Whether the change in the title of ownership of the real estate can serve as a ground for suspending the prescriptive acquisition due to the possession.

In acquiring the ownership of real estate by possession, the reason for suspending the prescriptive acquisition should be deemed as the continuous destruction of the existing status of possession. Therefore, the reason for changing the title of ownership on the register of real estate before the expiration of the prescriptive acquisition period cannot be deemed as the possessor’s continued destruction of the existing status of fact, and thus, cannot be the cause for interrupting prescription.

Plaintiff (Counterclaim Defendant)

Defendant (Counterclaim Plaintiff)

Daegu District Court Decision 75Na87 delivered on November 12, 1975

The appeal shall be dismissed. The costs of appeal shall be borne by the plaintiff (Counterclaim defendant).

The plaintiff (Counterclaim defendant)'s ground of appeal is examined.

In the acquisition of real estate ownership by possession, the reason for suspending the acquisition should be the reason that can be recognized as the continuous destruction of the existing possession condition. Therefore, even if the title of ownership on the real estate registration injury was changed before the expiration of the acquisition period, the reason cannot be deemed as the possessor's continued destruction of the existing actual condition (Supreme Court Decision 66Da1682 delivered on November 22, 1966). For the same purpose, the plaintiff (Counterclaim defendant) is liable to implement the registration procedure for transfer of ownership for the expiration of twenty (20) years after the expiration of the prescription period under the premise that the plaintiff (Counterclaim defendant) purchased the real estate from the non-party who was the previous owner before the expiration of the prescription period and registered in the name before the expiration of the prescription period cannot be the reason for the interruption of the prescription period, and the possession of the real estate in this case by the defendant (Counterclaim plaintiff) is justified and there is no error in the misapprehension of legal title.

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Hah- Port (Presiding Justice)