A. Requirements to deem that a clan has scamed itself

(b) The case reversing the judgment of the court below on the grounds of violation of the rules of evidence as to whether a clan member has cultivated his farmland

A. In a case where farmland owned by a clan has been used as a memorial soil, if part of the clan members have cultivated it, in light of the characteristics of the farmland, it shall be deemed to constitute “the land cultivated by the clan” as provided by Article 5 subparag. 6 (d) of the former Income Tax Act (Elimination by Law No. 4661, Dec. 31, 1993).

B. The case reversing the judgment of the court below on the grounds of violation of the rules of evidence as to whether a clan member has cultivated his farmland

A. (B) Article 5 subparagraph 6 (d) of the former Income Tax Act (defence by Act No. 4661 of Dec. 31, 193), Article 14 (3) (b) of the former Enforcement Decree of the Income Tax Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 1319 of Dec. 31, 1990), Article 8 (2) of the Administrative Litigation Act, Article 187 of the Civil Procedure Act

Dr. Pasan Cr. Cr. Pasan Cr.

Director of the District Office

Seoul High Court Decision 93Gu33168 delivered on September 13, 1994

The judgment below is reversed and the case is remanded to Seoul High Court.

We examine the grounds of appeal.

1. According to the reasoning of the judgment below, the court below rejected the Plaintiff’s assertion that Nonparty 1’s land was non-party 1 and Nonparty 2’s non-party 1’s non-party 1 and Nonparty 2’s non-party 1’s non-party 1 and non-party 3’s non-party 1’s land transfer statement for the purpose of Non-party 16’s religious ground located in Gangseo-gu Seoul ( Address 1 omitted) and Non-party 1 and 549’s land size ( Address 4 omitted) for the purpose of Non-party 1 and Non-party 4’s non-party 1’s non-party 9’s farmland transfer, which was non-party 1 and Non-party 2’s non-party 1’s non-party 9’s farmland transfer, which was non-party 1 and the non-party 2’s non-party 1’s non-party 9’s farmland transfer, which was non-party 1 and 36’s land size.

2. However, according to the witness's testimony rejected by the court below, from February 1979 to November 22, 1990, the land of this case was cultivated as the above land by the witness (non-party 8) and the non-party 7, the father of the witness, and the non-party 7. The witness and the non-party 7 have cultivated the land of this case as the plaintiff's clan member with the plaintiff's permission. If the farmland of this case was used as a clan member, if some of the clan members have cultivated it, in light of the characteristics of the above soil, it shall be deemed to constitute "self-owned land" as provided in subparagraph 6 (d) of Article 5 of the former Income Tax Act (Article 461 of December 31, 1993) (Article 5 subparagraph 6 (d) of the former Income Tax Act), Article 14 (3) of the Enforcement Decree of the same Act (amended by Presidential Decree No. 13581, Dec. 31, 1993).

However, evidence Nos. 6-1, 3 (Dismissal of Judgment), Gap evidence Nos. 10, 12-1, 13-4, Gap evidence Nos. 14, 14 (Certificate of Cultivation and Certificate of Seal Imprint), and Gap evidence Nos. 18-1, which were not rejected by the court below, are not evidence produced for the lawsuit of this case, and most of them are not evidence produced for the purpose of the lawsuit of this case, and evidence which shows credibility as a public document. The contents of the above evidence are consistent with the testimony of the above witness and his father that the above witness and the non-party No. 7 cultivated the land of this case as the above soil for the above period (in accordance with the above evidence No. 10, it is evident that the land of this case was cultivated by the above non-party No. 7 as of February 28, 1979).

In addition, according to the records in Gap evidence Nos. 7-1, 2 (the mark and content of the Pungsan Cr. 7) and Gap evidence Nos. 9-1 (the transcript) submitted by the plaintiff as the same person as the non-party 15 (the non-party 15) of the satisfaction compensation, the above non-party 7 (the non-party 7) and the non-party 15 (the non-party 15) are identical in their names (the non-party 16), their wife (the non-party 17), their children (the non-party 8) and the non-party 7 (the non-party 7) are the same person as the plaintiff's clan as the non-party 15 (the non-party 15) of the satisfaction compensation, and this is also identical with the plaintiff's testimony that the non-party 7 witness and the witness of the above non-party 7 are the members of the above clan.

Therefore, the testimony of the above witness seems to be reliable.

Meanwhile, there is only evidence No. 19, which appears to be contrary to the above witness’s testimony, which is only evidence No. 19, at the time when the court below adopted the witness’s testimony as an impeachment evidence that did not believe the witness’s testimony as the plaintiff’s representative.

However, the contents of No. 19 are that Nonparty 12 cultivated the instant land from 1981 to September 19, 1987, which was the time of the statement, and it is extremely similar to that of Nonparty 14, and considering the circumstances in which Nonparty 14 testified at the prosecutor's office, the above Nonparty 12 is likely to be the same person as the above Nonparty 7's clerical error, which is the name of the above Nonparty 7's satisfaction compensation, as the name of Nonparty 15.

If it is recognized that the above non-party 12 is the same person as the above non-party 7, the above non-party 19 evidence shall be deemed not to be inconsistent with the testimony and contents of the above non-party 19.

In light of the above circumstances, the court below determined whether the above non-party 12, who is the name of the above non-party 7's satisfaction compensation, was the same as the above non-party 7's name, and determined whether the above non-party 19's evidence is more reliable or not, although the above non-party 19's statement is not the same as the above non-party 7's testimony and its contents, the court below should determine which evidence is more reliable or not. However, although the contents of Gap's evidence 19 are contrary to the above witness's testimony and the contents of Gap's evidence are contrary to the above witness's testimony, the court below decided that the non-party 19's statement is contrary to the above witness's testimony, and rejected the above witness's testimony by the only statement of evidence Gap's evidence 19's above, on the ground that there is no other evidence to acknowledge the above facts of the plaintiff's assertion, it did not err in the misapprehension of the rules of experience and thereby affected the conclusion of the judgment.

3. Therefore, without further proceeding to decide on the remaining grounds of appeal, the lower judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to the lower court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion. It is so decided as per Disposition by the assent of all participating Justices on the bench.

Justices Kim Jong-soo (Presiding Justice)