Citco Construction Co., Ltd.

Hule Co., Ltd. (Attorney Gangseo-won, Counsel for the defendant-appellant)

Of the “Defendant (Counterclaim Plaintiff)” listed in the attached Table 2, the remainder of the Defendant (Counterclaim Plaintiff) with the exception of Defendant (Withdrawal) 23 and one other and one other than Dae Chang Construction Co., Ltd. and one other in his successor are as follows.

Defendant (Withdrawal) 23

Grand Construction Co., Ltd.

Defendant (Withdrawal) 31

Defendant 31-1

Of the “Defendants” listed in the separate sheet of the [total Defendant] list, the following “Defendants” is indicated as “Defendants” except for Defendant (Withdrawal) 47 and Defendant 47-1 and Defendant 32.

Defendant (Withdrawal) 47

Defendant 47-1

Defendant 32 (Attorney Go Jong-hee, Counsel for the defendant-appellant)

November 24, 2010

Jeju District Court Decision 2007Gahap664, 2009Gahap26 decided Dec. 10, 2009

Note 1) Defendant, appellees

1. Of the judgment of the court of first instance, the part concerning the claim for the construction of the Plaintiff Co., Ltd. and the claim for the principal claim of the Plaintiff Co., Ltd. (Counterclaim Defendant) shall be modified as follows:

All of the claims of Plaintiff Citco Construction Co., Ltd. and the claims of Plaintiff (Counterclaim Defendant) against the Plaintiff are dismissed.

2. The Defendant-Counterclaim Plaintiff’s “Defendant-Counterclaim Plaintiff” listed in the [Counterclaim Claim] List is all dismissed.

3. The total costs of the lawsuit shall be borne individually by each party.

1. Settlement of parties;

A. The plaintiff party

Plaintiff Conco Construction Co., Ltd. as “Plaintiff Conco Construction,” Plaintiff (Counterclaim Defendant) as “Plaintiff Conco Construction,” and Plaintiff (Counterclaim Defendant) as “Plaintiff Conco Construction,” and Plaintiff Conco Construction’s claim as “Plaintiffs claim” and Plaintiff Conco Construction’s claim as “Plaintiffs claim.”

B. The defendant (Counterclaim plaintiff) and the defendant's party

(1) Of the above party’s indication, the “Defendant (Counterclaim Plaintiff)” and “Defendant’s side” indicated in the “Defendant’s side” are “Defendant (including the Plaintiff-Counterclaim Plaintiff, the Counterclaim Plaintiff, the Withdrawn, and the Intervenor)” and “Defendant’s side.”

(2) Of the above “Defendant (including the Counterclaim Plaintiff, the withdrawing party, and the succeeding intervenor)”, the remaining parties excluding the Defendant (Withdrawal) 23, 31, and 47 are “Defendant 4”).”

(3) The remaining parties except those who did not file a counterclaim among the above “Defendants” are “Defendant (Counterclaim Plaintiff 5)”.

2. Purport of claim

A. The plaintiffs' claims

The Defendants:

(1) The sum of the claims for appeal No. 1 in the attached Form 2 to the Plaintiff Conco Construction shall be paid with interest calculated at the rate of 20% per annum from the day following the delivery of the claim and the application for modification of the cause of appeal as of August 17, 2010 to the day of complete payment of the corresponding money and each of the above money.

(2) Plaintiff Habule:

(A) Of the list of the above [Claims] (4) The "total amount of the Appellate Trials" shall be paid with the money in question, calculated by the rate of 20% per annum from the day following the delivery of the application for the purport of the claim and the modification of the cause of the claim as of August 17, 2010 to the day of complete payment.

(B) From January 1, 2009 to Jeju-si (number omitted) to 1,682.9m2, the date of loss of the ownership of the Plaintiff Habule and the last day of the possession of the Defendants each month from the date of the loss of the ownership of the Plaintiff Habule and the last day of the possession of the Defendants.

