2016Du56042 Revocation of the Request for Remedy against Unfair Dismissal

Military Personnel Mutual Aid Association

Attorney Park Jong-sung et al., Counsel for the defendant-appellant

The Chairman of the National Labor Relations Commission

Defendant 1 and one other

Law Firm LLC et al.

Daejeon High Court Decision 2015Nu12197 Decided September 29, 2016

June 25, 2020

The judgment of the court of first instance shall be reversed, and the case shall be remanded to the Daejeon High Court.

The grounds of appeal are examined (to the extent of supplement in case of a document submitted after the period for submitting a statement of reasons for appeal elapses).

1. Determination on the second ground of appeal

For the same reasons as the judgment of the court below, it is difficult to conclude that the intervenor 2 leaked out of the Plaintiff’s place of business the ○○○○, etc. stored by the instant file, or leaked it in collusion with the intervenor 1.

Examining the reasoning of the original judgment in light of the relevant legal principles and records, the lower court’s judgment did not err in its judgment by either violating the duty of explanation as stated in the grounds of appeal, or failing to exhaust all necessary deliberations, thereby adversely recognizing facts beyond the bounds of the principle of free evaluation of evidence by violating logical and empirical rules, and thereby adversely affecting the conclusion of the judgment.

2. Determination on the third ground of appeal

A. Where a collective agreement or employment rules provides that a person to be disciplined shall be notified of the facts of the disciplinary action, it shall not be deemed valid, but if there is no such provision, it shall not be obligated to notify the person to be disciplined of the fact (see Supreme Court Decision 92Da18542, Sept. 25, 1992). In addition, even where a collective agreement or employment rules provides that a party shall be given an opportunity to provide a person with an opportunity to provide a prima facie evidence related to the grounds of the disciplinary action, the person shall be provided with such opportunity, and the vindication itself does not necessarily require (see Supreme Court Decision 2007Da51758, Dec. 27, 2007). Moreover, it is sufficient if a disciplinary committee notifies the person to be disciplined of the facts of the facts of the disciplinary action and gives him/her an opportunity to make statements thereon, and it is not necessary to take measures to ensure that the person subject to the disciplinary action is given an opportunity to give a detailed statement about the matters of individual facts of the offense (see Supreme Court Decision 194.7Nu194.

B. According to the reasoning of the original judgment and the record, it is difficult to find out the following facts. 1) The personnel committee merely provides that “the Intervenor shall have sufficient opportunity to make statements” (Article 57(1)) and there is no provision stipulating that the Intervenor shall be subject to disciplinary action. Nonparty 1 shall be subject to disciplinary action against the Intervenor at the time of his resignation, and it is difficult to find the Intervenor to be subject to disciplinary action against the Intervenor 1 on the following grounds: (i) the Intervenor 2 was informed of the fact that he was informed of the fact that he was informed of the fact that he had been subject to disciplinary action against the Intervenor 1 for about 1 year; and (ii) the Intervenor was informed of the fact that he had been subject to disciplinary action against the Intervenor 1 on the ground that he was informed of the fact that he had been subject to disciplinary action against the Intervenor 3’s personal information at the time of his resignation; and (iii) the Plaintiff was informed of the fact that he had been subject to disciplinary action against the Intervenor 1’s personal information by taking advantage of his personal information.

D. Nevertheless, solely on the grounds as indicated in its reasoning, the lower court determined that the instant dismissal disposition was unreasonable for the reason of disciplinary action, on the grounds as stated in its reasoning, that it constitutes a “collective harassment and bullying” and a “private circulation of 1’s private life among the facts suspected of disciplinary action. In so determining, the lower court erred by misapprehending the legal doctrine on the defect in the procedures for disciplinary action, thereby adversely affecting the conclusion of the judgment. The grounds for appeal pointing this out are with merit.

