Lee & Lee and 128 others (Law Firm LLC, Attorneys Im Im-soo et al., Counsel for the defendant-appellant)

Hotel Capital Co., Ltd. (Law Firm Rate, Attorneys Lee Chang-sik et al., Counsel for the defendant-appellant)

August 17, 2015

1. The defendant's amount of money corresponding to the "total" of the attached Table 2 sheet to the remaining plaintiffs except for plaintiffs 51, 84, and 125, and the corresponding amount, among them:

A. The amount of money indicated in the “property damage” column of the same Table shall be 5% per annum from November 13, 2013 to September 10, 2015 and 20% per annum from the following day to the date of full payment;

B. The term “security deposit” of the “official fee” of the same Table means each corresponding money indicated in the “official fee”;

(1) As to the respective amounts of money against the Plaintiffs other than Plaintiffs 17, 32 (Plaintiffs 30), 51, 82 (Plaintiffs 63), 84, and 125, 5% per annum from November 13, 2013 to July 16, 2015, and 20% per annum from the next day to the date of full payment;

(2) As to each amount of money against Plaintiffs 17, 32, and 82, 5% per annum from November 13, 2013 to September 10, 2015 and 20% per annum from the following day to the date of full payment.

sub-payment.

2. Each claim filed by Plaintiffs 51, 84, and 125 and all remaining claims by the rest of the plaintiffs are dismissed.

3. Of the costs of lawsuit, ① 1/6 of the portion arising between Plaintiff 4 and the Defendant shall be borne by Plaintiffs 4 and the remainder by the Defendant, ② 3/5 of the part arising between Plaintiffs 32 and 82, and the remainder by Plaintiffs 32 and 82, respectively, and the Defendant shall be borne by the Defendant. ③ The part arising between Plaintiffs 51, 84, and 125 and the Defendant shall be borne by Plaintiffs 51, 84, and 125, ④ the part arising between Plaintiffs 4, 32, 51, 82, 84, and 125, and 2/5 of the remainder of the part arising between the Plaintiffs and the Defendant, except the remainder by Plaintiffs 4, 32, 51, 82, 84, and 125, respectively,

4. Paragraph 1 can be provisionally executed.

The defendant shall pay to the plaintiffs 5% interest per annum from October 1, 2013 to the date of delivery of a copy of the application for modification of the claim and the cause of claim in this case, and 20% interest per annum from the following day to the date of full payment.

1. Basic facts

A. Since 1988, the Defendant operated a volatile club (hereinafter “instant club”) with facilities, such as raina, physical training hall, swimming pool, etc., in the hotel capital building located in the 22-76-dong, Yongsan-gu, Yongsan-gu, Seoul. The part related to the instant club among the rules (hereinafter “instant rules”) and the rules (hereinafter “instant rules”) prescribed by the terms and conditions of the instant club, is as follows.

Article 4 (Members) of the Regulations shall apply to the members of the voting association included in the text of this case, and the procedures for registration and the amount of membership shall be classified as follows: 1. Family members shall be one individual member's spouse and unmarried lineal ascendant or descendant at least 14 years old: 4. Annual members shall be one individual member's entitlement for membership for one year as determined by us; 5 (Provisional Payment) Members shall be the deposit for membership; 1. The annual fees shall be refunded at the time of their withdrawal; 4. Annual membership fees shall be maintained by paying a separate annual membership fee if they wish not to retire; 9 (Extinguishment and Suspension of Membership Rights); 1. Where a member's membership is removed from his or her membership rights due to any other change in his or her membership rights, his or her membership rights, his or her membership rights shall be automatically terminated; 2. Where the member's membership rights are removed from his or her membership rights, his or her membership rights shall be removed from his or her membership rights, any other change in his or her membership rights shall be removed from his or (3).

