[1] The standard for determining whether a person bears the burden of proof as to whether the person is an independent possession and whether the person is an independent possession or an independent possession

[2] The nature of the possession where the State occupies the farmland purchased under the former Farmland Reform Act (=the possession of the owner)

[3] In a case where the issue was whether the possession of the state's real estate is an autonomous possession in view of the nature of the source of title, the case holding that the possession of the state's real estate is the possession of the state's real estate in the nature of the source of title since the state's purchase of the mother's land prior to the division was intended to distribute it to the self-employed farmers, etc., and it was planned

[1] According to Article 197(1) of the Civil Act, the possessor of an object is presumed to have occupied as his/her own intent. As such, in cases where the possessor asserts the prescriptive acquisition, he/she does not bear the burden of proving his/her own intent, and bears the burden of proof to a person who denies the establishment of the prescriptive acquisition by asserting that the possessor has no intention to own. Moreover, whether the possessor’s possession is the possession with intention to own or without intention to own is determined by the intention of the possessor, not by the internal deliberation of the possessor, but by the external and objective nature of the title that caused the acquisition of possession, or all circumstances related to the possession

[2] The Government's purchase of farmland which is not self-defilled by the former Farmland Reform Act (repealed by Act No. 4817 of Dec. 22, 1994, Article 2 subparagraph 1 of the Addenda of the Farmland Act (amended by Act No. 4817 of Dec. 2, 1994, hereinafter "the former Farmland Reform Act") is a condition subsequent to the cancellation that farmland will not be distributed after the purchase. Among the purchased farmland, it is not included in the distributed farmland finalized by the procedure under Article 32 of the former Enforcement Decree of the Farmland Reform Act (repealed by Act No. 2 subparagraph 1 of the Addenda of the Enforcement Decree of the Farmland Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 14835 of Dec. 22, 1995), or if the Government's purchase of farmland is confirmed to be not distributed to farmers, its ownership is returned to the original owner. Thus, the State's purchase of farmland in accordance with the former Farmland Reform Act is intended to be returned to the original owner from the time of non-distribution.

[3] In a case where the issue was whether the possession of the State's real estate is an autonomous possession in view of the nature of the source of title, the case holding that the possession of the State's real estate is an possession of the real estate in the nature of the source of title, since the State purchased the real estate for the purpose of distributing farmland, but is not included in distributed farmland as not included in distributed farmland after going through the procedure under Article 32 of the former Enforcement Decree of the Farmland Reform Act (repealed by Presidential Decree No. 14835 of Dec. 22, 1995), and the State's purchase of the mother's land before the division is for the sake of distributing it to self-employed farmers, etc., and it was planned that it should be returned to the original owner from the purchase date

[1] Articles 197(1) and 245 of the Civil Act / [2] Article 197(1) of the Civil Act, Article 5 subparag. 2 of the former Farmland Reform Act (repealed by Act No. 4817 of Dec. 22, 1994), Article 32 of the former Enforcement Decree of the Farmland Reform Act (repealed by Presidential Decree No. 14835 of Dec. 22, 1995) / [3] Article 197(1) of the Civil Act, Article 5 subparag. 2 of the former Farmland Reform Act (repealed by Act No. 2 subparag. 1 of the Addenda of the Farmland Act No. 4817 of Dec. 22, 1994), Article 21 of the former Enforcement Decree of the Farmland Reform Act (repealed by Presidential Decree No. 14835 of Dec. 22, 1995)

[1] Supreme Court en banc Decision 97Da37661 delivered on March 16, 200 (Gong200Sang, 962) Supreme Court Decision 99Da72743 delivered on February 26, 2002 (Gong2002Sang, 777) / [2] Supreme Court Decision 2001Da48187 delivered on December 27, 2001 (Gong2002Sang, 357) Supreme Court Decision 2002Da5666 delivered on October 10, 203 (Gong203Ha, 2171) Supreme Court Decision 204Da1141 delivered on April 14, 2005

Plaintiff 1 and two others (Law Firm Kelim, Attorneys Hah-hwan et al., Counsel for plaintiff-appellant)

Republic of Korea (Attorney Seo Young-young et al., Counsel for the defendant-appellant)

Seoul High Court Decision 2010Na55936 decided January 21, 2011

The part of the lower judgment against the Plaintiffs is reversed, and that part of the case is remanded to the Seoul High Court. All of the Defendant’s appeals are dismissed.