[Plaintiffs filed a claim for unjust enrichment from March 27, 2002 to December 31, 2008 against the share in the site at the first instance trial, and reduced part of the claim for unjust enrichment against the share in the said site at the trial at the first instance trial (6) and added unjust enrichment from March 27, 2002 against the share in the site as well as from March 27, 2002 against the share in the site after January 1, 2009. Further, the Plaintiffs withdrawn from the trial by the Defendant (Withdrawal) 23, 31, and 47, and then changed their claim against the said Intervenor to the claim against the said successor).

B. Claim of the counterclaim by the Defendant (Counterclaim Plaintiff)

The "share in the site right" in the attached Form [Counterclaim Claim] list among the 1,682.9 square meters in E-Do-dong (number omitted) of E-Do-dong in Jeju-do to the Defendant (Counterclaim Plaintiff) shall implement the registration procedure for transfer of ownership based on the restoration of each real name with respect to the relevant share.

3. Purport of appeal

A. The plaintiffs

Of the judgment of the court of first instance, the part regarding the plaintiffs' claims is modified as stated in the above plaintiffs' claims.

B. The defendants (with respect to the main claim)

Of the plaintiffs' claims in the judgment of the first instance, the part against the defendants is revoked, and the plaintiffs' claims corresponding to the revoked part are dismissed.

C. Defendant (Counterclaim Plaintiff) (Counterclaim Claim)

Of the judgment of the first instance court, the part concerning the counterclaim shall be revoked. The "share in the site right" in the attached Form [Attachment] list of the 1,682.9m2 of E-Do-dong (number omitted) and E-Do-dong (Counterclaim Plaintiff) in Jeju-do-si (Counterclaim Plaintiff) means the procedure for the registration of ownership transfer based on the restoration of the name of each real estate with respect to the relevant share

1. Basic facts

A. Sale of the building site of this case and market stores

(1) Around July 23, 1971, the Nonparty newly built the 1,366.85 square meters in the lux roof market, and the 1,246.18 square meters in the underground room (hereinafter “the building before its extension”) on the ground of the 1,682.9 square meters in the Dong-dong (number omitted)-dong, Jeju-si, Jeju-do (hereinafter “instant site”).

(2) On December 20, 1971, the Nonparty: (a) the building prior to the said extension was divided into: (b) the stores set forth in subparagraphs 1 through 77; and (c) the toilets, warehouses, and underground rooms with the exception of each of the above stores among the first floors; and (d) the Nonparty completed the registration of initial ownership on each of the following buildings:

(1) Shops referred to in subparagraphs 1 through 7 among the 1st floor (hereinafter referred to as "market stores")

(2) Among the 1st floor, rest toilets, warehouses, stairs rooms, passages 476.73 square meters and underground rooms 1,2416.18 square meters (A evidence 1-2; hereinafter referred to as "public buildings") other than the above market stores.

(3) Since March 1978, the Nonparty: (a) sold the shares to be registered as the site ownership of each of the above market stores and the market stores of this case from March 1978 as shown in the attached Form [the exclusive ownership part and the parcelling-out relation]; (b) completed the registration of ownership transfer for the first time with respect to the buyers of the market; (c) as to the ownership of each of the above market stores and the land of this case; and (d) completed the registration of ownership transfer for the pre-sale of the pre-sale contract prepared at the time (Article 15).

① The Nonparty may not claim usage fees of the instant land from the buyer (No. 1).

(2) When disposing of other land (the above site) is to be disposed of on the same condition, the purchaser shall be given preferential right to purchase to the purchaser: Provided, That this shall not apply where the sale is made into the corporate property of a market stock company.

(3) Where a buyer renounces the right of priority under subparagraph 2 and the non-party disposes of it to another person, it shall be premised on the same conditions as those under subparagraph 1. When selling it to another person, he/she shall obtain a written consent from the original seller to the effect that he/she agrees to the content of this contract, and notify the

④ The Nonparty: (a) constructed a building of the total size of 3,00 square meters on the instant site within seven years to sell the entire building and to transfer the ownership, he/she shall allocate shares in proportion to the building volume; (b) in such cases, he/she shall not designate or assign the location of the co-ownership; and (c) he/she shall not file a claim for partition of co-ownership; and (d) if he/she does not extend within seven years, he/she shall allocate shares in proportion to the building volume of 3,00 without compensation ( Subparagraph 4).