B. The Plaintiffs entered into a facility use agreement with the Defendant to use the instant club (hereinafter “instant use agreement”) with a direct admission fee, security deposit, and annual fee paid, or by acquiring membership rights of the instant club from the members who entered into the instant use agreement with the Defendant, and have become a party to the instant use agreement by acquiring membership rights of the instant club, and have used the instant club as an individual member and a family member by paying annual fees to the Defendant under the instant use agreement. The details of the Plaintiffs’ admission year, type of membership, and security deposit and membership fees paid to the Defendant are as follows: the Plaintiffs’ entry year, type of membership, and the details of the Plaintiffs’ membership fees paid to the Defendant are as follows: “the entry year” in attached Table 2, “the classification of membership members”, and “deposit money”, and “admission fee” column

C. On September 12, 2013, the Defendant notified the Plaintiffs that “The operation of the instant club is suspended as of September 30, 2013 because it is no longer possible due to the continuous occurrence, etc. of the instant club, thereby receiving deposits paid,” and the Defendant suspended the operation of the instant club on September 30, 2013 following the public announcement of the same content on September 16, 2013.

[Ground of recognition] Facts without dispute, each entry or image of Gap evidence 1 through 6 (including each number), the appraisal result of the appraiser non-party 1, the purport of the whole pleadings

2. Determination as to the claim for damages

A. The plaintiff's assertion

As long as the Plaintiffs maintain their membership as members, the Defendant is obligated to provide services for the Plaintiffs to use the instant club. Nevertheless, the Defendant unilaterally suspended the operation of the instant club, thereby failing to perform its obligations under the instant use contract.

Due to the Defendant’s nonperformance of such obligation, the Plaintiffs suffered property damage equivalent to the amount obtained by deducting the Plaintiffs’ membership fees and deposits from the amount equivalent to the value of membership rights of the instant club at that time (the same shall apply to the respective entry in the “amount claimed” in attached Table 2), and suffered emotional distress by being unable to use the instant club that has been used well-groundedly for 25 years.

Therefore, the defendant is obligated to compensate the plaintiffs for the above property damage and compensate for 1,000,000 won each as consolation money for the above mental suffering (the plaintiff 4 sought only the payment of consolation money without seeking compensation for property damage).

B. Occurrence of liability for damages

1) Determination as to the cause of claim

According to the above facts, as long as the plaintiffs maintain their membership in the instant club pursuant to the instant use contract, the defendant has a duty to allow the plaintiffs to use the instant club normally. On September 30, 2013, by suspending the operation of the instant club, the defendant refused to perform the above obligation by allowing the plaintiffs to use the instant club any longer. The defendant has a duty to compensate the plaintiffs for the damages suffered by the plaintiffs due to the nonperformance of such obligation, barring any special circumstances.

2) Judgment on the defendant's defense, etc.

A) Defenses by which an agreement is concluded with Plaintiffs 51, 84, and 125

(1) The Defendant, after suspending the operation of the instant club on September 30, 2013, received an application for withdrawal from Plaintiffs 51, 84, and 125, and concluded an agreement on the instant use contract. As such, Plaintiffs 51, 84, and 125 cannot claim damages against the Defendant.

(2) On September 12, 2013, Plaintiff 51, 84, and 125, the Defendant notified Plaintiff 2, who was unable to operate the instant club on September 30, 2013, that the deposit was returned as of September 30, 2013. The Defendant’s suspension of the operation of the instant club on September 30, 2013. The Defendant’s submission of the Plaintiff’s 10-1, 2, 3, and 3-1, 1, 2, 3-1, 3-2, and 1, 4, 10-1, 2, 3, 10-1, 2, and 5-1, 2, 30-1, 3, 10-1, 3, 2, and 15-1, 204, respectively, to the Defendant.

(3) Therefore, the defendant's defense against plaintiffs 51, 84, and 125 is justified.

B) Claim for termination of the agreement

(1) The Defendant provided that ① the Plaintiffs and the Defendant did not make a separate agreement regarding the contract term at the time of the instant use contract; ② the instant rules and regulations do not provide for the contract term separately; ③ Article 10 of the instant rules provide for “other necessary matters”; “other matters concerning the termination of the instant use contract” are important matters pertaining to the existence of the contract, and thus, constitutes “other necessary matters” and thus constitutes matters delegated by the instant rules pursuant to Article 10 of the instant rules. (iv) Article 10 of the instant rules do not explicitly stipulate matters concerning “the termination of the instant use contract”, and therefore, the said provisions do not stipulate the matters concerning “the termination of the instant use contract” as stipulated in Article 10 of the instant rules, and thus, the Defendant asserted that the instant use contract term constitutes “the matters not included in these regulations,” under Article 10 of the instant rules, which are matters to be lawfully followed by the Defendant’s decision to terminate the instant use contract at any time without setting the period of time, and that there is no change in the contractual condition that the Defendant’s right to terminate the instant use contract under Article 10 of the instant rules.

