Do 2013 3346 A. Violation of the National Security Act (Organization, etc. of dual organizations)

B. Violation of the National Security Act (Empire, rubber, etc.)

C. Violation of the State Public Officials Act

D. Violation of the Political Parties Act

A

Defendant and Military Prosecutor

Attorney B (Korean National Assembly)

C. Attorney C.

High Court Decision 2012No 209 decided March 5, 2013

February 18, 2016

all appeals shall be dismissed.

The grounds of appeal are determined.

1. As to the grounds of appeal by the defendant

A. In light of the type, content, etc. of the crime committed based on the facts constituting the indictment, whether the indictment against the assertion of violation of the principle of Japanese caution in the indictment must be determined specifically in the relevant case based on the criteria for whether the facts stated in the indictment may hinder the judge or jury from understanding the substance of the crime committed in this case by making the judge or jury in addition to the contents of the indictment attached or quoted in the indictment, and other matters required by the statutes (see Supreme Court Decision 2009Do7436, Oct. 22, 2009, etc.).

For the same reasons as the judgment of the court below, although the first head of the facts of the indictment of this case revealed the career, inclination, activities, etc. at the time of the defendant's university attending the university of this case, the contents of the indictment do not seem to be the head of ascertaining the substance of the judge and exercising the defendant's right to defense by making the judge unprejudgment the facts of the indictment at all, or by making the statement a prejudgment the judge, the court below rejected the defendant's assertion that the indictment of this case is null and void because it violates the principle of Japanese attention in the indictment of this case.

Examining the reasoning of the judgment of the original court in light of the records, such judgment of the original court can be deemed to be based on the above legal principles, and at the same time, there is no illegality of misunderstanding the legal principles on the indictment of Japan, such as the assertion of the grounds of appeal.

B. The recognition of facts of crime against the part of the violation of the State Security Act (the composition, etc. of an immigration organization) due to the accession of an immigration organization ought to be proved to the extent that there is no reasonable doubt (Article 359(2) of the Military Court Act), but the selection of evidence and the probative value of evidence conducted on the premise of fact-finding belongs to the fact-finding court’s free judgment (Article 360 of the Military Court Act).

For the same reasons as the judgment of the court below, the judgment of the court below was justified on the first instance which recognized the defendant's violation of the State Security Act (the composition, etc. of a foreign organization) since it was aware of the fact that the representative was the representative of the 14th term and the 15th term of the 15 term Korean University Federation of All Students of the Republic of Korea (hereinafter referred to as the "Korean Federation of All Students"), and participated in the above activities as a representative of the Korean Federation of Korean Federation. Thus, the judgment of the court below on the first instance which recognized the defendant's violation of the State Security Act (the composition, etc. of a foreign organization) was justified, and it did not accept the allegation of the facts and the grounds for appeal by misunderstanding the legal principles.

This part of the grounds of appeal is the purport of disputing the recognition and judgment of the above facts by the court below. It is nothing more than factually attributable to the court below's determination on the selection and probative value of evidence belonging to the free judgment of the court of fact-finding. In addition, the reasoning of the original judgment is examined in light of the legal principles as seen earlier and the evidence duly adopted. However, the judgment of the court below did not err by misapprehending the legal principles as to dual membership under Article 7 (3) of the National Security Act or by exceeding the limit of free conviction, as alleged in the grounds of appeal.

C. As to the portion of the violation of the National Security Act (e.g., obscenity, rubber, rubber, etc.), “Article 7(1) of the National Security Act,” refers to the act of asserting, or complying with, the same content as the activities of the anti-state organization, etc., such as the anti-state organization, etc., for the same purpose as the activities of the anti-state organization, etc., to the extent of evaluating the activities of the anti-state organization, etc. (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 70Do758, Apr. 27, 2008).

For the reasons indicated in the judgment of the first instance court, it is recognized that the contents of “the collection of materials for the Assembly of Representatives for the Assembly of the 18th Rad Special Representatives for the Assembly of the Republic of Korea” are active and aggressive, which threatens the existence, safety, and democratic basic order of the State. Defendant 1 participated in the Assembly of the Republic of Korea as a representative of the 15th Mad Korean National Assembly, and discussed the above materials and participated in various resolutions and activities. Accordingly, it is recognized that the first instance judgment that found Defendant 1 guilty on the part of North Korea’s activities, which is the organization of the Republic of Korea, is reasonable, and that it is reasonable to acknowledge that the determination of the first instance judgment that found Defendant 1 guilty, and that it was based on misconceptions of facts or misapprehension of legal principles.

This part of the grounds for appeal is the purport of disputing the recognition and judgment of the facts as above by the court below. It is nothing more than factually attributable to the court below's determination on the selection and probative value of evidence belonging to the free judgment of the court of fact-finding. In addition, the reasoning of the original judgment is examined in light of the legal principles as seen earlier and the evidence duly adopted, even if it is examined in the judgment of the court below, it is not erroneous in the misapprehension of the legal principles as to the same Article of Article 7 (1) of the National Security Act, as alleged in the grounds for appeal.

