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(영문) 서울고등법원 2020.3.26. 선고 2019누56540 판결
부정수급액및추가징수액반환명령취소청구
Cases

2019Nu5640 For revocation of an order to return illegal receipt amount and additional collection amount

Plaintiff Appellant

A Stock Company

Law Firm Namsan, Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant

Attorney Kim Tae-hun, Justice Kim Tae-hun and Justice Park Jung-he

Defendant Elives

The Head of the Seoul Regional Employment and Labor Office Seoul Northern Site

The first instance judgment

Seoul Administrative Court Decision 2018Guhap76781 Decided August 23, 2019

Conclusion of Pleadings

February 20, 2020

Imposition of Judgment

March 26, 2020

Text

1. The plaintiff's appeal is dismissed.

2. The costs of appeal shall be borne by the Plaintiff.

Purport of claim and appeal

The judgment of the first instance shall be revoked. On June 5, 2017, the Defendant’s disposition of returning KRW 33,420,800 against the Plaintiff and the disposition of additionally collecting KRW 33,420,80 shall be revoked.

Reasons

1. Quotation of judgment of the first instance;

The grounds alleged by the plaintiff in the trial while filing an appeal are not significantly different from the contents alleged by the plaintiff in the first instance court, and even if the evidence submitted to the trial is re-examineed along with the plaintiff's assertion, the first instance judgment dismissing the plaintiff's claim is justified.

Therefore, the reasoning for this Court regarding this case is that the reasoning for the judgment of the court of first instance is the same as that for the judgment of the court of first instance, except for the modification of the written judgment of the court of first instance as follows. Thus, this Court shall accept it in accordance with Article 8(2) of the Administrative Litigation Act

【Revisioned Part】

Part 6 through 8 of the judgment document of the first instance court is as described in the following box.

1) In light of the following: (a) the employee of the non-existenceB’s non-existence of the grounds for disposition helps the Plaintiff’s employees in the process of using the computer so that he/she could receive online lectures and evaluations; and (b) did not mean that the Plaintiff received subsidies by false or other unlawful means; (c) the Plaintiff cannot be deemed to have received subsidies by means of false or other unlawful means; (d) the Plaintiff believed that he/she was able to conduct postal training with the consent of his/her assistant in trust and trusting the explanation; (e) the Plaintiff paid the full amount of the training expenses; and (e) only incurred monetary damages by being refunded only 80% of the training fees for the employees who completed the training course; and (e) whether the Plaintiff was entitled to receive the additional number of instructors B, the amount equivalent

It is unfair to impose the total amount of additional collection exceeding the amount to be collected, as it deviates from and abused discretion.

○ The judgment of the first instance court No. 11 on the third page of the judgment is "......... judgment" is "..... judgment on the non-existence of the grounds for disposition".

○ On the fourth written judgment of the first instance court, the entry in the following writing boxes shall be added between the second and the last sentence.

The burden of proof in an administrative litigation to which the provisions of the Civil Procedure Act apply mutatis mutandis is, in principle, apportioned among the parties in accordance with the general principles of civil procedure, and in the case of an appeal litigation, there is the burden of proof as to the legitimacy of the disposition to the defendant who asserts the legitimacy of the disposition. However, if there is a reasonable and acceptable proof of the legitimacy of a certain disposition asserted by the defendant, the disposition is justifiable, and any assertion contrary thereto and proof contrary thereto return to the plaintiff, who is the other party (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2015Du42817, Oct. 27,

It is true that the written judgment of the first instance court No. 5 is "no trust," and it is not sufficient to reverse the evidence of No. 16 through No. 21, and there is no other counter-proof."

The first instance court's judgment Nos. 6-2 and 10-2 are as follows.

다) 관련 형사사건의 수사과정에서, 이 사건 훈련이 실시된 기간에 B에서 근무한 사람들을 포함한 B의 임직원, 아르바이트생들은 "임의로 훈련생들의 아이디와비밀번호를 생성하였고, 훈련 대상기관에 파견되어 형식적으로 몇 명의 훈련생들에게| OX 퀴즈 등을 내기는 하였으나, 실제로는 B의 직원이나 아르바이트생들이 훈련생

After having access to the website of the trainee learning management system with the ID and password of the Plaintiff, an agent evaluation was conducted at will, and even if it does not fall under the “person who can undergo remote training” as prescribed by the former Regulations on Support, it was conducted to the effect that it was conducted. There is no special circumstance that only the trainee of the instant case belonging to the Plaintiff was conducted with a different method of learning guidance and evaluation.

Part 6 of the judgment of the first instance court shall be deleted from 11 to 14.

The first instance court's judgment Nos. 6, 15, 7, 15, and 4 are as follows.

