The purpose of the provision on the period of prescription of the personnel regulations governing disciplinary proceedings for local public enterprise workers and the starting point of such period.

The provision on the period of prescription of the personnel regulations governing disciplinary proceedings on workers of a local public enterprise is against the principle of good faith to prevent workers from exercising the right to discipline for a considerable period of time due to the occurrence of the grounds for the disciplinary action against workers, but the local public enterprise is unilaterally able to take disciplinary action against the workers, and thereby preventing such workers from exercising the right to discipline for a relatively long period of time. In addition, it is against the principle of good faith to put a restriction on the employer’s exercise of the right to discipline on the ground of the lapse of the above period of time. Thus, the starting point is the time when the grounds for disciplinary action occurs in principle.

Article 56 (1) 5 of the Local Public Enterprises Act

[Plaintiff-Appellant] Plaintiff 1 and 1 other (Law Firm Han-sung, Attorneys Park Jong-soo et al., Counsel for plaintiff-appellant)

Plaintiff (Attorney Lee Jong-chul, Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

The Chairman of the National Labor Relations Commission

Jeonbuk Development Corporation (Attorney Park Jin-jin et al., Counsel for the defendant-appellant)

Seoul High Court Decision 2007Nu20432 decided January 16, 2008

The judgment below is reversed and the case is remanded to Seoul High Court.

The grounds of appeal are examined.

1. Article 46-3(1) of the Personnel Regulations stipulating the disciplinary proceedings on workers of the Defendant Intervenor joining the Defendant (hereinafter “ Intervenor”) provides that “if two years (three years in the case of acceptance of money, valuables and entertainments, and embezzlement and misappropriation of public funds) have passed from the date on which the grounds for the disciplinary action occurred, no request for the disciplinary decision shall be made.” The above provision provides that “If the Corporation was able to unilaterally punish workers due to the occurrence of the grounds for the disciplinary action against the worker, it shall prevent the worker from taking out unstable positions for a considerable period of time due to the failure to confirm whether or not the Corporation has exercised the disciplinary action against the worker, and if the Corporation neglected to exercise the disciplinary action rights over a relatively long period of time, it would go against the good faith principle to exercise the disciplinary action rights again against the Corporation, and thus, the starting point is the time when the grounds for the disciplinary action occurred (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 94Da1650, Mar. 10, 1995).

2. According to the reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance as cited by the court below and the judgment of the court of first instance as follows: (a) the Plaintiff, while taking charge of ordering the promotional materials of apartment buildings sold by the Intervenor, received a total of 63 million won from the representative of the printing company from January 2001 to February 202 under the pretext of case expenses for giving and receiving printed materials on a total of 12 occasions; (b) the former District Prosecutors’ Office, investigating the Intervenor’s office while investigating the act of corruption, such as giving and receiving money and valuables as above, and investigated the Plaintiff and other relevant persons; (c) such facts were reported to the general public through the local media; (d) the former District Court sentenced the first instance judgment of a criminal case against the relevant persons on June 23, 2005; and (e) the Intervenor’s appellate court, upon the issuance of the above judgment, ordered the Nonparty, etc. to perform the investigation and resolution on the remaining period from January 206 to February 18, 2006.

3. Examining the above facts in light of the legal principles as seen earlier, the starting point of the statute of limitations for the Plaintiff’s violation of the duty of integrity is around February 2002. Since it concerns the Plaintiff’s last act of delivering money and valuables, the statute of limitations for disciplinary action should expire on February 2005 after 3 years have passed under Article 46-3(1) of the above personnel management regulations, but the period of prescription for the Plaintiff’s act of delivering money and valuables should expire on February 1, 2005 after the commencement of prosecution investigation before the completion of the statute of limitations. However, according to the evidence No. 20-1 of the above personnel management regulations, the intervenor corporation cannot be deemed to have received the first instance judgment of the above criminal case on August 1, 2005, and it cannot be deemed that there was a new provision on disciplinary action or a new provision on disciplinary action against the Plaintiff’s act of delivering money and valuables at the expiration of the statute of limitations for a certain period of time after the expiration of the statute of limitations.

Nevertheless, the court below determined that the disciplinary action in this case was lawful after the statute of limitations has already been completed on the ground that the statute of limitations for the violation of the duty of integrity has not run or suspended, and the statute of limitations for the violation of the duty of integrity has not expired until the time of the request for the above disciplinary action, and that the statute of limitations for the violation of the duty of integrity has already been completed after the statute of limitations has already been completed, and the court below erred by misapprehending the legal principles on the statute of limitations for the disciplinary action, which affected the conclusion of

4. Therefore, without examining the remaining grounds of appeal, the judgment of the court below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the court below for a new trial and determination. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench

Justices Park Si-hwan (Presiding Justice)