(a) Where a contractor cancels the contract after the expiration of the agreed date in the status of suspension of construction works in the contract for construction works, whether the contract for delay shall be applied;

(b) In the case of paragraph (a), the time when the penalty for delay occurred, the completion period and the method of calculating the amount thereof;

A. Where there is an agreement on compensation for delay in a contract for new construction of a building, unless the contractor completes the work within the agreed period and delivers it to the contractor, the contractor shall be liable to pay compensation for delay unless there are special circumstances. The agreement on compensation for delay shall not be applied on the ground that the contract for delay has not been completed after the completion of part of the construction before the agreed date, and the contract for delay has not been completed by the contractor after the termination of the contract.

B. In the case of “A”, the date of completion of the agreement, unless there are special circumstances, shall not be deemed to continue without delay until the completion of the building by the contractor or the contractor. The period of the contract shall be limited from the time when the contractor was able to cancel the construction due to the suspension of construction or other reasons for cancellation (not when the contractor was de facto cancelled) to the time when the contractor could have requested another contractor to complete the same building, and if the construction is delayed due to a cause not attributable to the contractor, it shall be deducted for that period. If the penalty for delay calculated is deemed to be unduly excessive, the court may reduce the amount of the penalty for delay as appropriate in accordance with Article 398(2) of the Civil Act.

Articles 398, 664, and 667 of the Civil Act

A. (B) Supreme Court Decision 88Meu6273,6280 Decided July 25, 1989 (Gong1989,1281). Supreme Court Decision 88Meu15901,15918 Decided September 12, 1989 (Gong1989,1460). Supreme Court Decision 93Da4287 Decided March 25, 1994 (Gong194,1327)

Kudong Construction Co., Ltd., Counsel for the defendant-appellant

Defendant Dong-dong Law Firm, Attorneys Park Dong-dong et al., Counsel for the defendant-appellant

Seoul High Court Decision 93Na3884 delivered on March 16, 1995

The appeal is dismissed.

The costs of appeal are assessed against the plaintiff.

The grounds of appeal (to the extent of supplement in case of supplemental appellate briefs not timely filed) are examined as follows.

(1) The contract for construction of a new building shall be deemed to have agreed on the liquidated damages for delay under the contract aimed at the completion of the work called the completion of the building, and the contract for the construction of the new building shall be deemed to have been agreed on by the contractor to pay the liquidated damages unless the contractor completes the work and delivers it to the contractor within the agreed period, unless there are special circumstances. Thus, the contract for the construction of the new building shall not be deemed to have been subject to the agreement for liquidated damages because the contract for the construction has been completed before the agreed date and the contract has been terminated later and the contract has not been completed after the contract was terminated. In this case, the contract completion date or the termination date shall not continue without delay until the contractor or the contractor completed the construction, and the contractor could not cancel the contract due to the suspension of construction or other reasons for the cancellation of the construction (which shall not be deemed to have been completely cancelled) until the contractor could not request another contractor to complete the building (which shall be limited to the time the contractor would not be deemed to have been subject to the reduction of the amount of liquidated damages for delay.

In accordance with the above legal principles, the court below recognized that the plaintiff had a duty to pay liquidated damages for delay pursuant to the contract, when the plaintiff entered into a contract with the defendant for new construction on the site owned by the defendant, but the construction was suspended without completing the construction by the completion date as set forth in the contract, and the defendant cancelled the contract thereafter, and thus the plaintiff cannot complete the construction of the building. The plaintiff is liable to pay liquidated damages for delay in accordance with the contract during the period calculated by deducting the period of construction from the agreed completion date to the time when the plaintiff completely suspended the construction from the time when the construction was completed until the time when the plaintiff completely finished the construction to another business operator. This decision of the court below is just and it is not erroneous in the misapprehension of legal principles as well as in the incomplete hearing. It is not reasonable to use the precedent cited in the lawsuit in this case.

(2) On June 4, 1990, the court below rejected the plaintiff's assertion that the plaintiff agreed between the plaintiff and the defendant to increase the contract price for the construction work of the building of this case and to conclude a new contract for the construction work of the ground floor with respect to the construction work of the building of this case. The court below rejected the plaintiff's assertion on the ground that there is no other evidence to acknowledge it. In light of the records, this decision of the court below is justified, and there is no violation of the rules of evidence, violation of the rules of evidence, or violation of the rules of experience. There

(3) In light of the records, it cannot be recognized that the civil petition of neighboring residents concerning the construction of this case was caused by the defendant's cause attributable to the defendant, and rather, the court below's decision that the temporary suspension of construction due to the civil petition of neighboring residents was caused by the cause attributable to the plaintiff is just and acceptable, and there is no error of law in violation of the rules of evidence, such as the theory of lawsuit, and there is no merit

(4) Therefore, the appeal is dismissed and all costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Lee Don-hee (Presiding Justice)