라) 이 사건 훈련에 관한 훈련생학습관리시스템 분석 결과, 특정일 · 특정시간대에 동일한 IP 주소에서 다수의 훈련생 명의로 로그인이 이루어진 상태로 진도학습이 이루어지는 양상이 나타났고, 동일한 IP에서 동시에 둘 이상의 훈련생 학습이력이 다수 존재하기도 하였는데, 이는 훈련생 아이디로 훈련생학습관리시스템에 로그인한 후 로그아웃을 하지 않은 채 다시 새로운 화면을 띄워 다른 훈련생의 아이디로 시스템에 로그인을 한 것으로서 앞선 입력내용을 참고하여 뒤의 훈련생 평가결과를 입력하는 과정에서 나타난 것으로 보인다. 이 사건 훈련생 중 G은 2014. 3.22. 08시 21분 버스를 출고하여 당일 12시 15분까지 운행을 하였음에도 10시 39분에 훈련생학습관리시스템에 로그인하여 평가를 받은 것으로 되어 있기도 하다. 또한이 사건 훈련과정 중 1번 훈련(훈련기간 2014. 2. 24.~2014. 4. 23.)의 평가 평균소요시간은 53.1초인데, 전체 로그인 건수 3,965건 중 소요시간이 30초 미만인 경우가| 2,256건에 이르고, 2번 훈련(훈련기간 2014. 12. 1.~2015. 1. 31.)의 평가 평균소요시

The inter-party 39.9 first, among the total 3,266 cases, the required time was less than 30 seconds. 2,300 cases.

The following writing boxes shall be added between the first instance court judgment Nos. 7 and 5.

D. 1) Determination as to the assertion of deviation from or abuse of discretion ought to be made by comparing and balancing the degree of infringement of public interest and the disadvantage that an individual suffers from the disposition by objectively examining the content of the act of violation as the ground for the disposition, the public interest to be achieved by the act of violation, and all the relevant circumstances. In this case, even if the criteria for imposing sanctions are prescribed in the Enforcement Rule, it is nothing more than that prescribed in the administrative agency’s rules for handling internal affairs, and it is externally binding upon citizens or courts. Thus, the determination of legality of the pertinent disposition should be made not only in accordance with the above criteria for disposition but also in accordance with the contents and purport of the relevant Acts and subordinate statutes. Thus, the pertinent disposition cannot be deemed legitimate immediately because it conforms with the criteria for disposition. However, unless there are reasonable grounds to believe that the above criteria are unreasonable in light of the contents of the act of violation as the ground for disposition and the relevant Acts and subordinate statutes and the relevant laws and subordinate statutes, it should not be determined that the disposition pursuant to the criteria has exceeded or abused discretion (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2007Du666, supra).

The Plaintiff’s assertion on this part is without merit, since the additional collection disposition of this case may not be deemed to be a case where the Plaintiff’s disadvantage is too harsh to the Plaintiff compared to the public interest that the Plaintiff intends to achieve through a fair and transparent operation of the workplace skill development training. ① Workplace skill development training is implemented with the purpose of realizing the ability-oriented society through the promotion and support of the workplace skill development training through the promotion of workers’ livelihood, the enhancement of the social and economic status, and the enhancement of corporate productivity. The act of receiving workplace skill development training subsidies by fraud or other improper means causes the insolvency of the Employment Insurance Fund, and may inflict damages on the insured who have paid the employment insurance premium in good faith. Therefore, it is necessary to impose strict sanctions. ② The public interest needs to promote the employment security of workers, the improvement of economic status, and the establishment of the employment insurance fund. ③ As alleged by the Plaintiff, as otherwise alleged by the Plaintiff, it seems important for the Plaintiff to not enjoy any disadvantage from the Plaintiff due to the instant disposition, and even if the Plaintiff did not receive any difference from the Plaintiff’s workplace skill development training fees.

It is difficult to evaluate the damages equivalent to the difference between the subsidies and the circumstances that form the basis for deviation from and abuse of discretionary authority of each of the dispositions of this case. (4) The additional collection disposition of this case conforms to the criteria prescribed in Article 22-2 (1) 2 of the Enforcement Rule of the Act on the Development of Workplace Skills of Workers, and the said criteria itself cannot be viewed as inconsistent with the Constitution or laws. It does not seem that the result of the application of such criteria is considerably unreasonable in light of the contents of the Plaintiff’s act and the purport of the relevant statutes. (5) Since sanctions against violation of administrative regulations are imposed based on the objective facts of violation of administrative regulations to achieve administrative purposes, it is not a real actor, but a person who is prescribed by the law as the responsible person, and may be imposed without intention or negligence on the violator (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2014Du8773, May 11, 2017). Even if the Plaintiff did not know about the training methods or methods conducted by B, the Plaintiff could not be deemed to have any reasonable grounds for the Plaintiff’s provision of training expenses.

2. Conclusion

Therefore, the judgment of the first instance court is justifiable, and the plaintiff's appeal is dismissed as it is without merit (it is difficult to reverse the above judgment even if the plaintiff's written reference was examined as of March 6, 2020, which was submitted after the closing of argument).

Judges

The judge of the presiding judge;

Judges Min Il-young

Judge Lee Jin-hun

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