(2) In light of the following circumstances, the Defendant’s right to unilaterally terminate the instant use contract on the ground of the “economic change and change in the situation” under Article 10 of the instant Rules and Article 10 of the instant detailed rules, which are acknowledged as having neglected the purport of the entire pleadings, i.e., the instant basic facts as seen earlier. Thus, the Defendant’s assertion is rejected.

(1) In the event of a continuous contract without a fixed period contrary to the Defendant’s assertion, there is no legal basis to deem that the parties may terminate the contract at any time by a unilateral declaration of intent, even though there is no separate agreement on

② Article 5(2) of the Rules of the instant Association provides that “If a person does not wish to retire from the membership, he/she shall continue to maintain membership by paying annual fees.” This basically sets the term of the instant use agreement as one year, and it is reasonable to deem that the agreement is to be renewed through the payment of annual fees, barring any special circumstance. Therefore, it is difficult to deem the instant use agreement as a contract with no fixed term of contract.

③ Article 10 of the Rules does not stipulate the contents of the termination of the instant use contract. Article 10 of the Rules provides that “The economic change and situation” under Article 10 of the Rules of this case is basically a requirement to modify the matters prescribed by the Rules of this case. However, the Rules of this case does not stipulate the right to terminate the instant use contract.

(3) Even if the Defendant’s right to unilaterally terminate the instant service contract under the latter part of Article 10 of the Rules on Home Affairs is interpreted as derived from the right to unilaterally terminate the instant service contract, the said Rules constitute “terms” under the Regulation of Terms and Conditions Act, as alleged by the Plaintiffs, and the matters concerning the termination of the instant service contract constitutes “important contents” under Article 3(3) of the said Act. However, unless the Defendant did not assert or prove that he/she had explained to the Plaintiffs at the time of entering into the instant service contract, the Defendant cannot assert as the content of the instant service contract the right to termination derived from the latter part of Article 10 of the said Rules pursuant to Article 3(4) of the said Act. In this respect, the Defendant’s aforementioned assertion is without merit.

C) Defenses to cancel the contract due to changes in circumstances

(1) The Defendant, in the course of operating the instant club, caused serious difficulties to its management due to accumulation by the enemy, and caused enormous costs to the instant club due to the deterioration of the facility, which constitutes a significant change in circumstances that are difficult to continue to maintain the instant use contract. Therefore, the Defendant’s notification of the suspension of operation of the instant club and notification of the suspension of the deposit to its members, including the Plaintiffs, to the effect that it would be returned due to changes in circumstances, is valid as an exercise of the right to terminate the instant club.

(2) On the other hand, the rescission of a contract on the grounds of change of circumstances is recognized as an exception to the principle of contract observance in cases where a significant change in circumstances unexpected at the time of the formation of the contract occurred, and such change in circumstances arose due to reasons not attributable to the party who acquired the right to rescind. If the binding force of the content of the contract is recognized, it shall be recognized as an exception to the principle of contract observance in cases where a significant violation of the principle of good faith occurs. Moreover, the change in circumstances here refers to an objective circumstance which served as the basis of the contract, not a party’s subjective or personal circumstance. Therefore, even if a change in circumstances not constituting the basis of contract formation subsequently results in damage due to a failure of one party to achieve the purpose of the contract intended at the time of the contract, barring any special circumstance, maintaining the validity of the contract as it is cannot be deemed contrary to the principle of good faith. Such a legal principle likewise applies to cases where a continuous contractual relationship claims the rescission of the contract on the grounds of change of circumstances (see Supreme Court

(3) Pursuant to such legal principles, in full view of the following: (a) as to whether the parties had made significant changes in circumstances that could not have been predicted at the time of the contract, the Defendant’s sales have decreased from October 1, 2009 to September 30, 2013 while operating the instant club; (b) on the other hand, the fact that the expenditure of the instant club increased due to price increase.