D. On the grounds as indicated in the judgment of the court below with respect to the part on the violation of the State Security Act by acquiring, possessing, and distributing e-mail (e.g., e., praises, rubber, and rubber) (e., praises) of e-mail, the expressions contained in the files contained in the facts charged in the first instance trial fall under the active and aggressive contents threatening the existence and security of the State and democratic basic order, and the fact that they were acquired and held for the purpose of gathering materials, and (ii) the fact that they were sent to the Defendant’s e-mail or acquired and possessed for the purpose of gathering materials, and (iii) this was recognized for the purpose of raising awareness about the acquisition, possession, and content and the activities of the anti-state organization at the time of such act, and that there was a legitimate deliberation that found the facts charged in this part of this case guilty, and thus, rejected the legal principles or the grounds for appeal.

This part of the grounds of appeal is the purport of disputing the recognition and determination of facts as above by the court below. It is nothing more than factually attributable to the court below's determination on the selection and probative value of evidence belonging to the free judgment of the court of fact-finding. In addition, the reasoning of the original judgment is examined in light of the legal principles as seen earlier, the relevant legal principles as indicated in the judgment of the court below, and the evidence duly adopted. However, the judgment of the court below did not err by exceeding the limit of free evaluation of evidence due to its violation of the legal principles as alleged in the grounds of appeal, or by misapprehending the legal principles as to the ethical expressive materials under Article 7 (5) of the National Security Act and the purpose of the ethic act.

2. As to the appeal by the military prosecutor

A. On the grounds of appeal regarding violation of the State Public Officials Act and violation of the Political Parties Act, a public official under Articles 53 and 22(1) of the former Political Parties Act (amended by Act No. 10866, Jul. 21, 2011); a crime that became a party member of this political party; and a crime committed by a public official under Articles 84 and 65(1) of the former Public Officials Act (amended by Act No. 10148, Mar. 22, 2010; see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 2012Do12867, May 16, 201; 2014Do6565, Jun. 3, 2014) is an immediate crime established upon joining this political party and completing the same simultaneously (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decisions 2012Do12867, Jun. 16, 2014>

The court below held that this part of the public prosecution was instituted against the State Public Officials Act and the Political Parties Act by failing to withdraw from a political party at the time of acquiring the status of the defendant who was a party, on the ground that each crime of violation of the State Public Officials Act and violation of the Political Parties Act is an immediate crime that is completed at the same time as joining, and that a crime of violation of the State Public Officials Act and the Political Parties Act is established as an immediate crime that is completed at the time of committing the crime, on the ground that the public official's status is a soldier.

At the time of acquisition, it was determined that the omission by the defendant who did not withdraw from the political party at the time of acquisition could not be evaluated as having the same legal value as that of the party's accession to this political party.

Examining the reasoning of the judgment of the original court in light of the record, the judgment of the original court seems to be based on the above legal principles, and at the same time, there was no error of misapprehending the legal principles on the violation of the State Public Officials Act due to party accession and the violation of the Political Parties Act, such as the assertion of the grounds for appeal.

B. From the past month, the recognition of conviction in a criminal trial as to the grounds for appeal on the violation of the State Security Act (e.g., praises, rubbers, etc.) by possession of documents - the acquisition of probative value by a judge to the extent that there is no room for a reasonable doubt, and there is no such proof, and even if there is no suspicion of conviction against the defendant, it cannot be said that the defendant is guilty (see Supreme Court Decisions 201Do2823, Aug. 21, 2001; 2005Do8675, Mar. 9, 2006, etc.).

For the reasons as indicated in the judgment, the first instance court held that ① the documents of the 5.18 Gwangju in unification from the date of the last month, 5.18 e.g., the e., the e.

It is difficult to view the Defendant as being the Defendant, and ② there is insufficient evidence to acknowledge that the Defendant was aware of the acquisition and possession of the “documents of young morals” and that there was no evidence to prove that there was the purpose of the dual act, and the Defendant was not guilty of this part of the public prosecution. Moreover, the lower court acknowledged that the first instance judgment was legitimate on the grounds as stated in the judgment, and rejected the allegation of the grounds for appeal by mistake of facts or misapprehension of the legal doctrine.

This part of the grounds of appeal is the purport of disputing the recognition and determination of facts as above by the court below. It is nothing more than factually attributable to the court below's determination as to the selection and probative value of evidence belonging to the free judgment of the court of fact-finding. Furthermore, in light of the legal principles and records as seen earlier, the reasoning of the original judgment is examined in the judgment of the court below. Thus, it is not erroneous in the misapprehension of the legal principles as to the pro rata materials under Article 7 (5) of the National Security Act and the purpose of pro rata act, etc., or exceeding the limits of free evaluation of evidence, as alleged in the grounds of appeal.

C. On the other hand, the Prosecutor appealed to the entirety of the judgment of the original court. However, on the part of the original judgment that found the Defendant not guilty and the part that found the Defendant not guilty of the violation of the National Security Act (e.g., praisement, rubber, etc.) due to the acquisition and possession of file of “business plan” in the 39th Korean Total Students Association in the Republic of Korea, the Defendant did not state the grounds for appeal on the grounds of appeal, and there is no statement on the grounds of appeal in the petition of appeal.

3. Conclusion

Therefore, all appeals are dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices.

Justices Kim Shin-chul

Justices Kim Yong-deok

Justices Park Poe-young

Justices Kwon Soon-il