The grounds of appeal are examined (to the extent of supplement in case of supplemental appellate briefs not timely filed).

1. Plaintiff’s ground of appeal

According to Article 197(1) of the Civil Act, the possessor of an object is presumed to have occupied the object as his/her own intent. As such, if the possessor asserts the acquisition by prescription, he/she is not responsible to prove his/her own intention, and the person who denies the establishment of the acquisition by prescription by asserting that the possessor has no intention to own it, has the burden of proof. Furthermore, whether the possessor is the possession with intention to own or with intention to own shall not be determined by the internal deliberation of the possessor, but shall be determined externally and objectively on the basis of the nature of the title that caused the acquisition by possession or all the circumstances related to the possession (see, e.g., Supreme Court en banc Decision 97Da72743, Feb. 26, 2002).

Meanwhile, according to the fact that the Government purchased farmland under Article 2 subparag. 1 of the Addenda to the Farmland Act (Act No. 4817, Dec. 2, 1994; hereinafter “former Farmland Reform Act”), which was not self-contributed after the purchase of farmland under the condition that the farmland will not be distributed, and the purchased farmland will not be repealed, and Article 2 subparag. 1 of the former Enforcement Decree of the Farmland Reform Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 14835, Dec. 22, 1995; hereinafter “former Enforcement Decree of the Farmland Reform Act”) No. 1486, Jun. 1, 2008, which was non-contributed for distribution of 80 farmland, excluding the farmland which was non-contributed for distribution of 18, 196, 206, which was non-contributed and non-contributed for distribution of 1, 2006, which was non-contributed for sale of 16.

In light of the above legal principles in light of the above facts, since the second real estate was purchased by the defendant for the distribution of farmland, but it was not distributed because it was not included in the distributed farmland finalized through the procedure stipulated in Article 32 of the former Enforcement Decree of the Farmland Reform Act, etc., and the Defendant purchased the second real estate before the division, to distribute it to the farmers, etc. who are self-defensive, and if it was determined not to distribute it, it was anticipated that it should be returned to the original owner. Therefore, it is reasonable to view the possession of the second real estate as the possession of the third real estate as the possession of the third real estate by nature of the title ( there is no circumstance to deem that the possession by

In addition, the fact that the second real estate is yellow in the enforcement of the former Farmland Reform Act does not obstruct the defendant's acceptance of the possession of the second real estate as above.

Nevertheless, the court below erred in the misapprehension of the presumption and reversal of the self-owned possession, and in the misapprehension of the legal principles as to the former Farmland Reform Act, which affected the conclusion of the judgment, since the second real estate was determined to be returned to the original owner as the land remaining after the Defendant purchased and distributed under the former Farmland Reform Act was planned from the time of purchase, and thus, the Defendant’s possession of the farmland purchased by the Defendant was decided to have continued to hold it for not less than 20 years since December 16, 1985. The Plaintiffs’ ground of appeal pointing this out is with merit.

2. As to the Defendant’s ground of appeal

The court below acknowledged the facts as stated in its decision after comprehensively taking account of the adopted evidence. The court below rejected the defendant's assertion that the defendant acquired the first real estate from the above non-party 1 or the plaintiffs, or the above non-party 1 renounced the ownership of the first real estate, on the ground that there is no evidence to support the defendant's assertion that the defendant had not been negligent at the time when the defendant commenced possession of the first real estate, since the fact that the registration of ownership preservation, which was completed in the name of the defendant with respect to the first real estate inherited by the plaintiffs under the circumstances of non-party 1, who is the father of the plaintiffs, had a separate title of the fact that there was a separate title of the fact that there was a separate title of the fact that there was a duty to implement the registration procedure for cancellation of

Examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the records, we affirm the above fact-finding and judgment of the court below as just, and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal principles as to waiver of ownership and prescriptive acquisition, or in violation of the principle of free evaluation of evidence in violation of logical and empirical rules

Meanwhile, as the grounds of appeal, the Defendant asserts that the acquisition by prescription for possession of the first real estate has been completed, or that the first real estate was distributed to Nonparty 2 and repaid, the Plaintiffs are not the owners of the first real estate. However, there is no evidence to acknowledge this. Therefore, there is

3. Conclusion

Therefore, the part of the lower judgment against the Plaintiffs is reversed, and that part of the case is remanded to the lower court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. The Defendant’s appeal is dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Shin Young-chul (Presiding Justice)