(4) The Defendant (including the Counterclaim, the withdrawing party, and the succeeding intervenor) is a buyer who directly purchased the pertinent market and the share of the site listed in the [Attachment] list from the Nonparty, or a person who takes over the ownership of the said market and the share of the site from such buyer again by purchasing the market and the share of the site from such buyer, and the registration date of the ownership transfer is completed on the pertinent date.

B. Acquisition of the plaintiffs' building sites and public buildings

(1) Meanwhile, on November 23, 1982, the Nonparty invested the instant site in kind to the Bosung Unemployment Co., Ltd. (hereinafter “ Bosung Unemployment”) and completed the registration of ownership transfer on December 11, 1982 with respect to the said site on December 11, 1982 (Evidence A 1).

(2) On June 19, 1984, Bosung Unemployment extended the second floor of 1,311.95 square meters and the third floor of 1,073.25 square meters (hereinafter referred to as “extension building”) on the building prior to the extension on June 19, 1984, and completed registration of preservation of ownership on the extended building on July 11, 1984 (Evidence 1-3).

(3) Since then, with respect to the above site and extended building, the Nonparty created a right to collateral security (1 billion won) with respect to the above public building, and on June 8, 198 and April 19, 1990, each of the maximum debt amounts of Hong Kong Liven Bank was transferred to the Korea Asset Management Corporation (Korea Asset Management Corporation from January 1, 200 to the Korea Asset Management Corporation) on May 15, 1991.

(4) On April 11, 200, the Korea Asset Management Corporation applied for a voluntary auction on the above site and public building and extension building based on each of the above collateral security rights, and the auction was conducted at Jeju District Court 2000 Ma6409. The auction was awarded at that auction procedure and completed the registration of ownership transfer in the name of Plaintiff Conco Construction on March 27, 2002 with respect to the above site and public building and extension building.

(5) Subsequent to the public auction on the above site and the public building and the extension building, the public auction was conducted again, and during that process, Plaintiff Habul purchased the said site and the public building and the extension building and completed the registration of ownership transfer in the name of Plaintiff Habule on September 11, 2006.

[Basis] Facts without dispute, Gap evidence 1-1, 2, 3, Gap evidence 2-1 through 77 (except for Gap evidence 2-6), Eul evidence 1-1, 2, 3, Eul evidence 2, Eul evidence 1-1 to 76, and the purport of the whole pleadings

2. Determination on the plaintiffs' claims

A. The plaintiffs' assertion and judgment order

From March 27, 2002 to September 11, 2006, the Plaintiffs owned Plaintiff Macco Construction and Plaintiff Hacule. Since the Defendant (including the Plaintiff Counterclaim, the withdrawing party, and the succeeding intervenor) occupied, used, or occupied and used the above site and public buildings without any title, the Defendants assert that the Defendants are liable to pay to the Plaintiffs the amount corresponding to the “request for Appeal” in the [Attachment] List of the Plaintiffs as unjust enrichment, and damages for delay thereof. Accordingly, after examining the claim for restitution of unjust enrichment against the share in the site, they will first consider the claim for restitution of unjust enrichment against the public building.

B. Determination on the claim for return of unjust enrichment against the share in the site

(1) Determination as to the cause of claim

According to the facts found above, since the land in this case was presumed to be owned by Plaintiff Mateco Construction from March 27, 2002 and from September 11, 2006, the land owned by Plaintiff Mateco Construction was presumed to be the land owned by Plaintiff Haeul. Thus, the Defendants who own the above land by owning the market store and possess the above land are obligated to return to the Plaintiffs the profits equivalent to the rent for the area equivalent to the share of the above land among the above land, barring special circumstances.

(2) The defendants' assertion and judgment

(A) Defendants’ assertion

The Defendants asserted that the Defendants did not bear the obligation to return unjust enrichment against the Plaintiffs on the following grounds: (a) the Defendants acquired the right to use the site as to the share in the site; and (b) the Plaintiffs did not acquire ownership as to the share in the site in this case.

