[1] Validity (effective) of the rules of employment stipulating the act of false academic background and career as grounds for dismissal, and whether disciplinary dismissal with justifiable grounds constitutes unfair labor practice (negative)

[2] The case affirming the disciplinary dismissal on the ground of false academic background and career in the job placement period

[1] A company's demand for the submission of a resume stating an employee's academic background or career is not only to evaluate employee's ability to work but also to determine whether to work through a prior personal judgment, such as the worker's intelligence and experience, degree of education, suspension of duty, and adaptation to work, in order to maintain trust and corporate order, it is necessary to determine whether to work as a result of such prior judgment. To this end, false career in the curriculum required to be submitted for this purpose is not only an important negative element for the worker's suspension of duty, but also a prior personal judgment on the worker who intends to work for the company. Therefore, the rules of employment that provide for the reason that the employee's false entry of career or work experience in the employment should be subject to disciplinary action shall be valid, unless there are special circumstances, and it shall not be deemed unfair labor practices, unless there are justifiable grounds for disciplinary action.

[2] The case affirming the disciplinary dismissal on the grounds of false academic background and career in the time of membership

[1] Article 27 of the former Labor Standards Act (amended by Act No. 5309, Mar. 13, 1997; see current Article 30); Article 39 subparagraph 1 of the former Trade Union Act (amended by Act No. 5244, Dec. 31, 1996; see current Article 81 subparagraph 1 of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act) / [2] Article 27 of the former Labor Standards Act (amended by Act No. 5309, Mar. 13, 1997); Article 39 subparagraph 1 of the former Trade Union Act (amended by Act No. 5244, Dec. 31, 1996; see current Article 81 subparagraph 1 of the Trade Union and Labor Relations Adjustment Act)

[1] [2] Supreme Court Decision 92Da18542 delivered on September 25, 1992 (Gong1992, 2994) Supreme Court Decision 93Nu21521 delivered on August 12, 1994 (Gong1994Ha, 2307) Supreme Court Decision 94Da14650 delivered on March 10, 1995 (Gong195Sang, 1573 delivered on August 22, 1995) (Gong195Ha, 3286) Supreme Court Decision 96Nu12672 delivered on August 29, 197

Jinizing Machinery Co., Ltd. (Attorney Kim Jong-tae, Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

The Chairman of the National Labor Relations Commission

Defendant joining the Defendant (Law Firm General Law Office, Attorneys Yoon Jong-tae et al., Counsel for the defendant-appellant)

Seoul High Court Decision 96Gu36083 delivered on June 3, 1997

The judgment below is reversed and the case is remanded to Seoul High Court.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. Summary of the reasoning of the judgment below

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below held that the Intervenor’s Intervenor (hereinafter referred to as the Intervenor) was not subject to disciplinary action against the Intervenor on September 21, 1992 by entering the Plaintiff’s production workers who run the manufacturing and distribution business, and that the Intervenor was not subject to disciplinary action against the Plaintiff on September 21, 1992, and that the Intervenor was not subject to disciplinary action against the Plaintiff on the ground that the Intervenor did not comply with the above-mentioned provision of the Rules of Employment for the reason that the Intervenor would be subject to punishment for a violation of the Assembly and Demonstration Act on June 24, 1988 by entering the Seoul District Court’s 19 years of imprisonment with labor or for any other reason that the Intervenor would not be subject to disciplinary action against the Intervenor on the ground that the Intervenor was not subject to disciplinary action against the Plaintiff on the ground that the Intervenor was not subject to disciplinary action against the Plaintiff on the ground that the Intervenor was not subject to punishment against the Plaintiff on the ground that the Intervenor was not subject to punishment against the Plaintiff.

2. Judgment on the grounds of appeal

A. In light of the records, it is proper that the court below determined that even if the intervenor did not comply with the above recommendation because the plaintiff recommended the intervenor to take charge of other machinery and did not issue an order for conversion as an order for work, it cannot be deemed a ground for disciplinary action, and there is no error of law by mistake of facts or misapprehension of legal principles due to violation of the rules of evidence as

B. A company's demand for a resume stating an employee's academic background or career is not only to evaluate employee's ability to work but also to determine whether to employ workers through a prior personal judgment such as the worker's intelligence and experience, degree of education, suspension of duty, and adaptation to work, etc. In order to maintain trust and corporate order, the company's demand for a resume stating an employee's academic background or career is to be considered as a result of such determination. The mere fact that a false career is required to be submitted for this purpose does not constitute an important element of the worker's suspension of duty, but the former personal judgment against the employee who intends to employ. Thus, the rules of employment that provide for a ground for discipline of a worker's false entry of his/her career experience or her career waste at the time of employment are valid as a provision of justifiable grounds for dismissal, barring special circumstances (see Supreme Court Decisions 94Da14650, Mar. 10, 1995; 95Nu5943, Aug. 22, 1995).

As duly established by the court below, in the resumes submitted by the intervenor to the plaintiff at the time of joining the plaintiff, if the plaintiff entered false information that the plaintiff had worked in another company without entering the university entrance, graduation, and previous convictions, the disciplinary dismissal of this case cannot be deemed to have a legitimate ground, and it cannot be deemed to have been done in light of the period of the above false experience and the importance of the intervenor's whole career in the intervenor's whole career. Furthermore, according to the records, while the plaintiff tried to employ eight graduates through TV employment fairs around February 1996, but failed to employ only one person, the plaintiff was aware of the facts such as the plaintiff's academic abolition, and it is unclear whether the plaintiff's legitimate trade union activities at the time of the disciplinary dismissal of this case were not only the preparation for establishment of union members or entrance, but also whether the plaintiff was aware of the plaintiff's trade union activities at the time, and it cannot be seen that the plaintiff's active dismissal of the plaintiff's worker's worker's labor union activity cannot be viewed as an unfair labor union activity.

In addition, according to the minutes of the disciplinary committee of this case, the plaintiff's director's director director's director's director's director's director's director's director's director's officer's officer's officer's officer's officer's officer's officer's officer's officer's officer's officer's officer's officer's officer's officer's officer's

Nevertheless, the court below determined that the dismissal of the disciplinary action in this case is unfair on the grounds as stated in its reasoning. Therefore, the court below erred by misapprehending the rules of evidence or by misapprehending the legal principles on the legitimacy of the dismissal of disciplinary action, which affected the conclusion of the judgment.

3. Conclusion

Therefore, without examining the remaining grounds of appeal, the judgment of the court below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the court below. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Chocheon-sung (Presiding Justice)