2012Nu18914 Revocation of Disposition ordering unemployment benefits return

A

The head of the Sung-nam District Employment and Labor Office

Suwon District Court Decision 201Guhap15016 Decided May 24, 2012

December 12, 2012

January 23, 2013

1. The defendant's appeal is dismissed.

2. The costs of appeal shall be borne by the Defendant.

1. Purport of claim

The Defendant’s disposition of ordering the return of unemployment benefits to the Plaintiff on March 24, 2011 is revoked.

2. Purport of appeal

The judgment of the first instance is revoked. The plaintiff's claim is dismissed.

1. Details of the disposition;

On December 11, 2008, the Plaintiff retired from employment as a daily employed worker, and applied for recognition of eligibility for employment insurance benefits to the Defendant (hereinafter referred to as “instant application”). On December 24, 2008, the Plaintiff obtained recognition of eligibility for employment insurance from the Defendant and received job-seeking benefits KRW 4720,000 (hereinafter referred to as “job-seeking benefits in this case”) from December 24, 2008 to May 18, 2009.

On March 24, 2011, the Defendant ordered the Plaintiff to return the instant job-seeking benefits pursuant to Article 62 of the Employment Insurance Act (hereinafter referred to as the “instant disposition”) on the ground that “the Plaintiff had worked on the 15th day ( November 17, 2008, November 18, 2008, from 20 to 26th day, December 28, 2008, December 1, 2008, December 1, 2008, 20, 3, 9, and 5th day) from November 11, 2008 to December 10, 208.”

[Reasons for Recognition] No dispute, entry of evidence Nos. 1 and 6, and the purport of the whole pleadings

2. Whether the instant disposition is lawful

A. The plaintiff's assertion

The Plaintiff revealed that the employee in charge of the Defendant is true about the requirements for eligibility for employment insurance benefits. While the employee in charge of the Defendant did not confirm the Plaintiff’s eligibility for recognition of eligibility for employment insurance and the Defendant’s computer network and paid the Plaintiff the instant job-seeking benefits, the Defendant’s order of the Plaintiff to return the entire job-seeking benefits of this case to the Plaintiff is unlawful as it deviates from the bounds of discretion or abused discretion due to excessive suspicion on the part of the Plaintiff.

B. Determination

In full view of the following circumstances, Gap's evidence Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, Eul evidence Nos. 1 through 8, 9, 12, and 13 (including branch numbers) and the overall purport of the pleadings, the plaintiff's assertion that the disposition of this case contains any error of deviation or abuse of discretionary power, since the disadvantage suffered by the plaintiff is greater than the public interest of the defendant's proper execution of the employment insurance finance to be achieved by the defendant as a result of the disposition of this case, and the disposition of this case is deemed to be excessively harsh to the plaintiff.

① On December 11, 2008, the Plaintiff was a worker under 60 years of age at the time of the instant application. On the application for recognition of eligibility for employment insurance (hereinafter referred to as “instant application”), the Plaintiff made the following entry (hereinafter referred to as “instant entry”) on the number of working days (hereinafter referred to as “the number of working days”) during one month prior to the date of application. The instant application does not indicate that the Plaintiff had no sufficient evidence to recognize that there was the intent of the Plaintiff to deny the former payment of benefits at the time of the instant application, except for the instant entry. In addition, considering the Plaintiff’s occupation, career, intellectual ability, academic background, etc., it is difficult to conclude that the Plaintiff could have known the Plaintiff to the Defendant at the time of the instant application as to the number of working days, because the Plaintiff failed to properly understand the number of working days due to misunderstanding or inconsistency with one another.

Details of the application for recognition of eligibility for employment insurance by Plaintiff

A person shall be appointed.

A person shall be appointed.

② As seen earlier, inasmuch as the entries in the front and back of the instant application are clearly contradictory, the Defendant asked additional questions to the Plaintiff and confirmed which entry was the Plaintiff’s genuine intent. However, without taking such measures, the Defendant recognized eligibility for employment insurance to the Plaintiff. Furthermore, the Defendant continued to pay the Plaintiff job-seeking benefits according to the first eligibility for employment insurance without confirming whether the Plaintiff’s eligibility for employment insurance benefits was satisfied. On November 30, 2008 and February 12, 2009, the Defendant was registered on the Defendant’s employment insurance network on December 30, 2008, and then on February 12, 2009, at any time. In fact, the Defendant confirmed the Plaintiff’s eligibility for benefits through the employment insurance network on February 19, 209, and recovered the Plaintiff’s number of working days on January 1, 2009. Nevertheless, the Defendant continued to pay the Plaintiff the job-seeking benefits according to the Plaintiff’s first eligibility for benefits.

③ From December 24, 2008, the Plaintiff met the requirement that “the number of working days per month prior to the date of applying for recognition of eligibility for employment insurance benefits shall be less than 10 days,” and thus, was entitled to receive lawful job-seeking benefits that are not different from the amount of the instant job-seeking benefits, until then, the Plaintiff did not actually receive the money for job-seeking benefits, and even if the Plaintiff received early receipt benefits upon the instant application, such benefits do not seem to be significant.

④ It is not likely that the Plaintiff, who was 62 years old at the time of the instant disposition for which two years have passed since the date of the instant payment of job-seeking benefits, satisfies the requirement that “the Plaintiff shall work for at least 180 days newly to receive job-seeking benefits.”

⑤ Above all, since the purpose of the job-seeking benefits system is to stabilize the livelihood of unemployed workers and promote reemployment, the Defendant’s operation of the job-seeking benefits system ought to take into account not only the appropriate execution of financial resources for employment insurance but also the public interest to achieve through this system. Nevertheless, the Defendant’s order to return the instant benefits to the Plaintiff late without due consideration as to such institutional purpose is highly likely to undermine the Plaintiff’s livelihood stability rather than the instant job-seeking benefits, and thus, would be contrary to the original purpose of the job-seeking benefits system.

(6) The Defendant asserts to the effect that the Plaintiff’s order to return the instant job-seeking benefits was legitimate since the Plaintiff entered not only the instant working days but also the date of the final severance on December 10, 2008 as the date of the Plaintiff’s final severance on December 5, 2008. However, the Plaintiff’s order to return the instant job-seeking benefits was not included in the instant application as of December 5, 2008, because the Plaintiff’s entry of the date of the final severance from employment in the instant application was not included in the instant disposition grounds for the instant lawsuit, and the Defendant’s assertion is not permissible as

C. Sub-decision

The instant disposition should be revoked as it is unlawful.

3. Conclusion

The plaintiff's claim shall be accepted on the grounds of its reasoning. Since the judgment of the court of first instance is just in conclusion, the defendant's appeal is dismissed on the grounds of its merit.

The presiding judge, senior judge and senior judge

Judges Noh Jeong-il

Judges Jeong Jae-ok

1) On the front of the application for recognition of eligibility for employment insurance, it is compared with the fact that “(3) this part of the application shall be set aside on the back of the application, stating “the reason for the final severance from employment 8,” and, on the back of the application, shall be set forth in the language “(3) to emphasize it once again in the judgment.”

A person shall be appointed.

A person shall be appointed.