(i) the first argument;

The buyers acquired the right to use a site in a small term under the Act on Ownership and Management of Condominium Buildings (hereinafter “Act on Ownership and Management of Condominium Buildings”), which is not a mere obligatory right on the share of the site through a contract for sale in lots with the Nonparty. The Defendants are the buyers who acquired the right to use the site as above, or those who acquired the market store and the right to use the site again from such buyers, and have the right to occupy and use the said site.

In addition, the non-party's disposal of the site of this case to Bosung unemployment on November 23, 1982 after the buyer acquired the right to use site as above is null and void in violation of Article 20 of the Aggregate Buildings Act prohibiting the separate disposal of section for exclusive use and right to use site. Therefore, the registration of ownership transfer in the name of Bosung Unemployment as to the above share in the site of this case and the registration of ownership transfer in the name of the plaintiffs are both null and void. Thus, the above share in the site of this case cannot be viewed as the plaintiffs' ownership.

(ii) the second argument;

Even if several buyers have a right to share in the site owned by the buyer in the sale contract is merely a mere obligatory right, and even if the non-party's disposal of the above site is valid, the Bosung unemployment allows buyers to use the above site without compensation from the non-party's market store's site, that is, it permits buyers to use the above site as the site's site's site. After the building has been extended, they also succeeded to the obligation to register the transfer of ownership in the buyer's future. Since Article 20 of the Multi-Family Building Act applies from April 11, 1987 to the buyer's right to share in the above site from the mere obligatory right to use the site's right against the above site, the defendants have the right to possess and use the above site in accordance with the above right to use the site.

In addition, the act that multiple buyers acquired the right to use site as mentioned above by the Act on the Ownership and Management of Aggregate Buildings and then set up the right to collateral on the above site in the Hong Kong sub-bank on June 8, 198 and April 19, 190 is null and void as an act of disposal in violation of Article 20 of the Act on the Ownership and Management of Aggregate Buildings as to the shares of the above site, and therefore the registration of transfer of the plaintiffs' ownership based on the above collateral is null and void. Thus, the plaintiffs cannot be deemed to have acquired the above shares of site.

(B) Order of determination on the Defendants’ assertion

According to the statements in Eul evidence 14-1 to 76, most of the market stores from March 1978 to December 1, 1979 are sold in lots before April 11, 1987 to which Article 20 of the Aggregate Buildings Act applies, but the market stores are sold in lots after April 11, 1987 as well as after April 11, 1987 to which Article 20 of the Aggregate Buildings Act applies.

As above, Article 20 of the Act on the Ownership and Management of Aggregate Buildings applies and Article 39, 45, and 64 of the market store which was sold in lots after the mortgage was established on the site differs from other market stores. Accordingly, the above applicable legal principles should be examined first on the remaining stores except for Articles 39, 45, and 64 of the above market store, and then it should be examined on the defendant (Counterclaim Plaintiff), who is the owner under subparagraph 39, 45, and 45 (hereinafter referred to as "Defendant 25, etc.") who is the successor of the defendant (Counterclaim Plaintiff), the owner under subparagraph 31-1, and 64, who is the owner under subparagraph 31 and 45 of the Act on the Ownership and Management of Aggregate Buildings.

(C) Judgment on the remaining Defendants except Defendant 25, etc.

1) Determination on the first assertion by the Defendants

If the Nonparty, while selling a market store in units, extended the building to the buyer within seven years and completed the registration of ownership transfer, he/she agreed to transfer the ownership of the site at a cost according to the building-level ratio (Article 15 subparag. 4 of the sales contract of the certificate No. 2).