(4) However, in light of the following circumstances as seen earlier, it is insufficient to acknowledge that, at the time of the establishment of the instant use contract, significant changes in circumstances unexpected to the Plaintiffs and the Defendant occurred on September 2013, only with the following facts and the descriptions in subparagraphs 12-1 and 2 of the evidence Nos. 12, which were revealed by considering the overall purport of the pleadings as a whole in the statement No. 8 as seen earlier, and there is no evidence to acknowledge otherwise. Accordingly, the Defendant’s defense is without merit.

① In relation to the use of a volatile club, such as the instant use agreement, the maintenance and management of the facility at an appropriate level by the operating entity constitutes a key content of duty. As the Defendant also has an lapse of time, it was sufficiently predicted that the expenses for the maintenance and management of the facility are required to a certain extent and the maintenance and management cost is increased according to the degree of the deterioration of the facility.

② The Defendant itself also recognized that the instant club had been operated with the enemy for providing additional services to the hotel users, which are the main business sector. From the time when the instant use contract was concluded between the Defendant and the Plaintiffs, the circumstance that the Defendant was somewhat hostile due to the operation of the instant club can be deemed as foreseeable. The circumstance that the Defendant was unable to operate the instant club, while operating the instant club, may not be deemed as an objective circumstance that served as the basis for its formation at the time of the formation of the instant use contract.

③ Although the Defendant’s sole management difficulties in operating the instant club increases the annual fee, it is alleged that there was difficulty in raising the actual annual fee due to the Plaintiff’s opposition, but there was no evidence to acknowledge it. Rather, the Defendant raised the annual fee by making it more effective once from 2002 to 2012, and the Defendant did not seem to have made it impossible for the Defendant to raise the annual fee in a larger width.

④ In the absence of any evidence to deem that there was a significant change in the economic situation that would normally have been difficult to anticipate the operation of the instant club from the time the Defendant entered into the instant use contract until the time the Defendant ceased to operate the instant club, it is difficult to readily conclude that the Defendant’s failure to operate the instant club solely on the ground that the Plaintiff was accumulated while operating the instant club.

⑤ Although the Defendant asserts that the replacement and total repair of the deteriorated facilities was required due to the deterioration of the instant club facilities or the leakage of pipes, etc., and that the cost would be approximately five billion won. However, there is no evidence to deem that the said amount of expenses is required for the repair work of the instant club.

(6) According to the credit analysis report (Evidence A 8) filed on September 2013 with the Defendant, the Defendant’s corporate assessment rating was assessed as AA+ (the immediately preceding corporate assessment rating also AAA+) that the Defendant’s corporate assessment rating is a company with the highest level of credit ability for commercial transactions and is able to cope with changes in the environment. The cash flow rating was assessed as CF1, which has the highest level of cash flow creation ability, and Watch rating was assessed as being a liquidity excellent company with the highest level of cash flow creation ability. The Watch rating was assessed as normal, that there was no recent change in the internal and external environment. The net income for the year 2012 was KRW 1.934 billion. The Defendant appears to have sufficient ability to operate the instant club even around September 2013.

(5) In addition, around September 2013, the Defendant appears to have unilaterally notified the members of the instant club of the suspension of operation of the instant club without taking any measures, such as requesting the increase of annual fees, due to difficulties in managing the instant club’s operation. In light of this, it is difficult to deem that recognizing binding force in accordance with the instant use contract is considerably contrary to the good faith principle. The Defendant’s assertion that the Defendant created the right to terminate the instant use contract by change of circumstances is without merit.