3. Determination as to the ground of appeal No. 1 ought to be made by the disciplinary committee, etc., through specific materials, whether a worker’s misconduct constitutes grounds for disciplinary action (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2008Du22211, Apr. 9, 2009). Whether such misconduct constitutes grounds for disciplinary action ought to be reasonably interpreted and determined by the objective meaning of the provisions stipulated in the rules of employment under the rules of employment (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2014Du2765, Jan. 28, 2016).

B. According to the reasoning of the judgment of the court below and records, the intervenor 1 entered the following facts in the non-party 4's private information management team's non-party 1' and non-party 2's non-party 1' and non-party 1's non-party 3's non-party 4's non-party 2's non-party 2's non-party 1's non-party 1's non-party 1's non-party 4's non-party 2''''''''''''''' and non-party 4''''''''''''''''''' non-party 1's non-party 4''''''''''' and non-party 1'the non-party 2's non-party 1's non-party 2''s non-party 1's non-party 1's non-party 1's non-party 1's non-party 1'.

C. For the following reasons, the lower court did not recognize the Intervenor’s acts listed in paragraphs (1) and (2) (hereinafter collectively referred to as “the instant misconduct”) as grounds for disciplinary action. (1) The Intervenor was the full-time officer and superior of Nonparty 1 of this case, the Intervenor’s actions appear to be based on the suspicion of Nonparty 1 and Nonparty 2, and Nonparty 1 did not appeal the Intervenor’s collective harassment or bullying before Nonparty 1’s action. In light of the fact that the Intervenor did not appeal the Intervenor’s collective harassment or bullying. In addition, it is difficult to view the Intervenor’s bullying or bullying solely based on the productive behavior of the Intervenor. (2) Moreover, since the Intervenor was an extension who belongs to the accounting team, such as Nonparty 1 and Nonparty 2, as his employee’s private rights, it is difficult to spread the pertinent bullying to the relevant group.

D. 1) According to the above facts, the Plaintiff’s personnel committee appears to have used the term “collective harassment and bullying,” or “compact related to private life,” with a view to clarifying the instant misconduct in the light of the Plaintiff’s reason attributable to the Intervenor, deeming that the instant misconduct in violation of the provisions of Chapter 4-A(a) of the Plaintiff’s Code of Ethics was committed.

Therefore, the lower court should have determined not whether the instant misconduct was included in the concept of the above terms, but rather whether the instant misconduct constitutes a ground for disciplinary action against the Plaintiff’s violation of the Rules of Ethics. 2) In full view of the reasoning of the original judgment and the following circumstances recognized by the record, the instant misconduct constitutes a violation of Chapter 4(a) of the Plaintiff’s Code of Ethics. (2) The Intervenor is the superior position, position, service period, and age in the accounting team like Nonparty 1.

B) The intervenors initially transferred Nonparty 1’s speech or behavior that is open to the public or disregarding, or that is not confirmed with respect to privacy during a period of approximately one year, and slandered Nonparty 1 by spreading facts that are not confirmed with respect to privacy, and committed an act beyond the appropriate scope of duties by taking advantage of B, such as the intention of separation of human relations and infringement of personal status, the advantage of the relationship, and the ebstinence of majority.

C) It seems that the above actions by the intervenors were contrary to the mutual respect value among the employees, and exceeded the level of daily guidance, advice, and loyalty. Nonparty 1’s actions were deemed to have led to considerable mental distress on the part of the intervenors, and that they were retired due to the aggravation of the working environment.

E. Nevertheless, the lower judgment, on the grounds stated in its reasoning, erred by misapprehending the legal doctrine on the interpretation of disciplinary regulations and the recognition of the grounds for disciplinary action, thereby adversely affecting the conclusion of the judgment. The grounds for appeal pointing this out are with merit.

4. Conclusion

Therefore, the judgment of the court below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the court below for a new trial and determination. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Noh Jeong-hee

Justices Park Sang-ok

Justices Ansan-chul

Justices Kim Jong-hwan