However, since the time when the above contract for sale in lots was concluded before April 11, 1987, which Article 20 of the Act on the Ownership and Management of Aggregate Buildings applies pursuant to Article 4 of the Addenda to the Act on the Ownership and Management of Aggregate Buildings, the right of the buyer's share arising from the contract for sale in lots is merely a claim right, and it cannot be viewed as a right to use the site under the Act on the Ownership and Management of Aggregate Buildings, which is prohibited from a separate disposition from the section for exclusive use. In addition, the time when the non-party invested the land in Bosung unemployment and completed the registration is also the time before the Article 20 of the Act on the Ownership and Management of Aggregate Buildings is applied. Thus, the non-party's disposition of the above site cannot be deemed null and void as a disposition contrary to Article 20 of the Act on the Ownership

2) Judgment on the second assertion by the Defendants

A) First of all, the following circumstances revealed through the overall purport of each statement of evidence Nos. 2, 17, and 18 and the entire pleadings: (i) the Nonparty, who planned the extension of the building, agreed not to claim the site usage fee from the buyers while selling the market store; and (ii) upon the completion of the extension of the building, the Nonparty, after establishing the public relations business, was appointed as the representative director and then transferred the site of this case to the public interest and transferred the extended building again to the public interest on the building before the extension of the public interest name; and (iii) until the public interest was established on December 2, 1982 and dissolved on December 1, 2003, the Nonparty continued to work as the representative director of the public interest business; and (iv) it is reasonable to view that the Nonparty, upon receiving the above site from the Nonparty, was subject to the obligation of the seller of the building site at the same time and received the obligation of the seller of the building site at the same time after the completion of the extension; and (v) it is reasonable to view that the Plaintiff’s succession to the above land.

B) In cases where Article 20 of the Multi-unit Building Act prohibiting the separate disposition of section for exclusive use and right to use site is applied to the buyer of a building before the enforcement of the Multi-unit Building Act, barring special circumstances, such as the provision to enable the separate disposition of section for exclusive use and right to use site, it is problematic whether the buyer’s right to occupy and use the site held against the owner of a building site belongs to the right to use site under the Multi-unit Building Act, and if the buyer disposes of the site to a third party who is not the buyer after the ownership of the building site, the disposition becomes invalid against Article 20 of the Multi-unit Building Act as to the possessor’s share in the site.

In this case, there is a view that Article 20 (2) of the Aggregate Buildings Act only provides that the right of the buyer shall not be deemed as a right to use the site under the Aggregate Buildings Act because it is merely a right to use the site, and that Article 20 (2) of the Aggregate Buildings Act only provides that "the sectional owner shall not dispose of the right to use the site separately from his section of exclusive ownership."

① However, Article 20 of the Aggregate Buildings Act purports to ensure stability in legal relations as to the aggregate building and rational regulation by suppressing the separation of the right to use the site from the section for exclusive use and preventing the occurrence of sectional ownership. ② Since the aggregate building Act was enforced, if the purchaser purchases the site but occupies and uses the site without completing the registration of ownership transfer, the right to use the site can be the right to use the site. Thus, the Supreme Court held that the right to use the site under the Aggregate Buildings Act is a right to the site for the purpose of owning the section for exclusive use, but it is not necessary to date the ownership, and that it is reasonable to say that the right to use the site can still be applied to the seller who purchased the building site with the section for exclusive use and to the seller who did not have the right to use the site for the same reason, and that the right to use the site can not be applied to the ownership of the section for exclusive use and to the seller who did not have the right to use the site for the same reason as the above Article 200 of the Aggregate Buildings Act.

Therefore, the right to possess and use the site held by the buyer of this case against the Bosung-si's business which is the owner of the site also becomes the right to use the site under the Aggregate Buildings Act by applying Article 20 of the Aggregate Buildings Act. Therefore, it is reasonable to view that the buyer of this case is the buyer who acquired the right to use the site, or the defendants who again acquired the right to use the site with the market store from such buyer, has the right to occupy and use the above site. Meanwhile, the defendants' assertion in this part is reasonable.

(D) Determination on Defendant 25, etc.

As seen earlier, on June 8, 198 and April 19, 190, after Article 20 of the Multi-Family Building Act was applied, the right to collateral security was established on the instant land in the name of Hong Kong (hereinafter referred to as the "multi-Family Building Act"), and Defendant 25 (hereinafter referred to as the "Defendant 25") subsequently purchased a market store from the non-party. In this case, we examine whether Defendant 25 acquired the right to collateral security on the share of the site.