C. Scope of damages

(i) Property losses;

A) The rest of the Plaintiffs except Plaintiffs 4, 51, 84, and 125 may enjoy, without any additional deposit, only the annual fee that could continue to use the instant club without the Defendant’s default. However, due to the Defendant’s nonperformance of the above obligation, the Plaintiffs suffered damages from the loss of the above “ future usage interest.” However, the market price of membership rights for sports facilities such as the instant club (A) ordinarily exceeds the amount to be refunded by the customer to the facility operator (B) at the time when the relationship of use of the sports facilities terminates, such as deposit and membership fees, the amount to be refunded by the customer from the facility operator (C) which is calculated by converting the above “ future usage interest” into the current monetary value. Accordingly, the monetary value of the above “ future use interest” that the said Plaintiffs lose due to the suspension of operation of the instant club is reasonable to view that the Defendant deducted the amount to be refunded by the customer from the facility operator due to the termination of the membership rights at the time of the suspension of operation of the instant club from the market price.

B) Comprehensively taking account of the appraiser Nonparty 1’s appraisal result and the fact-finding result of this court’s fact-finding on the Pacific Appraisal Corporation, the following circumstances acknowledged to show the overall purport of the pleadings, the value equivalent to the membership of the instant club around September 30, 2013 can be recognized as KRW 8,140,000 in the case of individual members as a result of the appraisal by the said appraiser, and KRW 4,560,00 in the case of family members.

① The appraiser’s appraisal result should be respected unless the appraisal method is against the empirical rule or unreasonable (see, e.g., Supreme Court Decision 2006Da67602, 67602, 67619, Jul. 9, 2009). Nonparty 1 assessed that the amount equivalent to the value of the membership of the instant club is KRW 8,140,000 for a private member and KRW 4,560,000 for a family member.

② The Defendant asserts that the appraisal of the market price of the instant club membership is unfair, as the above appraiser was a special class 1 hotel, with a different hotel from the above hotel operated by the Defendant. However, the market price of the instant club membership does not simply have the rating of the hotel to which the instant club belongs, but should be assessed by comprehensively considering the location of the hotel, surrounding environment, the inside facilities of the instant club, annual fees, or deposit money, and therefore, it does not necessarily have to be compared with the above-mentioned hotel in assessing the market price of the instant club membership. Nonparty 1 appears to have assessed the market price of the instant club by comprehensively taking into account the aforementioned various circumstances into account.

③ Based on Supreme Court Decision 2013Da100750 Decided January 29, 2015, the Defendant asserts that the amount equivalent to the market price of the instant club membership cannot be deemed as ordinary damages and is merely special damages. However, as seen earlier, the amount of property damages recognized for the Plaintiffs other than Plaintiffs 4, 51, 84, and 125 is calculated by converting the “ future gains that can continue to use the instant club while paying annual fees without additional deposit,” into monetary value, and the calculation of this amount is only taking into account the “ future gains that can continue to use the instant club while paying annual fees without additional deposit,” and it does not mean that the instant membership price itself is not evaluated as the property damages of the said Plaintiffs. The above Supreme Court Decision cited by the Defendant is also the same purport. However, it is inappropriate to regard the monetary value of the future gains as the “amount calculated by multiplying the bank’s interest rate on the amount corresponding to the market price or membership fees” by the method.

C) Therefore, it is reasonable to view that the amount of property damage suffered by the remaining plaintiffs except Plaintiffs 4, 51, 84, and 125 is the amount calculated by deducting the corresponding money indicated in the “claim Amount” of the attached Table 2 from each corresponding money indicated in the “Membership Value” column of the attached Table 2.

D) However, if the above plaintiffs continued to use the instant club, they should pay annual fees to the defendant as consideration for the use thereof, and the extent of their liability for compensation to the above plaintiffs should be limited to 50% of the above damages, taking into account the following circumstances: (a) the circumstance that the facilities of the instant club were deteriorated and that the defendant continued to operate the instant club due to the financial deficit of the defendant due to the operation of the instant club; (b) the appraisal result of the appraiser Nonparty 1 did not reflect these circumstances; (c) if the amount of compensation for the plaintiffs is calculated as a result of the above appraisal, it would be entirely transferred to the defendant due to the continuation of the instant use contract, and it would be contrary to the concept of fairness.

2) Consolation money

In general, in a case where property damage occurs due to non-performance of contractual obligation, the mental suffering which the parties received shall be deemed to have been recovered by compensating for property damage. As such, there are special circumstances that the compensation for property damage alone causes irrecoverable mental suffering, and where the other party knew or could have known such circumstances, the consolation money for mental suffering may be recognized only when the other party knew or could have known (see Supreme Court Decision 2002Da53865, Nov. 12, 2004, etc.).

