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(영문) 대법원 2019.04.03 2018다296878
근저당권말소
Text

The appeal is dismissed.

The costs of appeal are assessed against the defendant.

Reasons

The grounds of appeal are examined.

Article 247(2) of the Civil Act provides that “The provisions concerning the interruption of extinctive prescription shall apply mutatis mutandis to the period during which the ownership of real estate is acquired by possession.” Article 168(2) of the Civil Act provides that “a seizure, provisional seizure or provisional disposition” as the cause interrupting extinctive prescription.

In the prescriptive acquisition of the ownership of real estate by possession, the reason for the interruption of the prescriptive acquisition is that it can be recognized as the continuous destruction of the existing possession condition (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 92Da52764, 52771, May 25, 1993; 97Da6186, Apr. 25, 1997); and Article 168 Subparag. 2 of the Civil Act, the term “Seizure or provisional attachment” under Article 168 Subparag. 2 of the Civil Act is either a means for compulsory execution of monetary claims or a means for preservation thereof, and thus, cannot be deemed as the continued destruction of the existing possession condition even if the attachment or provisional attachment was taken prior to the expiration of the period of prescriptive acquisition. Therefore, it cannot be said that the cause for the interruption of the prescriptive acquisition

The court below, based on its stated reasoning, rejected the Defendant’s assertion that the acquisition of ownership following the Plaintiff’s acquisition by prescription was recognized, and that the decision was made prior to the completion of the acquisition period, and that the decision was served on the Plaintiff, the possessor, and that the acquisition by prescription was interrupted, on the ground that the seizure or provisional seizure of the real estate cannot be a ground for suspending the acquisition by prescription.

In light of the aforementioned legal principles and records, the above determination by the court below is just and acceptable. Contrary to the allegations in the grounds of appeal, the court below did not err by misapprehending the legal principles on the interruption of prescription for the acquisition of prescription.

Therefore, the appeal is dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided by the assent of all participating Justices.

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