Article 20 (1) of the Aggregate Buildings Act provides that "The right of a sectional owner to use site shall be subject to the disposition of his section of exclusive ownership." Article 20 (2) of the same Act provides that "the sectional owner shall not dispose of the right to use site separately from his section of exclusive ownership: Provided, That this shall not apply where the sectional owner provides otherwise by the regulations." In relation to the interpretation of the above provision, it is reasonable to interpret that Article 20 (1) of the Aggregate Buildings Act provides the principle that indicates the subordinate indivisible inseparability, and that Article 20 (2) of the same Act provides that the main text of Article 20 (1) of the same Act does not have a meaningful meaning only as a dance provision (so-called subordinate inteparability theory). Therefore, the disposition of the section of exclusive ownership and the right to use site

In addition to the above legal principles, although Defendant 25 et al. established a right to collateral security on the instant land before the purchase of a market store from the Nonparty, the act of establishing a right to collateral security on the instant land by creating a separate disposal of the market store and the site, which is a section for exclusive use, shall be deemed null and void on the ground that the act of establishing a right to collateral security on the instant land would result in a separate disposal of the market store and the site, which is a section for exclusive use. On the other hand, Defendant 25 et al. acquired a market store, which is a section for exclusive use, from the non-party, and acquired the right to collateral security at the same time.

Therefore, Defendant 25 has the right to possess and use the above site by acquiring the right to use the site.

(3) The plaintiffs' second defense and judgment on this issue

As to this, the plaintiffs legally acquired the right to collateral security on the land of this case as the "third party in good faith" under Article 20 (3) of the Multi-Family Building Act, and therefore the registration of transfer of ownership in the plaintiffs' name based on the above right to collateral security is valid, and therefore the defendants cannot acquire the right to collateral security on the above right to collateral security.

On the other hand, Article 20(3) of the Aggregate Buildings Act provides that "the prohibition of separate disposition under the main sentence of paragraph (2) shall not be effective against a third party who has acquired a real right in good faith unless the purport thereof is registered." Thus, "the bona fide third party" under the above provision refers to a third party who has acquired a land which is the object of a right to use a site without gathering the circumstances in which the land is a site of an aggregate building (see Supreme Court Decision 2009Da26145, Jun. 23, 2009, etc.).

However, there is no evidence to deem that Hong Kong Lak Bank constitutes “a bona fide third party” under the above provision, and instead, Hong Kong Lak Bank established a collateral security right on the instant land as well as the public building and extension building, and the bank granting a loan as a collateral to verify whether there is a ground building through a fact-finding survey in order to verify the value of the ordinary site as a collateral. In light of the fact-finding, Hong Kong Lak Bank appears to have known that the instant site was used as a market store’s site at the time of the establishment of a collateral security right, and therefore, the Hong Kong Lak Bank cannot be deemed as a “ bona fide third party” under the above provision, and thus, the Plaintiffs’ above assertion cannot be accepted.

(4) Sub-determination

Therefore, the defendants acquired the right to use the land as to the above share of the site, while the plaintiffs did not acquire the ownership of the land as to the above share of the site. Accordingly, the plaintiffs' assertion against the defendants seeking return of unjust enrichment as to the above share of the site is without merit.

C. As to the claim for return of unjust enrichment from public buildings

First, with respect to the part of 1,2416.18 square meters in the underground room among public buildings, each description or image of health room, Gap evidence No. 5, Gap evidence No. 6, 7, and 8 (including each number) is insufficient to recognize that the defendants exclusively occupied the above underground room or currently occupied it, and there is no other evidence to acknowledge it otherwise.

Next, with respect to the remaining toilets, warehouses, stairs rooms, and passages 476.73 square meters among public buildings, health rooms, toilets, warehouses, etc., other than underground rooms, are not independent buildings, but common areas with no capacity to register in its structure. Therefore, it is reasonable to view that the Plaintiffs alone own the common areas, on the ground that such parts were registered, and rather, the Defendants, the owners of market stores, and the Plaintiffs, the building owners, share the above toilets, warehouses, etc. pursuant to the main sentence of Article 10 of the Multi-unit Building Act, “The common areas belongs to all co-ownership.