With respect to this case, the remaining plaintiffs except the health team, plaintiffs 51, 84, and 125 suffered from irrecoverable mental distress due to the suspension of operation of the club of this case only due to the compensation of property damage, and there is no evidence to acknowledge that the defendant knew or could have known such circumstance, the above plaintiffs' assertion of consolation money is not acceptable.

D. Sub-determination

1) Therefore, the Defendant is obligated to pay damages for delay calculated at each rate of 5% per annum as stipulated in the Civil Act from November 13, 2013, the day following the day when a copy of the complaint in this case was served to the Plaintiffs other than Plaintiffs 4, 51, 84, and 125, as damages for nonperformance, and 20% per annum as stipulated in the Act on Special Cases concerning the Promotion, etc. of Legal Proceedings from the following day to September 10, 2015, where it is deemed reasonable for the Defendant to dispute over the existence or scope of the obligation.

2) The remaining plaintiffs claimed for the payment of damages for delay from October 1, 2013 with respect to each of the above amounts. However, since the damages liability due to nonperformance falls under a debt for which the due date has not been fixed, the defendant is deemed to have been delayed from the day after receiving the claim for performance from the above plaintiffs. Thus, there is no evidence to acknowledge that the above plaintiffs prior to November 12, 2013, the delivery date of a copy of the complaint of this case, the above plaintiffs did not accept the above plaintiffs' claim for this part beyond the above recognized limit.

3. Determination on the claim for return of security deposit and membership fee

A. Determination on the cause of the claim

1) The agreement between the Plaintiffs 51, 84, and 125 and the Defendant on the instant use contract is concluded, as set out in the above 2.B. A).

2) Furthermore, according to the above facts, the Defendant unilaterally suspended the operation of the instant club on or around September 2013 constitutes a significant change in circumstances unforeseeable by the Plaintiffs at the time of the instant use contract, and such change in circumstances occurs for reasons not attributable to the Plaintiffs. It is obviously contrary to the good faith principle to recognize the binding force of the instant use contract under the circumstances where the Defendant voluntarily demanded the Plaintiffs to return deposits and membership fees on the ground that the instant use contract has been terminated. Furthermore, it is reasonable to deem that the right to terminate the instant use contract continues to exist on or around September 2013 to the Plaintiffs on the grounds of such change in circumstances. Furthermore, it is apparent in the record that the duplicate of the instant complaint, excluding Plaintiffs 51, 84, and 125, including the Plaintiffs’ intent to terminate the instant use contract, was delivered to the Defendant on November 12, 2013, and on the same day, it is reasonable to deem that the instant use contract between the Plaintiffs and the Defendant was terminated on the same day).

3) As above, the above Plaintiffs and the Defendant terminated upon termination of all of the instant use contract, barring any special circumstance, the Defendant is obligated to pay to the above Plaintiffs the deposit and weekly 2), admission fees, and delay damages from the date following the end of the instant use contract (in the case of Plaintiffs 51, Nov. 1, 2013; in the case of Plaintiffs 84, Nov. 8, 2013; and in the case of the rest of the Plaintiffs, Nov. 13, 2013).

4) The Plaintiffs filed a claim for late payment on deposit and membership fee from October 1, 2013. However, it is reasonable to deem that the Defendant’s deposit and obligation to refund membership fee come to the due date on the date of termination of the instant use contract. However, there is no evidence to acknowledge that the instant use contract between the Plaintiffs and the Defendant had already been terminated before the termination date recognized in paragraphs (1) and (2). Thus, the Plaintiffs’ claim for this part of the Plaintiffs’ claim beyond the above recognized limit is rejected.

B. Judgment on the defendant's defense

1) Defenses of performance

Since the defendant defenses that he paid all the membership fees and the obligation to return the deposit to plaintiffs 51, 84, and 125, the defendant paid KRW 4,400,000 to plaintiffs 51 on November 8, 2013 as the refund of the membership fees and the deposit money, and the fact that the defendant paid KRW 5,00,000 to plaintiffs 84 on November 20, 2013 is as seen earlier, and therefore, the defendant's defense is without merit 3).

