Decision to permit the recovery of right of appeal and statute of limitations

With respect to a case of which public prosecution was instituted on December 30, 1967, the first instance judgment was rendered on September 30, 1982 and the period for filing an appeal was also set. However, on October 12, 1985, the decision to permit a request for recovery of the right of appeal was made on February 6, 1986 and the decision to permit the request for recovery of the right of appeal became final and conclusive. As long as the decision to permit the request for recovery of right of appeal becomes final and conclusive, the first instance judgment is to return to the state before the final and conclusive judgment becomes final and conclusive, and therefore, in this case, it cannot be deemed that the statute of limitations has expired pursuant to Article 249(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act on the ground that 15 years have already passed since the judgment was instituted

Articles 249 and 347 of the Criminal Procedure Act

Defendant

Defendant

Seoul District Court (67Da31145)

The judgment of the court below is reversed.

Acquittal of the defendant.

The gist of the grounds for appeal by the defense counsel is that the sentence of the court below is too unreasonable.

We examine ex officio the grounds for appeal prior to judgment.

According to the records, on December 30, 1967, a public prosecution was instituted on December 30, 1967, and on September 30, 1982, the judgment of the court below which sentenced the defendant to one year of imprisonment with prison labor is sentenced and the period of the public prosecution was exceeded, but on October 12, 1985, the decision to permit the claim on February 6, 1986 upon the defendant's request for recovery of his right of appeal is clear and definite.

As such, once a decision to permit the recovery of right of appeal becomes final and conclusive, the judgment of the court below is to return to the original state before the final and conclusive judgment becomes final and conclusive, and eventually, the crime charged in this case has already been 15 years since December 30, 1967, which was prosecuted without the final and conclusive judgment, and the statute of limitations has not been deemed to have expired pursuant to Article 249(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act. Accordingly, the judgment of the court below cannot be maintained

Therefore, the judgment of the court below is reversed in accordance with Article 364 (2) and (6) of the Criminal Procedure Act, without examining the grounds for appeal.

The summary of the facts charged in this case is as follows: at around 17:30 on November 27, 1967, the defendant conspired with the non-indicted, and at around 17:30 on November 27, 1967, the statute of limitations for prosecution has expired after 15 years from the time when the non-indicted was indicted without confirmation of the judgment, since the non-indicted 1, who worked in the factory in the Doyang steel Manufacturing Industry Co., Ltd., Ltd., which was located in the 115-dong, Yeongdeungpo-gu Seoul Metropolitan Government, takes two teits inserted in a duit, and took place outside the factory, and he stolen them by receiving 6,000 won of the teitt market price outside the owner.

It is so decided as per Disposition for the above reasons.

Judges Kim Jop (Presiding Judge)