Therefore, the plaintiffs' assertion seeking return of unjust enrichment from public buildings cannot be accepted.

3. Judgment on a counterclaim

A. Defendant (Counterclaim Plaintiff)’s assertion

The Defendant Lessee (Counterclaim) asserts that, as the Defendant Lessee acquired the right to use the site under the Aggregate Buildings Act regarding the share of the site as alleged in Article 2-B-(2)-(a) of the above Act, the Plaintiff Lessee is liable for the Defendant Lessee to implement the registration procedure for ownership transfer on the relevant share of the site in the [Counterclaim Claim] list of the relevant share of the site in the [Attachment] list of the instant land.

B. Determination

(1) A claim for the registration of ownership transfer for the restoration of the true title of registration is already made by the registration indicating ownership in his/her own name or by the person who acquired ownership under law is permitted to restore the true title of registration. Thus, in order to exercise the right to claim the registration of ownership transfer for the restoration of the true title of registration, the person who is the other party should be entitled to claim the ownership as the true owner (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 2006Da30921, Apr. 9, 2009; 99Da37894, Sept. 20, 2001).

(2) In the instant case, the Defendant Lessee cannot be deemed to have acquired the ownership of 8) ownership on the share of the site under the name of the Defendant Lessee, and the Defendant Lessee cannot be deemed to have acquired the ownership under the law. Thus, the Defendant Lessee seeking the cancellation of the registration of the transfer against Plaintiff Haul and its former registered titleholder with respect to the share of the site, and claiming the registration of the transfer against Plaintiff Haule for the registration of the transfer against the Nonparty’s succession of the obligation under the sales contract, or claiming the registration of the transfer against the Plaintiff Haule for the registration of the transfer of ownership due to the restoration of the real name in Bosung unemployment in subrogation of the Nonparty Hasung, or by subrogation of Bosung who is the owner of the site, and then seeking the registration of the transfer against Boule who had filed for the registration of ownership transfer due to the restoration of the real name in the instant housing site under the premise that the Defendant Lessee (Plaintiff) can exercise its ownership as the owner of the real ownership.

4. Conclusion

Therefore, since both the plaintiffs' claim and the defendant (Counterclaim)'s counterclaim are without merit, the part regarding the plaintiffs' claim in the judgment of the court of first instance regarding the plaintiffs' claim is modified to be dismissed in entirety as shown in the Disposition No. 1, and the appeal regarding the defendant (Counterclaim plaintiff)'s counterclaim is dismissed as without merit. It is so decided as per

[Attachment]

Judges Park Ho-hoon (Presiding Judge)

(1) Defendant 32 filed a counterclaim at the first instance court, but appealed on June 9, 2010. However, Defendant 32 withdrawn the appeal.

Note 2) On June 9, 2010, the Defendant 32 (No. 32) who withdrawn the appeal and Defendant 23 (No. 23) who withdrawn from the lawsuit and Defendant 31 (No. 31) who withdrawn from the lawsuit, were excluded from the list of the [Attachment 2] list of the first instance court (Counterclaim Plaintiff). On the other hand, the succeeding intervenor of the withdrawing party included Dae Construction Co., Ltd. (No. 23-1) and Defendant 31-1 (No. 31-1) as the succeeding intervenor of the withdrawing party.

Note 3) The number of persons listed in the [Attachment] List shall be 56.

Note 4) The number of persons listed in the attached Form [Plaintiff Claim] list shall be 53.

Note 5) The number of persons listed in the [Counterclaim Claim] List] shall be total of 39 persons.

Note6) The Plaintiff’s claim against the Defendant (Counterclaim Plaintiff) 45 against the Defendant (Counterclaim Plaintiff) is extended (see, e.g., the Plaintiff’s claim No. 45).

Note 7) The area of each market store shall be referred to in the attached Form [Attachment 1].

8) As seen earlier, the right to use the site acquired by the Defendant (Counterclaim) cannot be deemed as the right to use the site as the right to possess and use the site and the right to use the site as the ownership.