized in the course of trading stocks, as well as unrealistic profits equivalent to an increase in the stock price of the existing stocks. The circumstance cited by the lower court is that the Defendant conducted the market price of this case on July 17, 2013 through October 7, 2013 (hereinafter “Defendant, etc.”) as recognized by the lower court, as follows: (a) around July 17, 2013 to around October 7, 2013; (b) around May 26, 2014 to August 7, 2014; (c) around November 6, 2014 and around November 27, 2014 to November 27, 2014.

It is unfair to exclude the unrealistic profit from the profit accrued from the profit.

2) The sentence sentenced by the lower court is too unhued and unreasonable.

2. Determination of the Prosecutor’s misunderstanding of the legal principles

A. The lower court’s determination: (a) the Defendant appears to have engaged in each of the instant market prices regardless of existing shares for the purpose of meeting the requirements for prompt listing of stocks of the E Co., Ltd. (hereinafter “E”) in the process of listing stocks to the KOSDAQ before the KOSDAQ market; and (b) the Defendant et al. purchased a total of 75,410 shares during the entire operation period, and sold a total of 20,850 shares during the entire operation period; (c) the Defendant et al. continued to hold the remaining 54,560 shares until November 27, 2014 during which the third operation period was completed; and (d) the Defendant et al. held the existing shares by the said time; and (c) the Defendant et al., including the Defendant et al. held the shares without selling the shares during the nine-day period prior to the abolition of listing, even though they were able to trade the shares during the said nine-day period.