2) Mutual Aid Note 4) Defenses

A) The defendant asserts that the total annual fee of KRW 1,732,50, the unpaid annual fee of KRW 76,849, and the total annual fee of KRW 1,380,50,00 shall be deducted respectively from the deposit and membership fee to be returned to the plaintiff 82, from the unpaid annual fee of KRW 1,732,50,00, the unpaid annual fee of KRW 76,849, and the unpaid annual fee of KRW 1,380,50,00 shall be deducted from the deposit and membership fee to be returned to the plaintiff 32. According to the above basic facts, the defendant is obligated to return only the balance calculated by deducting the annual fee of the plaintiffs' deposit and membership fee of the plaintiffs pursuant to Article 7 (1) of the detailed rules of this case, which occurred until September 30, 2013 in which the defendant suspended the operation of the club of this case. The defendant's defense is reasonable.

C. Sub-decision

Therefore, the Defendant shall pay to the remaining Plaintiffs except Plaintiffs 17, 32, 51, 82, 84, and 125 the annual interest rate of 5% under the Civil Act from November 13, 2013 to July 16, 2015, which is the date of delivery of a copy of the application for change of the cause of claim from July 16, 2015, and the annual interest rate of 20% under the Act on Special Cases Concerning Expedition, etc. of Legal Proceedings from the following day to the date of full payment, and the Defendant shall pay to the Plaintiffs 17, 32, 84, and 125 the annual interest rate of 20% from the following day to the date of full payment. The Defendant shall be deemed to have an obligation to pay 15% of the annual interest rate of 15% as to each of the above amounts indicated in the attached Table 2’s “deposit,” and the pertinent interest rate of 20% from the date of full payment.

4. Conclusion

Therefore, the remaining plaintiffs' claims except the plaintiffs 51, 84, and 125 are justified within the scope of the above recognition, and they are accepted, and each plaintiffs' claims except the plaintiffs 51, 84, and 125 and the remaining claims except the above plaintiffs are dismissed. It is so decided as per Disposition.

[Attachment]

Judge Jeong-su (Presiding Judge)

(1) In order for the Plaintiffs to claim the return of the deposit and the membership fee to the Defendant, the Plaintiffs must assert and prove that the instant use contract was terminated. Since the Plaintiffs’ claim for compensation for property damage at the time of filing the instant lawsuit includes the purport of seeking the return of the deposit and the membership fee, it is reasonable to deem that the Plaintiffs expressed their intent to terminate the instant use contract through the delivery of a copy of the instant complaint

2) According to the evidence No. 1-1 of this case, it can be acknowledged that the contents of this case’s club’s club’s agreement include expenses not refunded. However, it is reasonable to view that the plaintiffs’ membership fees are included in the subject of return following the termination of this case’s use contract, in light of the following circumstances, although the appraiser Nonparty 1’s appraisal showed the overall purport of the argument, i.e., (e., (i) the membership fees were not returned as in the past’s agreement, but the membership fees are deemed as having the same nature as the deposit, as in the recommendation of the Fair Trade Commission, although the membership fees were not returned as in the past, and (ii) the defendant also recognized the duty to return the membership fees.

(3) The plaintiffs 51, 84, and 125 submitted their respective withdrawing members to the defendant, and there is a claim for delay calculated by the rate of 5% per annum on each deposit and membership fee during the period from the day following the day when they submitted their respective withdrawing members to the day when they received the aforementioned deposit and membership fee. In light of the situation of return, etc., it is reasonable to view that the above plaintiffs submitted their withdrawing members to the defendant and received the deposit and membership fee refund from the defendant to the purport that all the claims and obligations related to the refund of deposit and membership fee are settled.

4) Although the Defendant used the phrase “off-off”, it is reasonable to view that the Defendant’s expression “off-off” as alleged by the Defendant is “off-off” in light of the fact that Article 7(1) of the instant detailed rules provides that “the deposit at the time of the club withdrawal shall be returned to unpaid interest, but the overdue annual fee, etc. shall be refunded after deducting the deposit from the deposit.”