Whether a party has the right to apply for a judgment of the suspension of compulsory execution pursuant to Article 15(6) of the Civil Execution Act (negative), and whether a court is allowed to object to a judgment where the court rendered a judgment that refuses a party’s request for the suspension of compulsory execution (negative)

Article 15(6) of the Civil Execution Act

Supreme Court Order 2004Ga69 Decided October 14, 2004 Supreme Court Order 201Da171 Decided October 19, 2011

[Defendant-Appellee] Defendant 1 and 2 others (Attorney Park Jong-hee et al., Counsel for defendant-appellee)

Seoul Western District Court Order 2017Kadan68 dated March 21, 2017

The special appeal shall be dismissed.

Judgment ex officio is made.

A judgment of the suspension of compulsory execution to stop the execution of an order for delivery of real estate issued in the real estate auction procedure does not have any ground other than Article 15(6) of the Civil Execution Act. Meanwhile, the judgment of the suspension of compulsory execution under Article 15(6) of the Civil Execution Act is conducted ex officio by the court, and the party concerned does not have the right to apply. Thus, a request for the suspension of compulsory execution by the party concerned is not only the demand of the court to proceed ex officio. Therefore, the court does not need to render a judgment on this request, and even if the court rendered a judgment that rejected this request, it cannot be allowed to do so, and thus, the objection against it is unlawful (see Supreme Court Order 2004Da69, Oct. 14, 2004; Supreme Court Order 201Da171, Oct. 19, 201, etc.).

According to the records, in the Seoul Western District Court Decision 2014Ma7632, the delivery order was issued to the special appellant in the real estate compulsory auction case, and the special appellant filed an immediate appeal against the above delivery order, and thereafter filed an application for the suspension of compulsory execution, and as the appellate court dismissed the application for the suspension of compulsory execution, it can be known that the special appellant filed the instant special appeal against the dismissal order. Examining this in light of the aforementioned legal principles, the instant special appeal is unlawful without any judgment as to its propriety.

Therefore, the special appeal is dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Kim Yong-deok (Presiding Justice)