(a) The validity of registration, if the land registered for sharing is partitioned and transferred to a single person among co-owners, if such land is converted to a single person;

(b) The degree of proof of major facts;

A. In a case where part of the land registered by multiple co-ownership is subdivided, the co-ownership relation on the previous land should be transcribed as it is in accordance with the provisions of Article 94(1) of the Registration of Real Estate Act in the register of partitioned land. If the co-ownership relation on the previous land is transferred to one of co-owners without being transcribed as it is on the register of the previous land, the entry of the registration on the sole ownership shall be the registration on the previous land to the extent that it exceeds the share ratio of that person on the register of the previous land.

B. If a party who has the burden of proof submits a number of evidence sufficient to prove the alleged facts, there is no circumstance to suspect the credibility of the evidence, and there is no particular reply from the other party, it would be in line with logical and empirical rules to deem that the alleged facts have been proven based on the evidence.

A. Article 94(1) of the Registration of Real Estate Act, Article 268 of the Civil Act, Article 187 of the Civil Procedure Act

B. Supreme Court Decision 4294Da146 delivered on December 28, 1961, 4294Da41 delivered on January 11, 1962

Plaintiff 1, Attorney Kim Tae-tae, Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant

Defendant 1 and 11 others

Attorney Lee Young-soo, Counsel for the remaining Defendants other than Defendant 2

Gwangju High Court Decision 84Na126 delivered on June 14, 1985

The judgment of the court below is reversed, and the case is remanded to Gwangju High Court.

1. First, we examine the grounds of appeal Nos. 2 and 4.

According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below determined that the non-party 1 and the non-party 1 and the non-party 268 square meters ("the non-party 2 land of this case") were the land originally owned by the plaintiff, and the non-party 1 and the non-party 4 were the non-party 1 and the non-party 1 and the non-party 2 were the non-party 1 and the non-party 2 were the non-party 1 and the non-party 2 were the non-party 3 and the non-party 1 and the non-party 4 were the non-party 1 and the non-party 2 were the non-party 1 and the non-party 4 and the non-party 1 and the non-party 2 were the non-party 1 and the non-party 2 were the non-party 1 and the non-party 1 and the non-party 4 were the non-party 1 and the non-party 1 and the non-party 2 were the non-party 1 and the non-party 1 and the non-party 1 and the non-party 71 and the non-party 1.

However, according to the records, the land No. 1 was partitioned into the above ( Address 2 omitted) 2,871 at the time when it was registered as the plaintiff's sole owner, but was completed with respect to the whole land No. 2,871 at the time of the above 2,871, and the plaintiff's registration of transfer of ownership was made in sequence as stated in the court below, and the plaintiff 2,871 at 2,871, 299, 2,871, 2,871, 2,871, and 2,872, and 1,871, and 2,871, and 1,871, and 1,871, and 2,871, and the part of the previous 1,000 shares of the land should be divided into the plaintiff's joint owner's share ownership registration within the scope of the previous 1,000,000,000,000.

However, the court below rejected the plaintiff's claim seeking cancellation on the ground that there is no evidence that the above transfer registration of ownership in Defendant 1 with respect to the land of this case was made based on a false guarantee certificate and a false confirmation certificate, such as the plaintiff's head, with regard to the ground that the court below failed to conduct a deliberation on the party's assertion as to the circumstances during which the above registration was made, or erred by misapprehending the legal principles as to the transfer registration based on the subdivision of land, or by misapprehending the legal principles as to the transfer registration based on

2. The third ground of appeal is examined as follows.

Although the cooking of evidence belongs to the exclusive authority of the fact-finding court and it is not necessary to clarify the reasons for the judgment as to the determination of evidence, the cooking of evidence against logical and empirical rules cannot be allowed. If a party who has a false burden of proof submits a number of evidence sufficient to prove the alleged facts, there is no circumstance to suspect the credibility of the evidence, and no particular counter-proof is submitted from the other party, it would be in line with logical and empirical rules to view that the alleged facts have been proven by the evidence.

In this case, the court below rejected all of the evidence presented by the plaintiff to the effect that there are special circumstances to suspect credibility of the evidence or counter-proof evidence as seen above. The evidence presented by the plaintiff to the court below is sufficient to acknowledge the plaintiff's assertion as it is, and it does not appear that there are any circumstances to suspect credibility of the evidence. Further, among the evidence presented by the defendants, it can be seen as impeding the plaintiff's assertion as it is, the first instance court witness 8 and 9, and the first instance court witness 10's testimony and the criminal records verified by the first instance court, and the defendant 1, 8, 12, etc., and each statement of evidence against the defendant 3, 4, and 9 were not presented as evidence, and the contents of the above statement of the defendant's testimony as to the defendant's right and duty of evidence were not known and it is hard to see that there were no errors in the misapprehension of legal relationship as to the plaintiff's above. However, each of the above witness's testimony of the defendant 1's witness's testimony and its contents were not known.

3. The above errors committed by the court below are nothing more than those which affected the conclusion of the judgment, and they constitute grounds for reversal under Article 12 (2) of the Act on Special Cases concerning the Promotion, etc. of Legal Proceedings. Thus, without examining the remaining grounds of appeal, the judgment below is reversed, and the case is remanded to the Gwangju High Court which is the original judgment. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent

Justices Lee Jae-hee (Presiding Justice)