Where approval of taking office was obtained from the competent agency on the ground of a false meeting minutes of the board of directors, the case holding that the revocation of taking office constitutes a revocation disposition in the sense of declaring invalidation, not a revocation disposition made pursuant to Article 20-2 (1) of the former Private School Act.

Article 20-2 (1) of the former Private School Act (amended by Act No. 7802 of Dec. 29, 2005)

[Plaintiff, Appellant] Plaintiff 1 and 1 other (Law Firm Gyeong, Attorneys Park Jong-soo et al., Counsel for plaintiff-appellant)

Plaintiff 1 and 6 others (Law Firm Han-tae, Attorneys Jeon-tae et al., Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Gyeonggi-do Superintendent of an Office of Education (Law Firm Filiwon, Attorneys Choi Jung-sik, Counsel for defendant-appellant)

Intervenor (Law Firm General Law Office, Attorney Choi Gyeong-tae, Counsel for the intervenor-appellant)

Seoul High Court Decision 2005Nu9387 decided May 4, 2006

All appeals are dismissed. The costs of appeal are assessed against the plaintiffs.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

Examining the reasoning of the judgment below in light of the records, the defendant was appointed as temporary director of the school foundation 1 at July 8, 2004, and the defendant was employed as the chief director and director of the school foundation 1 at the time of non-party 2's meeting minutes without holding a board of directors. Since the plaintiffs obtained approval of taking office from the defendant based on the falsely prepared meeting minutes of the board of directors without holding a board of directors, such approval of taking office constitutes invalidation, the defendant adopted a method of revoking the approval of taking office to the plaintiffs retroactively as of the date of approval of taking office in consideration of the issues such as protection of a third party in good faith (hereinafter "the cancellation disposition in this case"). On July 9, 2004, the defendant appointed nine non-party 2, etc. as temporary director of the school foundation 1 at the same time on the 14th of the same month, and then, on the 206th of the same month, the above provisional director's appointment was revoked by the resolution of the board of directors (refer to the judgment of the court 208.

Therefore, each of the plaintiffs' arguments on the premise that the disposition of this case was a disposition of cancellation under Article 20-2 (1) of the former Private School Act, namely, that the disposition of this case did not go through the correction procedure under Article 20-2 (2) of the same Act or the prior notification procedure under Article 21 (1) of the Administrative Procedures Act, or that the disposition of this case was unlawful on the ground that it did not go through Article 20-2 (2) of the former Private School Act, and that the disposition of this case was not in accordance with Article 20-2 (2) of the former Private School Act, that there was an error of law that deviates from the scope of discretion in the disposition of this case where the date of cancellation of approval of taking office was retroactive to the date of approval of taking office, or that the court below erred in applying Article 20-2 (2) of the Private School Act retroactively to December 29, 2005.

In addition, insofar as the approval of taking office against the plaintiffs itself is deemed null and void, it cannot be deemed that the defendant revoked the approval of taking office of all the plaintiffs, and it infringes on the school juristic person's own authority. Furthermore, the argument that the disposition in this case is an illegal disposition against other executives on the annual basis due to the plaintiff 1's personal problems, or that the approval of taking office was revoked despite the defendant's response to compensating for losses of basic property for profit, and that the plaintiff 1 does not transfer the operating right of the non-party 1 school juristic person, not the transfer of the right of taking office of the non-party 1, and that the plaintiff 1 delegated the money as a security, it is merely an argument as to the fact that the illegality or validity of the disposition in this case can not be affected by the illegality or validity of the disposition in this case.

The decision of the court below that rejected the plaintiffs' assertion that the cancellation disposition of this case was unlawful is just, and contrary to this, all of the grounds of appeal that the court below erred by misapprehending the legal principles on the cancellation of approval of taking office under the Private School Act, or by erroneously applying the law, etc. are not accepted.

On the other hand, the Supreme Court decisions presented by the plaintiffs as the basis of their arguments are not appropriate to apply the same as they are either irrelevant to or different from this case.

Therefore, all appeals are dismissed, and the costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Yang Sung-tae (Presiding Justice)