The case recognizing the negligence of a woman and a doctor on the part of a woman who died of a fetus due to the delay in operation after starting a house more than one hour after receiving a report that a woman was hospitalized by an emergency patient who needs a king operation.

The case which recognized the negligence of a woman and a doctor on the part of a woman who died of a fetus due to the delay in operation after starting one hour after receiving a report on the hospitalization of an emergency patient in need of the king operation.

Article 750 of the Civil Act

[Plaintiff-Appellant] Plaintiff 1 and 1 other (Law Firm Gyeong, Attorneys Park Jong-soo et al., Counsel for plaintiff-appellant)

Plaintiff (Attorney Kim Young-young, Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant)

Defendant (Attorney Han-chul et al., Counsel for defendant-appellant)

Seoul High Court Decision 98Na48820 delivered on June 15, 1999

The appeal is dismissed. The costs of appeal are assessed against the defendant.

The grounds of appeal are examined (to the extent of supplement in case of supplemental appellate briefs not timely filed).

1. According to the reasoning of the lower judgment, the lower court partially accepted and determined the reasoning of the first instance judgment as follows.

On December 25, 1994, at least 04:00 on December 25, 1994, at least 04:45 on the same day, Nonparty 1 diagnosed that, as a result of the diagnosis by Nonparty 1, who was a doctor, the fetus, was in a state where the fetus is placed, and as a result, Nonparty 1 diagnosed that only a part of the surgery is needed by the scophn alcohol during a rapid time. At the time, the Gangnam-ma Hospital at the time could not immediately perform an emergency scopic operation against Nonparty 1 due to the relationship scheduled for another pregnant woman. At the same time, Nonparty 1 could not perform an emergency scopic operation with respect to the other pregnant woman. He confirmed whether it is possible to walk the phone to the nearby hospital operated by the Plaintiff two times at around 05:30 on the same day and around 05:40 on two occasions, and recommended Nonparty 1 to transfer it to the neighboring hospital.

Accordingly, at around 06:10 on the same day, the non-party 1 complained of the regular truth at intervals of five minutes at a nearby hospital, and requested the king surgery and went to an emergency room at around 06:30 according to the direction of this Decree, the non-party 1, the nurse of the emergency room, and the non-party 1, the nurse of the emergency room, requested the defendant, who is the father and the director of the hospital, to go to the hospital because there was an emergency patient in need of the king operation by leaving a phone at around 06:40. Around that time, the non-party 1 called the defendant by telephone.

At around 07:30, the non-party 1 complained of continuously and severely severe pains after being moved to an operation room, and confirmed that the safinite safinite safinite safinite safinite safinite safinite safinsafinsafins safinsafins safinsafins safinsafins safins safins

At around 07:40, the defendant left a taxi and started a medical examination at the hospital operating room at around 08:35, the result of the medical examination, which had already occurred out of the quality of the fetus, and the fetus's body was discharged entirely at around 08:52 by inducing only a natural part, because one of the fetus was in a state in which it is impossible to perform a king operation due to severe lusium, and the fetus was naturally discharged at around 08:52, but a serious lusium was killed due to a serious lusium, and at around 10:35, as a result of the autopsy, it was observed that a large quantity of the fetus was inhaled within the lusium.

In the case where a fetus is in a state with a fetus, there is a high risk of death due to damage of delivery, settlement (settlement), delay of delivery, etc. compared to normal two conditions. Therefore, in the case where both sides are already in a state with a fetus, it is necessary to take an appropriate measure after frequently measuring the heart of the fetus and carefully observing the progress of delivery, and promptly selecting the method of delivery, such as the king operation, etc.

Based on such factual basis, the lower court determined that there was negligence on the part of the Defendant on the ground that: (a) the Defendant, at around 06:40, was at the time at around 07:40, on the ground that: (b) it was found that the Defendant was negligent on the ground that: (c) the fetus’s sking operation with respect to Nonparty 1 was delayed due to the delay in the sking operation with respect to Nonparty 1; and (d) the fetus’s sking operation was taken over in the womb

2. In light of the records, the above fact-finding and judgment of the court below are all acceptable, and there is no error of law in finding facts due to violation of the rules of evidence as alleged in the ground of appeal.

In addition, as otherwise alleged in the ground of appeal, even if the plaintiff was negligent in failing to directly treat the non-party 1 as a medical doctor on duty at the time of the accident, without directly reporting the non-party 1's internal organ at the time of the accident, and at around 08:20, after again reporting the status of the non-party 1, the record reveals that the defendant is the only woman and doctor capable of performing the king operation at the nearby hospital, and the defendant is the nurse's homeball and the king operation at around 06:40 of the day, and the non-party 1 was reported to the status of being promptly subject to the king operation at the time of the accident at around 07:40 of the time without any special circumstance and at the latest at around 08:35, the defendant cannot be exempted from the liability for the delay of the king operation and the death of the fetus caused thereby. The dissenting opinion of the judgment of the court below in the grounds of appeal that criticizes the judgment below cannot be accepted.

3. Therefore, the appeal is dismissed, and all costs of appeal are assessed against the losing party. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Lee Jin-hun (Presiding Justice)