1. The Intervenor’s appeal is dismissed.

2. The appeal cost includes the part resulting from the supplementary participation.

1. The reasoning of the judgment of the court of first instance citing this case is identical to the ground of the judgment of the court of first instance, except for adding the following 2.2. Thus, this case is quoted as it is in accordance with Article 8(2) of the Administrative Litigation Act and the main sentence of Article 420

2. Additional determination

A. As to the assertion regarding the statute of limitations on disciplinary action, the intervenor asserts that the time limit for notifying the holding of the disciplinary committee under Article 42 of the Rules of Employment of the Plaintiff and Article 28 of the collective agreement should be interpreted as extinctive prescription, and that the disciplinary action in this case should be deemed null and void as long as the plaintiff proceeds disciplinary proceedings against the intervenor after the lapse

Article 42 subparag. 1 of the Rules of Employment of the Plaintiff provides that "a company shall notify the relevant employees, etc. of a request for appearance three days prior to the holding of the disciplinary committee, stating the grounds for disciplinary action and the date, time, and place of the relevant disciplinary committee within 15 days from the date of the occurrence of the grounds for disciplinary action." Article 28 subparag. 1

The provision on the period of prescription for disciplinary action is against the principle of good faith to prevent an employee from exercising his/her right to disciplinary action for a considerable period of time due to the occurrence of the grounds for disciplinary action against an employee, even though the employer was able to unilaterally punish the employee, by failing to determine whether to exercise his/her right to disciplinary action, and thereby to prevent the employee from exercising his/her right to disciplinary action for a relatively long period of time. Thus, it is against the principle of good faith to impose restrictions on the employer’s exercise of the right to disciplinary action on the ground of the lapse

(See Supreme Court Decision 2008Du2484, Jul. 10, 2008). Based on the above legal doctrine, the Plaintiff’s rules of employment and collective agreement are examined as to the instant case.